Since independence in April 1980, Robert Mugabe has lead Zimbabwe as its head of state for 36 years - first as the Prime Minister for seven years and then as President. Mugabe rose to power in his fight for black, majority rule in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) in the Rhodesian Bush War. In late 1965, white-led Rhodesia declared independence from the crown. Following the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), black nationalist movements began fighting the government for majority black rule. Two primary groups arose – the Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). Led by Mugabe, ZANU, with support from neighboring Mozambique, was able to swamp the government fighters, and in 1979, after over fourteen years of war, the Lancaster House Conference led to the resignation of PM Ian Smith. The Lancaster House Agreement led to popular elections and an overwhelming victory for Mugabe and his ZANU party.¹

Over three decades later and Mugabe and his party, now Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), are still in power. After initially taking office, Mugabe was hailed for reaching out towards both the white minority and political rivals in ZAPU; his economic approach was also praised. Thirty-six years later and the country is on the verge of a second economic collapse, has controversially altered the farming sector, ostracized the white minority, and committed massacres against the supporters of his political rivals.²

At 92 years old, Mugabe’s time in leadership is limited – a fact ZANU-PF members know all too well. The party has begun fracturing over the succession of Mugabe, though the long-ruling leader shows no signs of stepping down in the near future. The primary opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), already fractured in 2005. Tsvangirai, leader of MDC until the party split and subsequently headed MDC-T, has led opposition parties since the turn of the century. The lack of cohesive political opposition, combined with voter intimidation and rigged elections, has led to a different form of opposition – protests. Sparked by Pastor Evan Mawarire by a viral video posted to his Facebook account in April, the movement known as #ThisFlag has evolved into a legitimate threat to Mugabe’s continued rule. With the Zimbabwean flag as its symbol, #ThisFlag has remained independent from any political party, with the message of the movement focusing on anti-corruption and lack of basic services.


4 "Lone Voice Speak Out, Sets off Surprise Viral 'ThisFlag' Campaign in Zimbabwe as Mugabe Clings on." MG Africa. 01 June 2016. Web. 23 Aug. 2016.
CANVAS

POLITICAL SITUATION

INSTITUTIONS:

a) **President:**

Initially, the role of President was ceremonial, acting as head of state, with all real power lying in the position of Prime Minister, held by Mugabe. The role of president was held by Canaan Banana, a member of ZANU and a member of the Ndebele ethnicity; Banana was chosen for the role in part due to his ethnicity, who primarily supported rival political party ZAPU. Following violence against Ndebele accused of supporting Joshua Nkomo and his ZAPU party, ZANU and ZAPU agreed on the Unity Accord (UA), which merged the two parties into ZANU-PF. In addition, the role of Prime Minister (previously held by Mugabe) was eliminated. Correspondingly, the role of President – now held by Mugabe – was strengthened to control executive functions of government as well as act as both head of state and head of government. Presidential candidates are directly voted on, with over 50% needed to claim victory in the first round. If no candidate receives the majority of votes, a run-off takes place two months later. Until the 2013 Constitution was ratified, the post of President had no term limits; now the president is limited to two five-year terms, not applied retroactively. Mugabe has announced his intentions to run as the ZANU-PF candidate in the 2018 Presidential elections; if he wins, Mugabe would be in power until he is 99 years old.

b) **Parliament:**

The Zimbabwean Parliament is divided into the Senate and the House of Assembly, with eighty and 210 seats, respectively. The mandate of Parliament is, similar to parliaments around the world, to control the legislative branch of government. In the Senate, each of the ten provinces elect six representatives. Out of the remaining twenty seats, two are representatives for people with

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disabilities and eighteen chiefs; two chiefs are elected from each region, save Bulawayo and Harare. The House of Assembly representatives are elected from the 210 constituencies; the remaining seats are reserved for women and six are elected from each of the ten provinces.  

Currently, ZANU-PF controls 57 (71%) seats in the Senate, followed by MDC-T controlling 21 (26%) seats and MDC-N controlling 2 (1%) seats. ZANU-PF also controls 196 (73%) seats in the House of Assembly, with MDC-T controlling 70 (26%) seats, and MDC-N controlling 2 (<1%) seats, and independents controlling the remaining 2 (<1%) seats.  

c) Courts:

The Zimbabwean judiciary system features seven levels of courts: the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, the High Court, the Administrative Court, the Labour Court, Magistrates’ Courts, and Customary law Courts, listed from highest to lowest authority. While legally there is independence of the judiciary branch from both the executive and legislative branches, this has not been the case in Zimbabwe. Often, the president places

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pressure on court decisions. The interference with the courts has lessened in recent years, with several prominent cases being ruled against ZANU-PF. Perhaps the largest defiance of Mugabe was in the case of Pastor Mawarire; the pastor was freed due to the charges he was facing in court differing from those he was read upon arrest. As Mawarire was, and still is, a considerable threat to Mugabe’s stay in power, the court ruling was the sign of a major break in the time-honored interference in court rulings.

**d) Constitution:**

The original constitution of Zimbabwe was the 1979 Lancaster House agreement, which was negotiated between Mugabe (representing ZANU), Nkomo (representing ZAPU), and British foreign secretary Lord Carrington. Ending the lengthy Rhodesian Bush War and leading the path to an independent Zimbabwe, the main controversy surrounding the document was land reform. Guarantees were placed in the agreement such that no forcible seizure of land from white citizens could take place for a decade, with the incentive that the United Kingdom would fund Zimbabwe's long-term land reform. The agreement was eventually signed and its land reform clauses were followed through until they expired ten years later.

In 2000, a new constitution was proposed and voted on via referendum. While this constitution was claimed to devolve power from the president, critics said not enough power was removed; no major changes from the current system were in the constitution. The proposed constitution also had a clause removing compensation requirements for land reform. The referendum failed to pass, with 54.3% voting against the new constitution, while 45.7% voted for. This marked the first time Mugabe had lost a vote since his initial inauguration entry years prior.

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With the failure of a new constitution, the Lancaster Agreement continued as the country’s core document. The Unity Accords that formed the Government of National Unity also called for the formation of a new constitution, to be voted on prior to the next elections. Agreed upon by all major parties, the new proposed constitution would place several checks of power on the president, such as a declaration of a state of emergency must be approved by parliament after two weeks. Zimbabweans were also guaranteed freedom from torture and detention without a trial. Laws promoting other individual freedoms were also included. The referendum saw overwhelming support for the new constitution, with 94.5% of voters in favor of the document. The constitution calls for much more freedom than the previous constitution, though enacting and following through on the laws is a different dilemma.

e) ZANU-PF:

Ruling Zimbabwe since its independence, ZANU-PF has shown its ability to adapt to new challenges as to remain in power. While opposition parties remain a fractured mess, ZANU-PF’s rising tensions are boiling underneath; the succession to the 92-year-old leader is causing strife from within the party. Mugabe has stated his intentions


to run for president in the upcoming 2018 elections. If Mugabe dies while in office, it is ZANU-PF, though, that chooses the next president, not parliament. After removing former vice president Joice Mujuru in December 2014 and appointing former Justice Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa, there was no clear successor to the presidency. This was further complicated by Mugabe’s younger wife Grace Mugabe stepping up, leading to rumors she is being groomed to take over after her husband’s passing.

While Mujuru is technically out of ZANU-PF, she still has retained strong support at the local and regional levels, and she additionally has strong ties to the security though her late husband, former army chief of staff General Solomon Mujuru. The main factions, though, are between Vice President Mnangagwa and First Lady Grace Mugabe.

In the recent months, the factionalism has increased as Mugabe’s health has decreased. Recent trips to Singapore and Dubai for health treatments have sparked rumors about possible deadly illnesses, only further enforced by the sudden nature of one recent trip to the Middle East. After rumors that Mugabe had died during a trip en route to Asia that was rerouted to Dubai, Mugabe emerged still breathing, stating, “yes, I was dead, it’s true I was dead. I resurrected as I always do.” Grace Mugabe has also stated her husband will continue ruling from the grave.

ZANU-PF has ruled through demands of loyalty, from citizens to vice presidents and every position in between. During the purge of Mujuru, several cabinet members and many local and regional officials. This story is not uncommon, and removal of potential threats is a core principle of ZANU-PF.

The United States currently imposes sanctions on top officials in ZANU-PF, including President Mugabe, First Lady Grace Mugabe, Vice President Mnangagwa, and former Vice President Mujuru. In total, 165 individuals or entities have sanctions against them in Zimbabwe.


f) Opposition Parties:

Zimbabwean political opposition is filled with over a dozen political parties, plagued with factions consistently splitting and forming their own opposition parties. Many of the political parties are relatively new, with a fair amount created in some form of split with another party. This factionalism is the main downfall of the opposition. Without the myriad opposition parties splitting votes, Tsvangirai would have most likely won the 2008 elections; instead Tsvangirai fell short of the required 50% and forced a run-off election which he later dropped out of due to violence against his supporters.  

The modern opposition to the government began with the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Prior to this, there were several periods with other opposition parties, but success was limited and the movements soon died out. Towards the end of the century, a new generation of Zimbabweans had emerged; shaped rather by the independent Zimbabwe under ZANU-PF than by the Rhodesian Bush War, these individuals began expressing dissatisfaction with the ruling party. Several civic groups and NGOs came together

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and, following their discussion of myriad issues facing the nation, decided the only way to solve the challenges was through the formation of an opposition party. Thus, MDC was formed in September 1999.

MDC was quickly put to the test with a constitutional referendum in February the following year; MDC believed that the proposed constitution did not have enough checks of power on the president. This referendum became the first time that ZANU-PF lost at the polls, with only 44% of the population approving the constitution. Following the rejection of the constitution, Mugabe’s government sped up his land reform program – something the rejected constitution would have allowed him to do with greater ease – and began violently seizing farmland from white Zimbabweans.

Following the success of the constitutional referendum, MDC preformed exceedingly well in the parliamentary elections in June 2000. Even with voter intimidation, MDC won 57 seats, opposed to ZANU-PF’s 62 seats; the last seat went to ZANU-Ndonga. Perhaps more noteworthy than their success in the polls was the locations they won seats in. While previous opposition parties were only able to gain support from one region, MDC was able to gain seats in both Matabeleland and Manicaland.

Despite the early successes, MDC was unable to win in the March 2002 presidential elections, gaining only 42% of the votes compared to ZANU-PF’s 56%.

During 2005 and the parliamentary elections, the weight of conflicting interests within MDC were finally exposed. Composed of a wide spectrum of Zimbabweans, individuals supported the party for its rally against Mugabe rather than for its own ideology. After failing to win the presidential election in 2002 and losing seats in that year’s parliamentary election, the different strategies for regime change from the MDC leaders proved too different. Party leader Tsvangirai called for a shift in party strategy, changing from the election system, seen by him as rigged, to mass nonviolent protests; he additionally believed that the party should not run for seats in the newly reintroduced senate that November, stated that it was a waste of time and money and believed that it existed solely to give positions to supporters of ZANU-PF. Other leaders of the party opposed this change and defied Tsvangirai by running for seats in the senate. Tsvangirai subsequently expelled the twenty-six party members who ran from the party.


The infighting between the two factions caused a split, forming what is now known as Movement for Democratic Change – Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and Movement for Democratic Change – Ncube (MDC-N), led by secretary-general Welshman Ncube. While MDC-T had a larger support base, as well as the backing of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the fracture caused enough diffusion of support such that neither party would be effective.\textsuperscript{30} Other parties that have formed via splits from MDC or related parties include MDC Renewal Team, People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and Renewal Democrats in Zimbabwe (RDZ).\textsuperscript{31}

Another popular figure, former VP Joice Mujuru, created her own political party following her dismissal from ZANU-PF and position as vice president. Seen as the likely successor to Mugabe for many years, Mujuru created the opposition Zimbabwe People First party in early 2016. As the party is still new and untested, it is unknown how widespread her support is, though she was popular in office and had vast local and regional support during her time in ZANU-PF. Mujuru’s political party could become a major player in the large pool of opposition parties.\textsuperscript{32} Other notable minor opposition parties are the Freedom Party, Transform Zimbabwe (TZ), United Parties, and Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU).\textsuperscript{33} Note that this is a different, reformed ZAPU than the one that fought during the Rhodesian Bush War and subsequently merged with ZANU into today’s ZANU-PF. Many other minor opposition parties exist. The lack of unity amongst opposition parties, as well as the support of individual party leaders as opposed to actual parties, poses a serious obstacle to the primary goal shared by all these parties: defeating Mugabe.


The issue of land reform is a one that has been at the forefront of Zimbabwean politics for the entirety of its independence. What was once known as the “bread basket of Africa” and was able to export excess food to neighboring countries has turned into a country with severe food shortages.\textsuperscript{34} By March 2017 it is estimated that up to half the rural population of Zimbabwe – or 4.5 million people – will need food aid.\textsuperscript{35} While the severe drought caused by El Niño has blame in the dramatic change in crop output, most blame has been placed on Mugabe’s land reform programs.

Land reform in Zimbabwe can be divided into two stages: the “willing buyer, willing seller” stage from 1980-2000 and the fast-track land reform from 2000 onward. While land reform was a heated discussion point during negotiations for the Lancaster Agreement, as the white Zimbabweans, accounting for only 4,500 of the population in 1979, owned


approximately 40% of Zimbabwean land. Not only did they own a disproportionate amount of land, but also the most fertile land: white Zimbabweans owned almost three-quarters of the best farmland. As such, stipulates were placed in the document restricting the Zimbabwean government from forcibly redistributing land for a decade. In return, the United Kingdom promised hundreds of millions of pounds to fund a long-term land redistribution. Under this agreement, only those owners who were willing to depart with their land could be purchased by the government, usually for a fair bit over the actual value of the land; the United Kingdom financed this endeavor with £44m per the Lancaster Agreement. During the 1980s approximately three million hectares were bought and given to 72,000 black Zimbabwean families.

Following the expiration of the ten-year clauses in the Lancaster Agreement, the government began passing amendments to the land reform provisions, primarily the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, which gave the government the right to acquire land for resettlement, subject to compensation determined to be fair by a six-person committee. Despite these changes, land reform slowed down in the 1990s, with fewer than 20,000 families resettled onto under a million hectares. Over the two decades, a combined 3.5 million hectares of land were resettled by 71,000 families; the target goal had been over double this. Additionally, only 19% of the resettled land was prime farmland.

The tone of land reforms took a dramatic shift at the turn of the century, beginning with the wording in the proposed 2000 constitution, which was defeated in a referendum. This rejection sparked what became known as the Third Chimurenga (Shona for revolution). Veterans of the Rhodesian Bush War led militant groups and began forcing white farmers off their land, with the government claiming that they were simply righting a historical wrong and that the land had been originally seized by the white settlers. These land seizures were often accompanied

by intimidation and violence, including assault, rape, and murder. In their report summarizing the first two years of the new phase of the land reform, Human Rights Watch reported that over 800 "violent or hostile" acts had happened and at least seven farmers killed. The violence did not stop at the white farm owners; as a result of these occupations, over three thousand farm workers (mostly black Zimbabweans) have been displaced, sixteen hundred assaulted, eleven raped, and twenty-six killed. The farms targeted were not limited to those listed by the government for acquisition. While the violence began to lessen by the end of 2001, an increase in extortion – accompanied by threats of violence – took place.\textsuperscript{41} A decade and a half after the beginning of the fast-track land reform, 4,800 white farmers were forced off of 6,214 farms covering approximately seven million hectares.\textsuperscript{42}

The land reform measures, primarily those taking place during the fast-track program, have been widely panned for crippling the Zimbabwean economy and dramatically reducing its exports, as well as cause the food shortages seen throughout the twenty-first century. Prior to the fast-track land reforms of the 2000’s, Zimbabwe produced an excess of food, leading the country to be dubbed the “bread basket of southern Africa;” the farming sector


was also vital for the economy, accounting for 40% of the national GDP. The land reforms, which saw skilled, white farmers operating commercial farms replaced with untrained, black farmers running land on a much smaller scale. The new owners of the land either do not have the capital needed to properly invest in their new farm or are run by the political elite of ZANU-PF. These setbacks, combined with the lack of farming knowhow, have left under 40% of farmland being optimally utilized.43

However, other experts have challenged this view of Zimbabwe’s land reform, instead claiming that it is “not a failure” – but still not a success. While it is often claimed that there is little investment on the newly resettled farms and that a disproportionally high amount of land was given to cronies of ZANU-PF, both these claims are exaggerated. While it is true that there were issues with investment, particularly during the economic collapse of 2008, averages of over $2,000 per household have been reported. Similarly, it has been found that less than 5% of the new landowners were connected to the political elites; a majority (approximately 68%) of the land did indeed go to ordinary Zimbabweans.44

Zimbabwe is primarily composed by two ethnic groups: the Shona and the Ndebele, composing 82% and 14% of the population, respectively.45 The latter live predominately in Matabeleland, located in the southwestern portion of the country.46 While both Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) simultaneously fought against white rule in Rhodesia, the parties were split largely along ethnic lines – the Shona supporting ZANU and the Ndebele supporting ZAPU.47 After independence and the popular vote of Mugabe as Prime Minister, Joshua Nkomo, leader of ZAPU, was giving the minor position of Minister of Home Affairs in Mugabe’s cabinet. Two years later, in 1982, Nkomo was removed from the cabinet, being accused of plotting to overthrow Mugabe.48 Additionally, Mugabe sent in the Fifth Brigade, an elite unit trained by North Koreans and made of primarily ethnic Shona, to handle dissidents in Matabeleland.49 These dissidents numbered around 500 and were primarily affiliated with Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), the armed wing of Nkomo’s ZAPU party. Rooting out a couple hundred dissidents quickly became a campaign rooting out any opposition, with some Matabeleland natives describing the events as genocide.50

The event, known as Gukurahundi (Shona for the spring rains that sweep away dry season chaff), saw the killing of over 20,000 citizens. Beginning in January 1983, the first few weeks saw a majority of the deaths, but the killings continued until the end of 1987. The events are often blamed on the West or rogue Fifth Brigade members, though strong evidence points to the orders coming directly from Mugabe himself.51 The Fifth Brigade additionally answered directly to Mugabe.52 The violence came to an end in 1987 through the signing of the Unity Accord, which saw ZAPU merge with ZANU to form ZANU-PF.53

Since the 1980’s, tensions have risen over Gukurahundi, particularly over the burial of victims; many killed during the massacre remain in mass graves or other improper burials. While the Matabeleland and Midlands regional governments have expressed desire to rebury victims, the national government usually avoids or deflects questions regarding the reburials.54

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Over the decades, several secessionist parties have formed in Matabeleland, usually advocating for a new state called Mthwakazi formed from Matabeleland and Midlands provinces. The justification for “independence” is the regions’ incorporation into Zimbabwe without consent from its citizens. Claiming Zimbabwe is a failed state, a handful of political parties seek secession over exclusion in education and employment. The parties also support the aforementioned reburial of Gukurahundi victims. While all these parties remain small, especially compared to the primary opposition party MDC-T, the tensions between the ZANU-PF government and Matabeleland can be seen stressing even more as Mugabe’s term continues on.

Amidst an ever deteriorating economic situation, with the informal sector surpassing the formal to functionally become the primary economy of Zimbabwe, the government failing to meet the rising demands of housing, and large-scale lay-offs due to the shrinking formal economy, an influx of unauthorized housing and informal street vendors arose in many urban hubs throughout the county. It is in this setting that Mugabe ordered Operation Murambatsvina (Clear the Filth), also known as Operation Restore Order, the government’s national urban clean-up program. Beginning in mid-May 2005, the police and army executed the destruction of unlicensed vendors and houses allegedly not built in accordance with city by-laws. Starting in Harare, the project quickly spread to other cities, including the industrial center of Zimbabwe, Bulawayo. The government claimed the program was to crack down on illegal housing and businesses. Known colloquially as Operation Tsunami due to the speed and ferocity that the program preformed, in reality Operation Murambatsvina was largely indiscriminate in its destruction. Over 90,000 vendors across the country were arrested and 700,000 lost their houses and/or livelihood.


While the 2008 presidential elections failed to oust incumbent president Mugabe, the end result saw vast consignments of power to opposition groups. The result of the election in March saw no candidate gain the 50% of votes needed to win outright; Tsvangirai (MDC-T) won 47.9% of votes, followed by Mugabe (ZANU-PF) with 43.2% and the remaining 8.9% going to other minor opposition parties. A runoff between Tsvangirai and Mugabe was held in June, with Mugabe sweeping the votes with 90.2%, compared to Tsvangirai’s 9.8%. Tsvangirai had dropped out prior to the vote, though. An intense, government-sponsored campaign of violence preceded the runoff voting; thousands of Tsvangirai supporters faced violence and injuries, and over one hundred were killed. Day-of intimidation was also rampant, with those who did not have an ink-stained finger being intimidated to vote in order to guarantee high turnout.

While it is clear that Mugabe won the run-off, the results were denied by the international community as a sham and not free and fair. Besides the usual critics of the Mugabe regime – namely, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union – members of the South African Development Community (SADC) began speaking out. The previously quiet leaders of neighboring Zambia and Botswana denounced the election, representing the first time either government directly criticized Mugabe. While the West tightened sanctions against the ZANU-PF leaders, Mugabe was backed into a corner. While Tsvangirai, who had fled to Botswana in fear of his life, claimed he was the rightful winner due to his win in the initial elections in March, Mugabe declared that ZANU-PF would be the one to name the new government. The international community, primarily the SADC and, to a lesser extent, the African Union (AU), led negotiations under South African President Thabo Mbeki to create a power-sharing agreement. The initial agreement was reached in September 2008 and the Global Political Agreement (GPA) was signed.

While the three parties involved – ZANU-PF, MDC-T, and MDC-N (also known as MDC-M) – all signed the agreement, the arrangement was very fragile, and all sides had factions in their parties against even the concept of a power-sharing agreement. Tsvangirai signed due to pressure from within his party who believed this was an opportunity to reform the system from within. Other opposition leaders saw the signing differently, stating that Mugabe remaining head of state showed that MDC was the lesser of the groups in the arrangement. Disagreements further divided the already fractured ZANU-PF, with some higher-ups seeing the agreement as a sell-out; both of Mugabe’s Vice-Presidents, Joseph Msika and Joice Mujuru, were opposed to the deal. Mujuru’s husband, retired General Solomon Mujuru, led a faction strongly opposed to the deal; the faction had already been trying to remove Mugabe. Even with the intense resistance from his own party, Mugabe was left with little option, as he was seen as the illegitimate leader in the eyes of the international community and needed access to foreign cash, which could be obtained by Tsvangirai. The deal was


signed on 15 September 2008 and took effect on 13 February 2009.\textsuperscript{63}

Under the new Government of National Unity (GNU), two cabinets create and implement policy, headed by Mugabe and Tsvangirai, respectively. Tsvangirai’s cabinet, the Council of Ministers, would additionally be responsible for daily management of governmental affairs. Mugabe’s cabinet would be composed of thirteen members from MDC-T, three from MDC-N, and fifteen from ZANU-PF. Mugabe remained President and head of state, while Tsvangirai became Prime Minister and Arthur Mutambara (MDC-N) became Deputy Prime Minister. Thokozani Khupe of MDC-T also became a Deputy Prime Minister.

The distribution of ministers was highly contested between the political parties. While many important ministries remained controlled by ZANU-PF – such as defense, lands and land resettlement, youth development, indigenisation, and empowerment, foreign affairs, justice, and media, information, and publicity – MDC-T gained control over finance, public service, health, economic planning and development, and constitutional and parliamentary affairs. The Ministry of Home Affairs became co-chaired between MDC-T and ZANU-PF following an impasse over who would lead it.\textsuperscript{30}

Initial, bold promises made by the unity government were never realized. While the idealism was not seen, institutions began functioning again, primarily due to the dollarization. While there were many shortcomings from the government, it is clear that the GNU, or at least the half led by MDC-T and MDC-N, was trying to make progress in reforming the destroyed economy. The initial skepticism proved to be well-formed, though; the unity was more of an experiment, and the experiment was not successful to the degree that was hoped.\textsuperscript{62} Before the new government was inaugurated, signs that the unity agreement might not achieve success was apparent. At the swearing-in ceremony of ministerial nominees, one nominee, white Zimbabwean Roy Bennett, was detained and taken to Mutare, 210 km (or 130 miles) away and charged with treason. The treason charge was later dropped and replaced with insurgency, banditry, sabotage, and terrorism. Bennett was to become the Deputy Minister of Agriculture.\textsuperscript{64}

For the most part, the government belittled or ignored MDC’s control or authority. Collective decision making, explicitly called for in the agreement, never happened. The military and police chiefs who oversaw and were responsible for the oppression seen in the 2008 run-off elections kept their positions. Violence against those believed to support MDC (or opposition in general) continued in rural areas; violence from a ZANU-PF militia Chipangano became active in low-income neighborhoods within Harare; no longer was the environment of fear exclusive to rural areas. Additionally, the agreement signed was rather vague, and division of executive power was not specified. No clear idea of power structure was ever known. A majority of the political structures remained unchanged, especially those regarding law enforcement. The result of the unity government was ultimately a failure, as there was certainly no unity amongst the signatories and little change was made.\textsuperscript{65}


Mugabe has made violence against opponents a signature of his 36 years in power. His first major oppression dates back to the Gukurahundi, when an estimated 20,000 supporters of rival political party ZAPU were killed over the course of several years. Leader of ZAPU, Joshua Nkomo, merged his party with ZANU, forming ZANU-PF. The Gukurahundi effectively eliminated any political challenge to Mugabe. The Chihambakwa Commission, set up to look into the crimes committed in Matabeleland and Midlands, never saw any of their recommendations regarding the security sector employed. The political repression seen in the mid-1980s was extreme, but still holds many similarities to the repression seen since.

Intimidation of civilians occurs primarily around voting season, especially around registration and the actual day of voting. Widespread violence occurred during election periods in 1985, 1990, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, and 2013 – that is to say every election with a notable opponent. Threats of violence are rampant across the country. Guilt is also used to force voters into electing candidates from ZANU-PF; recollections of Mugabe and ZANU as the freedom fighters of Zimbabwe are used to link a vote for Mugabe as patriotic and a vote for Tsvangirai or another opposition candidate as unpatriotic. Additionally, actual violence – such as beatings, arson, kidnapping, and torture – are not unheard of.

The government’s political oppression is enforced by three main groups: the military, the police, and the central intelligence. All three of these organizations tout the ruling party’s ideology, despite the former two being public institutions that are expected to remain politically unbiased. Repercussions for actions from these groups is nonexistent; Mugabe occasionally grants amnesty or pardons individuals who carry out these
various crimes of repression. Otherwise, the non-independent judiciary fails to charge them. Another key player in carrying out the violence against opposition supporters is the Joint Operations Command (JOC); the JOC, alongside Mugabe himself, has since been found responsible for the planning of mass violence against Tsvangirai supporters during the run-off election in 2008.

The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) use their powers as police officers to influence the public’s voting decisions. Politically motivated harassment, intimidation, arrests, detention, raids, and beatings have been reported on numerous occasion. The police also instigate violence at nonviolent protests and rallies. While forbidden from publically engaging in partisan politics under the Police Act, no repercussions happen for police who actively promote ZANU-PF; the same cannot be said for police vocally supporting opposition movements. Police are even being encouraged to be partisan, with the head of the ZRP, Commissioner General Augustine Chihuri stating that police who are ready to surrender to the colonizers and their surrogate (MDC) are unfit to be police. Other senior police officials have travelled Zimbabwe rallying the police force to mobilize support for ZANU-PF.

The national army also plays a large role in intimidation of voters. Similar to the police, leadership in the military has also publically stated its support for ZANU-PF; military leaders also have stated that voting for MDC is selling out and that the army is ready to defend Mugabe. With citizens fearful of a return to the violence that marred the 2008 run-off election, the army is consistently fueling the fears. Soldiers have been deployed across the country for various reasons, such as assisting food distribution programs, assessing food scarcity an army history research project, and various other community projects; these were all guises to allow the army to promote ZANU-PF. Soldiers working on the alleged army history research asked villagers about the Rhodesian Bush War and about any local battles, attempting to connect ZANU-PF with freedom and patriotism. Other reasons for deployment throughout Zimbabwe served similar purposes. Soldiers

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have been accused of directly campaigning for ZANU-PF; additionally, harassment and intimidation of citizens is common. Soldiers have also gotten physical with individuals opposing or believed to be opposing Mugabe and his party; members of the army beat up an individual wearing MDC-branded clothing and warned him to vote for ZANU-PF or they would return. Soldiers wielding AK-47s also disrupted and assaulted a political rally in Mashonaland West.

Both the police and the army are forced to vote for ZANU-PF. Voting for members of either organization vote in advance in their barracks and their superior officers review their ballots to confirm the vote was for ZANU-PF.

Under direct management of the president, the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) is responsible for state security. No accountability is placed on the group, and is outside the realm of legislation. The CIO has been accused of spying on civil society leaders, media organizations, and other groups seen as hostile to the ruling party. Furthermore, the CIO has been implemented in harassment, beatings, abductions, and torture of opposition. While still employed by the government, three employees of the CIO also have positions as central committee members for ZANU-PF.

Crackdowns are especially common within the suburbs of Harare. Teachers are additionally a common target, with nine members of the Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ) being kidnapped by ZANU-PF supporters in February 2008 while they were distributing flyers promoting education system reform. The individuals were beaten with iron bars, wood, and pieces of furniture, and one female was sexually assaulted. As influential members of society, teachers are often targeted as they are perceived as opposition supporters.\(^67\) It is reported that over half of teachers were forced to vote for a particular party due to violence or the threat thereof. Members of the government have publically stated that employees of the government are obligated to support the ruling party. Over three-fourths of teachers have received threats and been forced to attend political meetings, while approximately a third have reported experiencing assault, disqualification from electoral duties, extortion, and torture. Other reported attacks include kidnapping, forced displacement, property destruction, rape, and sexual violence.\(^68\)

Another primary target of intimidation is the media; while the repression ramps up during the election cycle, intimidation is present on reporters, journalists, and their companies year-round. Zimbabwean newspapers the Daily News, NewsDay, and Zimbabwe Independent have all been sued for published articles. Journalists themselves also face intimidation; they live in fear during election season and consistently face arrests.69

Intimidation reaches a high during voting, with dozens of cases reported in some more rural districts. Verbal abuses range from hate speech to death threats, with physical violence also widespread.70 Abductions also take place, though usually the individuals are released shortly thereafter. Occasionally, individuals will disappear for longer periods of time, such as with political activist Itai Dzamara. Forced into an unmarked vehicle on 9 March 2015, the whereabouts of Dzamara are still unknown, nearly eighteen months later.71 Protest rallies are frequently met with police violence, despite the nonviolent nature of the movements; batons and teargas are regularly used against the protesters.72

With ZANU-PF firmly entrenched in power, party loyalists have seen decades of benefits, ranging from farms confiscated in the land reforms to expensive hotel stays for nearly two years. In Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Zimbabwe received a score of 21 out of 100 in 2015, with a lower score meaning higher corruption perception. The country also ranked 150 out of 168 on corruption perception.

While briberies and other small acts of corruption are commonplace, the notable corruption comes from the top. Petty corruption is frequent with police public services, tax administration, customs administration, and public procurement. Bribes are frequent for businesses obtaining public contracts or licenses and with citizens obtaining governmental services (water, sanitation, electrical connection, etc.) and identity documents such as driver’s licenses and passports. Perhaps the most persistent encounter with petty corruption is with the police. Roadblocks where police extort money are common and are frequently paid off to avoid trouble or obtain service.

Higher up corruption comes from the judiciary, land administration, natural resources, and government-run business conglomerates. Land administration has been plagued by corruption since the controversial land reforms at the turn of the century, with accusations of large amounts of seized land being handed to ZANU-PF party loyalists and elites. While it is disputed exactly how prevalent this actually was, there certainly was at least a notable amount of farmland handed over to those who touted the party line. Since then, corruption regarding agricultural land has continued, primarily perpetrated by the lack of legal structure and property rights.

Zimbabwe owns several business conglomerates, with profits going to high-level governmental officials. The most lucrative of these involves the natural resources of Zimbabwe, particularly the diamond trade. In March 2016, Mugabe announced the plan to nationalize the diamond industry, claiming the move was to stop the international mining companies from stealing Zimbabwe’s wealth. The corruption of the diamond industry was from Mugabe’s government all along, and the nationalization of the industry only increased the corruption. Later in the year, diamond-mining companies were removed from Marange and Chimanimani mining sites, both located in Manicaland. A state monopoly on diamonds was thus created, greatly profiting those in ZANU-PF. The Minister of Mines and Mining Development, Obert Mpofu, was able to spend US$20 million in three years, though his monthly salary was merely US$800 – equivalently US$28,800 in three years.

Corruption is not just limited to profiting off of companies and individuals; it can also be expensive residence. Second Vice President Phelekezela Mphoko stayed over 600 nights in the Presidential Suite at the Rainbow Towers Hotel in Harare, the country’s most luxurious hotel. The extended stay was despite a reportedly multi-million-dollar house being purchased by the government for Mphoko. Eventually, Mphoko left the hotel, but not before racking up a large bill; the room cost approximately US$1,000 a night.

Perhaps the most damaging corruption has been regarding the food aid distribution. Allegations against the government claim that food aid has become politicized and opposition supporters have been denied desperately needed food. Most affected are those in rural communities. Ruling party members have been linked as the leads of this corruption, though Mugabe and his government have denied that any withholding of food aid is taking place.


Zimbabwean press is designated as “not free” by Freedom House, with a score of 70 out of 100 (with 0 being the best score) in 2015. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) gave press freedom in Zimbabwe an underlying situation score of 40.41 and an abuses score of 26.39 (each ranking out of 100, with 0 being the best score), placing the country at 124 out of 180 countries.

While the 2013 constitution has made steps towards press freedom – providing for both freedom of expression and access to information – the implementation of these laws is lacking. Several restrictive laws still limit journalism and media distribution. Among the most restrictive laws are the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, the Official Secrets Act, and the Broadcasting Services Act. AIPPA forces the registration of all journalists and media companies operating within Zimbabwe; the need for approval gives the government control over who and what companies can work in the country. Journalists can face criminal charges and up to two years in prison for working unlicensed. POSA and the Criminal Law Act both have strong restrictions on what can be published by journalists, and include equally strong penalties. The Official Secrets Act, a remnant of colonial rule, is used to limit access to information. Lastly, the Broadcasting Services Act removes most funding sources from independent companies by banning foreign funding and investment. Several other laws are also used to control media.

One of the largest limitations to freedom of press in Zimbabwe is the requirement of licenses for reporters and companies involved in the distribution of media. In charge of regulating licenses for publications is the Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC), while broadcasting and radio is handled by the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ). Claims that the government installed ZANU-PF loyalists to the BAZ board are common, and the consistent denial of independent radio stations certainly does not help the organization’s image. Obtaining a license, especially from BAZ, is a challenging process; the lengthy and complicated process, the large fees, the politically biased selection, and procedural delays all block independent broadcasting in the country. Accreditation for foreign media is additionally a challenge, with hefty fees also required.


A large portion of media is government owned, and refrains from criticisms of either Mugabe or ZANU-PF. The Zimbabwe Broadcasting Company (ZBC), a state-owned organization, runs almost all the broadcasting media; the outlets are subject to intense censorship and have strong biases for ZANU-PF. Two new private radio stations, Star FM and ZiFM, began broadcasting in 2012. The government also has control over much of the newspaper sector, owning the two largest daily newspapers, the *Chronicle* and the *Herald*, through Mass Media Trust. More independent papers exist than independent broadcasting companies, with *NewsDay*, the *Standard*, the *Zimbabwe Independent*, the *Southern Eye*, and the *Daily News* all running independent of the government. International newspapers also occasionally make it into the country, though unregistered foreign media is prohibited from being distributed.

Even if independent media manages to get up and running, challenges in the distribution of their news is a challenge. Radio stations based internationally and broadcasting into Zimbabwe are jammed, such as VOA’s Studio 7. Additionally, a license for each radio owned must be obtained and renewed annually. This even applies to car radios, which became a part of updating the vehicle registration in 2014. With radio being the primary source of information in rural areas, these licensing requirements limit or challenge the access to information to the rural majority or Zimbabwe’s citizens. Distribution of media through newspapers also has challenges, as prices skyrocketed for newsprint over the last few years. Harassment from soldiers of ZANU-PF supporters at vendors selling independent newspapers is also not unheard of.

Internet access, while high for an African country at 20%, is not always reliable for those with access. While increased competition has led to a decrease in cost, power outages occur regularly plague access to the internet. The government has also more recently begun targeting social media. Apps such as WhatsApp and Facebook have played pivotal roles in the protest movements of the last few months, and the government has threatened to expand its media repression into the arena of social media.

The first notable instance of protests brought attention to the turmoil in Zimbabwe despite its small scale. At the 2003 ICC Cricket World Cup, Zimbabwe hosted a portion of the matches; to bring awareness to the true situation in Zimbabwe, two Zimbabwean cricket players – Andy Flower and Henry Olonga – donned black armbands during their opening match against Zambia on 10 February, symbolizing the “death of democracy” in Zimbabwe. The duo also released a statement to journalists to accompany their protest.\textsuperscript{81} The backlash was immediate, with Zimbabwean and international institutions involved with the tournament upset primarily with the involvement of politics in sports.\textsuperscript{82} Others spoke out in support of the symbolic gesture, such as opposition party MDC calling Flower and Olonga heroes. The 4,000-strong crowd also supported the act, with some members of the audience creating their own makeshift black armbands. Quickly gaining international attention and notoriety, the International Cricket Council (ICC) requested that the pair not wear the armbands.


for the remainder of the cup. On 19 February during their match against India, Flower and Olonga chose not to wear the black armbands, and instead wore the more visible black wristbands. Almost two hundred members of the audience wore black armbands as well. Continuing these actions until they lost, Flower and Olonga left the country following the tournament out of fear of the government. While their protest might not have resulted in any changes to the oppression of Zimbabweans, Flower and Olonga’s action revealed to the world the reality within their country.83

Other, more organized protest movements have taken place as well. One of the main groups formed following the 2004 announcement of the March 2005 parliamentary elections is Sokwanele or Zvakwana, the Ndebele and Shona word for “enough is enough,” respectively. Sokwanele, dedicated to nonviolence to oust Mugabe, was primarily focused on the aforementioned parliamentary election. The group recorded instances of election rigging from the incumbent ZANU-PF for months leading up to the day of voting at the end of March. Sokwanele remained non-aligned with the opposition, and even criticized MDC for failing to change tactics after several years of stolen elections. The group also advocated the implementation of other nonviolent methods to take down Mugabe, such as street protests, sit-ins, stay-aways, and boycotts.84 One such action saw the group spray-painting sewage pipes and lamp posts along the major Tongogara Road, which was to be travelled by Mugabe on his way to the Independence Day celebration at the National Sports Stadium a few days later. Sokwanele additionally sprayed “Get UP Stand UP” on the stadium. As the regime could not remove all the graffiti in time, Mugabe was forced to take a detour.

Other tactics Sokwanele employed were distributing matchboxes with messages inside, releasing a CD promoting their cause, and producing branded condoms with the groups logo – a ‘Z’ for Zvakwana. Sokwanele gained notoriety through these actions as well as word of mouth; the government struggled in finding individuals involved with the group, going so far as to search houses for yellow paint, which was incriminating due a claimed connection between the Sokwanele graffiti and yellow handprints seen around Bulawayo.85

Another protest group formed during the same time was Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA), who are still active today. While the group is primarily concerned with women’s issues and female empowerment, the group still places pressure on the Mugabe regime. The group is best known for their annual Valentine’s Day protests on 14 February, where the group hands out roses under the motto “the power of love can conquer the love of power.” These protests often see arrests, though the arrested individuals are usually released relatively quickly. The 2013 Valentine’s Day protest saw the arrest of 181 individuals, with some accompanied by babies.86 Protesters with WOZA have also faced violence from police officers during the marches.87

More recently, in July 2016 the group began economic protests against the economic mismanagement of ZANU-PF. In Bulawayo, the group gathered thousands in the streets and banged pots, pans, and wooden spoons to protest the the hunger and poverty faced by many families throughout the country. The protest became known as #BeatThePot and a larger version later took place in Harare, with numbers in the tens of thousands.\textsuperscript{88}

Founded in 2009, Heal Zimbabwe Trust (HZT) is an organization working towards preventing conflict and supporting dialogue between groups. The group’s main tactic is the dialogues, which it conducts between members of different political, religious, and ethnic organizations. HZT also works to help those affected by victims of politically motivated violence. The group has also worked in support of protest groups in this past year.\textsuperscript{89}

The beginning of what is now consistent mass protests against the government began in April 2016. On 14 April, people were shocked when approximately three thousand individuals gathered in Africa Unity Square in an anti-government protest – the first protest of this kind in nearly ten years. The protest was organized by MDC-T, and its leader Tsvangirai gave a speech saying that ZANU-PF has failed its people and calling for Mugabe to resign. Though the police almost banned it, the High Court allowed the protest to take place.\textsuperscript{90}


Not even a week later, Pastor Even Mawarire, pained by not being able to pay for his children’s school fees, posted a video online in which he, with the Zimbabwean flag draped around his shoulders and clenched in his hands, passionately describes the official meanings of the colors of the flag – green for vegetation, yellow for minerals, red for the blood of those who fought for Zimbabwe’s freedom, and black for the majority people – and then revisits each in a patriotic telling of what each color means to him. Throughout the video, Mawarire states the phrase “this flag.” What started off as a hashtag for responses to Mawarire’s video, #ThisFlag has since spread into the name of the movement against Mugabe.91

On 25 May, ZANU-PF supporters were bused into Harare for a rally supporting Mugabe, known as the Million Man March.92 On the same day, the youth movement Tajamuka emerged and declared its intentions of protesting daily until the resignation of Mugabe. Tajamuka is lead by Promise Mkwananzi, chairperson of Zimbabwe Informal Sector Organization (ZISO), and is also known as Sesjikile.93 Tajamuka is a colloquial term used among the youth,


translating to “let’s act” in English. The group is composed of fourteen political parties and over thirty civilian groups; Tajamuka itself is not a political party nor does it plan on transforming into one.  

94 Late the following month, Tajamuka demonstrated outside the Rainbow Towers Hotel in Harare. The Second Vice President Phelekezela Mphoko had been staying in the Presidential Suite at the Rainbow Towers on the taxpayer’s dime since he was appointed to his position in December 2014 – over a year and a half prior to the protests. Mphoko had refused to move into the reportedly US$3 million government-issued house in the suburbs. The Tajamuka protesters gave Mphoko seven days to leave the hotel, with Mphoko’s refusal leading to the protesters to literally drag him out.  

95 While the protest did not immediately succeed, Mphoko did move out of the hotel in August, two months later. In total, Mphoko spent 613 nights in the hotel at the cost of US$619,099, with a rate of US$1,023 per night.  


On 1 July, Zimbabweans protested in Beitbridge, on the border with South Africa, over new, government-imposed import restrictions on basic goods such as bottled water, cereal, potato chips, and dairy products. The protesters had barricaded the road to prevent crossings into South Africa and burned down a warehouse belonging to the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA).97

The organized protest movements also scaled up their tactics in July. On 5 July, civil servants went on strike over a lack of a paycheck in over a month.98 Organized by a collaboration between #ThisFlag and Tajamuka, as well as other groups, a nation-wide protest, dubbed “stay-away day,” was planned for Wednesday, 6 July. The movement was protesting the impending economic collapse of the economy, with lack of funds to pay civil servants’ salaries, a liquidity crisis, import limitations, a lack of jobs, and road blocks. Protesters placed burning tires in the streets of some Harare suburbs to prevent people from driving into town.99 While the government claims it was not responsible, the internet was unavailable during most of the day. Though the rotest was primarily aimed at the economic conditions in Zimbabwe, some also called for the resignation of Mugabe.67 Protests in both Harare and Bulawayo encountered riot police. Despite threats from Jonathan Moyo, Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education in Mugabe’s cabinet, that failure to attend work could result in firings, the call worked, as the center of Harare was sparsely occupied that day.100

The protest leaders called for another stay-away the following week, 13 July, if the demands placed by #ThisFlag and other movements were not met. The five demands were: (1) pay civil servants on time; (2) reduce roadblocks and stop officers harassing people for cash; (3) President Mugabe should fire and prosecute corrupt officials; (4) abandon plans to introduce bond notes to ease a cash; and (5) remove the ban on imported goods.101

Mawarire, one of the key players in the stay-away protest, was arrested on 12 July on charges of inciting public violence and disturbing the peace; charges of subversion were additionally added at the last minute. Over two hundred lawyers volunteered to represent Mawarire, with thousands of protesters, wearing the Zimbabwean flag, gathered outside to protest the pastor’s arrest. The judge eventually ruled Mawarire not guilty and he was released. Calls for a second stay-away on Wednesday 13 July coincided with the date of Mawarire’s trial and release. The shutdown did not gain widespread participation, though, and no noticeable change happened in any city that day.

The protest movements began shifting into protests against the introduction of the “bond notes” beginning in August, though the protests were always strongly economically focused. A group of two thousand protesters marched towards the office of Finance

Minister Patrick Chinamasa to deliver him a petition to stop the introduction of the bond notes. Clashes with the police occurred after the group began going to Parliament; after the police fired tear gas at the protesters, they responded by throwing stones and chairs. Following the protest, data prices spiked; many Zimbabweans believe this was an attempt to stop the organization of protests, which primarily happened over applications such as WhatsApp. Data prices were hiked up by 500%, with 1GB of data raised to US$30.

Following his stint with the police, Mawarire left the country for his own safety. Since then, Mawarire has been gathering support from the Zimbabwean diaspora in South Africa and the United States.

The Mugabe government also attacked the main symbol of the #ThisFlag movement: the Zimbabwean flag. In an attempt to prevent protesters from obtaining the icon, the government has created laws criminalizing the manufacturing or importation of the Zimbabwean flag without governmental permission. Reasoning behind the law is claimed to be to limit mutilation or insult of the flag.

Another attempt to deliver a petition – this time to the Ministry of Home Affairs asking for an end to police violence – ended in a police confrontation on 24 August; police used teargas, water cannons, and batons against youth protesters. Protesters responded by throwing cans of teargas back, along with rocks. Several cars, belonging to state media and police, were burned, though it is unclear who committed the act.

The European Union later condemned the violent ways the police handled the demonstrations.

Protests at the end of August saw nearly sixty people arrested, including Tajamuka leader Mkwananzi. The protests saw once again the police use of teargas and water cannons, where unrest broke out in Harare shortly after.\footnote{111 "Zimbabwe Charges 68 People after Protests." 
\textit{IOL}. Reuters, 08 Sept. 2016. Web. 2 Sept. 2016.} A third planned shutdown also failed a few days later, where riot police patrolled the streets of Harare and Bulawayo. The failure of the protest was blamed on intimidation from security forces, as well as the government threatening to revoke licenses for shops that closed.\footnote{112 "Zimbabwe Protest Day Flops after Crackdown Vow." 

While the protests had mixed results, it was clear on 1 September that Mugabe and ZANU-PF felt threatened by the protesters. That Thursday, the government imposed a two week ban on protests in Harare, citing a lack of manpower to prevent public disorder. Demonstrations planned for the following day were postponed by two weeks. Opposition leaders and protesters expressed anger over the law, stating that the ban was a violation of their constitutional rights.\footnote{113 Mhofu, Sebastian. "Zimbabwe Bans Protests for Two Weeks." 
\textit{Voice of America News}. Voice of America, 1 Sept. 2016. Web. 2 Sept. 2016.} Several days later, Mugabe stated that Zimbabwe would not become another Arab Springs, basically stating that the protests would not succeed in overthrowing him.\footnote{114 Marima, Tendai. "Mugabe’s Last Stand." 

With the protest ban still in effect, the rallies moved to more rural areas, a major paradigm shift for the movements. This marks a noteworthy change in strategy from any protest movement in Zimbabwe, as the areas of concentration were always major cities, specifically focused around Harare and Bulawayo.\footnote{115 "Anti-Mugabe Protests Move Rural Areas - Report." 
\textit{News24}. News24, 7 Sept. 2016. Web. 14 Sept. 2016.} Just a day later, Zimbabwe’s High Court lifted the ban on protests, citing the law as limiting citizen’s rights.\footnote{116 "Zimbabwe Court Overturns Ban on Harare Protests." 

Mugabe is known for many things, but none perhaps as much as his economic legacy. Through several failed policies, Zimbabwe was struck with hyperinflation in 2008, leading the the currency – which had lost all value, making
it useless – to be abandoned, in favor of currencies from neighboring countries and global powers, primarily the United States dollar and the South African rand. Though this move halted hyperinflation, the country now faces yet another financial challenge; Zimbabwe is currently facing a severe liquidity problem, and is unable to finance salaries.

At independence, the Zimbabwean economy had a positive outlook. The Zimbabwean dollar (ZWD) was replaced at par with the Rhodesian dollar. At this time, US$1 was equal to 0.65 ZWD. For the first two years after independence, Zimbabwe’s economy was flourishing, especially compared with neighboring countries’ growth rates. The initial economic boom, however, was not due to Mugabe’s leadership, but rather a combination of lifted sanctions, superb rains, and significant international reconstruction aid. Only a few years after freedom, Zimbabwe’s economy began slowing down. From 1980 through the late 1990s, the strength of the economy mirrored weather conditions, with good rainfall levels or severe droughts significantly impacting the economy. The 1980s saw growth most years, though never as much as the first two years of the decade. With a shortage


The economy began its downward spiral in the end of 1997, following a new compensation pack for war veterans, consisting of ZWD 50,000 (equivalent to US$3,000 that year) and a monthly pension of ZWD 2,000 (US$125). As there was no budgeted financing for either of these payments, investors saw uncertainty in the economic future of Zimbabwe, causing the Zimbabwean dollar to lose 75% of its value against the United States dollar in November 1997; this crash would later become known as “Black Friday.”

Over the next few years, the economy continued deteriorating, primarily through poor decisions from the government. The economy began shrinking in 1999, with real GDP growth in the negatives. An economic recovery agreement was reached between the Zimbabwean government and the IMF the same year, with conditions including tight monetary policy and confidence-building measures, transparency of Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) war costs, and faster privatization. Unfortunately, this program was unsuccessful.

Zimbabwe’s unbudgeted involvement in the Second Congo War was particularly damaging to the country, with 11,000 troops, or a third of the Zimbabwean army, sent into the country at its outbreak in September 1998, and continued spending of US$27 million per month. Mugabe’s aforementioned land reform program not only vastly disrupted the farming sector, but also caused foreign donors to reduce assistance, as well as the World Bank and IMF suspending aid. A drought in 1999, a decrease in the production of goods, and the collapse of the banking system additionally were factors in the economic decline at the turn of the century. Between 1998 and 2000, yearly inflation rates were 50%. The next few years saw an incoherent governmental response to the diminishing economy. By the middle of 2001, the government had borrowed the statutory limit of 20% of the previous year’s revenue from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ). Price controls were introduced in October 2001, and expanded in November 2002, with a freeze for half a year. As these prices were usually less than the cost of production, many businesses closed or produced limited quantities of goods, leading to a reduction of formal employment. Negotiations of these controlled prices took place in January 2003 with the Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TNF), and prices were once more frozen for half a year at the new prices. Among items renegotiated were staple commodities, such as “mealie meals,” salt, milk, beef, bread, and transport fares. These new controlled prices lasted until early May, when an easing of the controls was announced. Under this new system, producers could make a case for a price increase of essentials to the Ministry of Industry and International Trade (MIIT). Additionally, profit margins for essential goods were set at no more than 20% and prices of all essentials were monitored. Items deemed as non-essential were liberalized. An already isolated country, Zimbabwe pulled out of the Commonwealth of Nations in December 2003 following their suspension over the land reforms. A shortage of banknotes caused a major liquidity problem, and a lack of foreign currency made it impossible to print more, though by 2003, there was a strong legacy of money creation. While at the end of 1998, broad money (M3) – which includes hard currency, deposits in checking accounts, savings accounts, and non-institutional money market accounts, among other things – had been ZWD 56.6 billion; at the end of 2003 this had risen to ZWD 3,240.3 billion. This lack of fiscal restraint from the Mugabe government severely plagued the nation. The GDP growth rate continued shrinking at the beginning of the century, reaching -12.1% and -13.6% in 2002 and 2003, respectively. Annual inflation reached 600% in 2003.


The 2003 liquidity problem led to a nationwide run on the banks in August. Besides the shortages on food and petrol, the lack of cash caused banks to impose limits on daily withdraws at several banks. Daily limits of ZWD 5,000 were meager withdraws when a loaf of bread was ZWD 1,000. Besides schoolteachers and other civil servants demanding their money, there were also police and army soldiers.127

Amongst the devastated formal economy, the informal sector became the main pillar of the economy. By 2005, about 40% of Zimbabweans worked in the informal sector. In May 2005, the government began Operation Murambatsvina, detailed above. This mass destruction destroyed large swaths of informal economic hubs within major cities – a backbone of society amidst the crisis.

In February 2006, Zimbabwe printed ZWD 21 trillion (US$210 million at the time) to purchase foreign currency for the purpose of repaying all of the country’s IMF loans.128

The economic catastrophe reached 1000% annual inflation in 2006 in May. Several months later, on 1 August, a new currency was introduced under “Operation Sunrise.” The new currency, later referred to as the second Zimbabwean dollar (ZWN) was worth 1,000 ZWD, effectively dropping three zeros from the previous currency. Individuals were given until 21 August, or three weeks, to exchange their old currency, a challenge for citizens living in rural areas. Many of these people living outside the city did not know about the exchange deadline or had to pay the bus fare to and from a city to exchange the currency. Combined, these challenges caused 22% of the currency, or $10 trillion to not be exchanged.129 This operation did nothing to address the underlying cause of inflation, and instead printed more money as a way of causing the illusion of the problem being fixed.130 The financial impact might not have been the intent of the program, though, as RBZ Governor Gideon Gono stated that the program would have a “positive psychological effect” on people.131 At the time of its introduction, US$1 was equivalent to 101 ZWN, or 101,347 ZWD, though the currency was additionally devalued against the USD, therefore making the new exchange rate 250 ZWN to US$1.132

In February 2007, when yearly inflation reached 1,281%, the central bank declared that inflation was illegal, stating that merchants that rose prices or wages between 1 March and 30 June would be arrested and punished.133 Hyperinflation officially set in


during March, when yearly inflation passed 2,200%.\textsuperscript{134} In July, Mugabe ordered all prices to be cut by at least 50%. Combined with the lucrative black market exchange rates, all items were sold at a major bargain, leading to a frantic run on shops. These price cuts left the shops unable to restock, creating a shortage of goods following the nationwide shopping spree.\textsuperscript{135}

By the end 2007, inflation had reached five digits; in October the inflation rate approached 15,000%. The largest denomination bill was ZWN 200,000 and was used in banded stacks of one hundred notes. Additionally, liquidity problems still plagued citizens, who were limited to ZWN 10 million per day. The government was still printing money and preparing for the introduction of larger denomination bills.\textsuperscript{136} The annual inflation rate reached 66,212% in December.

Inflation rates continued accelerating, with the annual inflation reaching six digits in January 2008, seven digits in May, eight digits in June, and nine digits in July. At


this point, shops charged double for check transactions, due to the processing time of the check. Additionally, the daily withdrawal limit from a bank was ZWN 100 billion - the largest bill in circulation – which was worth less than a loaf of bread cost. At this point, annual inflation for the month of July was officially at 2,200,000%, with experts estimating the true number to be far greater. The government, however, continued printing money in a futile attempt at keeping up with inflation, and by doing so, directly causing the continuation of hyperinflation. July also saw the announcement of yet another redenomination, as the cash registers were incapable of handling over fourteen digits. RBZ Governor Gono stated that ten zeros would be dropped for the new currency (ZWR), leaving ZWR 1 equal to ZWN 10,000,000,000 (1010), or ZWD 10,000,000,000,000 (1013). This made the ZWN 100 billion bill, the largest in circulation and only introduced less than a month prior to the redenomination, worth ZWR 10 – less than US$2.

Yet again, the revaluation of the currency did little to slow inflation, and by August and September, annual inflation had reached ten and twelve digits, respectively. In an 18-month experiment, the government granted 250 wholesalers and a thousand retailers the license to operate in foreign currencies. During the experiment, and even in the months before its start, the Zimbabwean dollar was replaced in transactions outside these select businesses.

Inflation reached nineteen digits in October, and twenty-three digits by mid-November. By mid-November, the daily inflation rate was 98% - in other terms the price of an item doubled in 24.7 hours, or just over a day; equivalently, the annual inflation rate was 89.7 sextillion percent (8.97 x 1022). After this point, inflation was deemed uncalculatable due to the lack of goods in stores. By January 2009, the government released the ZWR 100 trillion note, worth approximately US$30 at the time.

In a last-ditch effort to save their currency, the Zimbabwean government revalued its currency yet again, introducing the fourth Zimbabwean dollar (ZWL). ZWR 1 trillion reduced to ZWL 1 to ZWR 1 trillion, or dropping twelve zeros. Additionally, ZWL 1 was equivalent to ZWD 10 septillion (1025). By this point, the de facto currencies of Zimbabwe were all foreign, with the South African rand and United States dollar being the most commonly used. While still remaining a legal tender, the Zimbabwean dollar was virtually unused by the time the fourth incarnation was released. The Zimbabwean dollar was officially dropped as legal tender on 12 April 2009. The Zimbabwean dollar was not demonetized until 2015. In the latter half 2015, the government began exchanges of old currencies with the United States dollar.


Beginning with the fourth Zimbabwean currency, individuals could exchange money at an exchange rate of ZWL 250 for US$1. The ZWL 1 would not be part of this exchange.\textsuperscript{144} The third Zimbabwean dollar could also be exchanged at a rate of ZWR 35 quadrillion to US$1. Bank accounts above ZWR 175 quadrillion would automatically be exchanged at this rate.\textsuperscript{145}

Following the removal of the Zimbabwean dollar from the market, the Botswana pula, South African rand, United States dollar, European Union euro, and British pound were used. Later in 2015, the Chinese renminbi (yuan), Indian rupee, Australian dollar, and Japanese yen were added to the collection.

While this so called dollarization, or the adopting of the United States dollar as the \textit{de facto} (and later \textit{de jure}) currency, stopped hyperinflation and forced fiscal discipline, the negative effects have begun to surface in recent years. Now, Zimbabwe is on the verge of what might be another economic collapse.

\textsuperscript{144} "Cash for Zimdollar Notes, Says RBZ." \textit{The Zimbabwe Herald}. The Zimbabwe Herald, 4 June 2015. Web. 1 Sept. 2016.

Instead of an abundance of currency and seemingly endless printing of yet more cash, Zimbabweans are now facing the crisis of too little currency. For the government, as they no longer print their own currency, they began only spending what cash it had, dubbed “cash budgeting.” Unfortunately, the government also did not balance their budget, with expenses far surpassing revenue.146 The lack of a balanced budget and the overspending and over-importation of the Mugabe regime has damaged – and even threatened to reverse – the progress made in the economy following its dollarization.

After Mugabe’s reelection in 2013, concern over the continuation of foreign investments was repeatedly brought up. The hopes of businesses to recover was put on hold, as there would be no potential under Mugabe to reinvigorate industries.147 Several diplomats and businessmen have ruled out true economic reform until Mugabe leaves office, most likely to happen only when he dies.148 The country saw slow and delicate

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improvement from the introduction of the multi-currency regime until the elections, but with all power back in the hands of Mugabe and ZANU-PF, poor economic decisions could easily revert the growth already achieved.

Zimbabwe has been facing a cash shortage ever since the switch to foreign currencies. No longer in control of the money supply in circulation, all currency was gained through exports (for the government) or through remittance (for the citizens). With a struggling South African economy, a decrease in remittances from the estimated three million Zimbabweans working in the neighboring country left a dramatic impact. During the Christmas season in 2009, banks imposed limits on cash withdrawals, which in turn caused a sharp decrease in large sales that quarter.

The severity of the liquidity problem was not fully realized until the latter half of 2013, when retailers were forced to cut prices in order to encourage spending. Dismal and reducing sales, large lines for cash withdrawals at banks, and the closure of many factories all plagued the nation as Mugabe was once more reelected.

Once Mugabe announced his cabinet, already having been delayed by a month-and-a-half, it was clear that the government was not looking after its citizens first. The makeup of the cabinet was focused first and foremost on balancing ZANU-PF factions, already beginning to fracture among rumors surrounding the health of Mugabe. The needs of the country came second in the determination of the composition of the cabinet.

The lack of money also hurt savings and loans; money was stored in banks for a maximum of 90 days, and banks only lent money for smaller loans, such as the restocking of a grocery store, as opposed to desperately needed loans to modernize or build industry.

While introduced in 2008, an indigenisation law, known formally as the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act, emerged as the primary detractor to foreign business investment. The policy, which took effect in 2008, was further pushed beginning in 2013; companies are required to have at least 51% of their ownership in the hands of “indigenous” Zimbabweans, referring to individuals placed under discriminatory practices prior to Zimbabwean independence in April 1980 and their descendants. The vague wording of the law has led to a variety of reactions from companies.
already operating in the county, but has been seen as the main issue holding back international companies from running in Zimbabwe. In August 2013, Saviour Kasukuwere, the Indigenisation Minister, reported plans to seize foreign-owned mining companies without compensation, though he added that if the foreign banks were seized, compensation would be given. This law was claimed to be a transfer of wealth back to the ordinary Zimbabweans, echoing rational for the 2000 land reform program.

That said, it appears that the Zimbabwean government has not always been as strict on indigenisation laws, with Kasukuwere having granted exemption to several Chinese firms in 2011; Kasukuwere stated that the exemptions were only being given to investors hailing from non-hostile countries, referencing Zimbabwe’s eastern allies.149

The multicurrency regime, though it immediately brought basic stability to the Zimbabwean economy, has caused several issues. Primarily, the Zimbabwean government has no control on their currencies, and by extension has little say in the markets. The completely liberalized economy has caused problems, especially regarding trade with neighboring countries.

Compared to other regional currencies, particularly the South African rand, the United States dollar is very strong; this makes imports into Zimbabwe cheaper. As the dollar dominates transactions, the rise in its value causes a reduction in competitiveness within Zimbabwe. It has become cheaper to import goods from neighboring countries than to produce them within its borders.

With the switch to the dollar, there was a shortage of change, which caused forced change to be handed out in the form of candy and pens. This lack of small monetary units also caused prices to be rounded up to the nearest whole dollar. In an attempt to reduce prices, the government introduced bond coins; these coins would be on-par with the value of their United States cent counterparts, but would be issued by the Zimbabwean government. Exclusively usable inside Zimbabwe, the coins were made in one, five, ten, twenty-five, and fifty cent amounts. As the cost of importing change from the United States was grand, this solution was chosen. The coins were introduced in December 2014, save the fifty cent coin, introduced in March the following year. Skepticism was widespread

following the announcement of the bond coins, with fear of the government reintroducing the Zimbabwean dollar.\textsuperscript{150}

In May 2016, the Zimbabwean government announced plans of introducing "bond notes," as a response to the severe shortage of cash. With values of $2, $5, $10, and $20, these notes will be tied to the value of the United States dollar. The notes are expected to be released in October. With over 90% of transactions using it, the shortage of the United States dollar left many waiting in long lines at the bank hoping to withdraw bills, as the ATMs stopped working earlier in the year.\textsuperscript{151} Functionally acting as an extension of the bond coins, these new bond notes are planned to be backed by a US$200 million loan from the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank). Opposition quickly asserted that bond notes were a clear sign of "economic illiteracy" from Mugabe and his lieutenants. At the time of the announcement of the bond notes, the government only had US$303 million in reserves. While RBZ governor John Mangudya tried to insist that this was in no way the reintroduction of the Zimbabwean dollar (or another domestic currency), many in the public expressed major doubts.\textsuperscript{152} In July, two months after the initial announcement, the Minister of Finance Patrick Chinamasa stated that the circulation of bond notes would depend on the amount of exports from Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{153} Unlike the bond coins, which were met with skepticism and fear, the announcement over bond notes, combined with other economic woes, led to the eruption of civilians. Protesting against economic mismanagement and governmental corruption, these protest movements have engulfed the nation in the past several months, and show no signs of stopping in the near future.\textsuperscript{154}


With the informal economy still operating as a large part of the economy, official unemployment rates are widely varying. Unemployment rates from the past decade range from 4% to 95%, from the World Bank and CIA World Factbook, respectively, and everything in between. A survey from 2011 posted by Zimstat, the governmental statistics agency, reported unemployment at 10.7%. Later, during the 2013 election campaign, ZANU-PF claimed unemployment at 60, while Tsvangirai of MDC-T stated it at 85% at the same time. The many claims of unemployment follow different methodologies to get their numbers, but all share the common theme of being based on unreliable data. 155

While there are not any numbers to quantify unemployment, the issue is still prevalent and a large aspect of current political criticism. Among those worst affected are recent graduates of higher education. A growing number of these graduates are forced to take on low-skill labor work – including shelf stackers, kombi drivers, and vendors – as that is the only work they can find, if they are lucky enough even for that. The government campaigned in 2013 with a strong focus on employment, making promises of creating jobs in ZANU-PF’s campaign manifesto. 156

Since their election victory, Mugabe and his party have failed to make substantial improvements to the unemployment situation striking the country. With the downsizing or outright closing of many companies, the government has attempted to halt lay-offs by passing bills, which additionally include forced severance pay. 157

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The false pledge from 2013 to create 2.2 million jobs and the continually worsening outlook on employment led to this being a prominent factor in the mass protests that have occurred over the last few months. A protest under the name #ThisGown saw university graduates playing soccer made from trash while in graduation gowns. An organization, the Zimbabwe Coalition for Unemployed Graduates (ZCUG) put on the protest, and has seen its membership grow to over 30,000 in just over two months.158

In what is claimed to be an attempt to support domestic industries, the Zimbabwean government placed an importation ban on a list of basic goods on 17 June, which later went into effect at the start of July. Among the items banned from being imported include bottled water, potato chips, baked beans, ice cream, cheese, canned fruits and vegetables, peanut butter, furniture, second-hand tires, fertilizers, and woven fabrics of cotton, among others.159 Many of the goods banned support the large informal economy. Hardest hit by the import bans was Beitbridge, the busiest inland border post in sub-Saharan Africa and bordering the regional economic powerhouse of South Africa.160 Protests on either side of the border broke out on 1 July at Beitbridge; the protesters destroyed property and allegedly burned down a warehouse belonging to the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA).161 Tensions with Zimbabwe’s southern neighbor have grown tense over the ban, with South Africa threatening that they would not stand for the embargo.162 On the other hand, manufacturing companies within Zimbabwe are continuing to call for an expansion of the list of banned import items.163

It is estimated that 1.5 Zimbabweans have entered neighboring South Africa since 2005 seeking asylum. While it is often claimed that many of these individuals fleeing Zimbabwe are economic migrants, that explanation falls flat of the real reasons, such as political persecution of opposition supporters, destruction of houses and businesses of those in informal structures and businesses, and the second worst hyperinflation ever seen. Both specific targeting, such as that of Operation Murambatsvina and targeting of MDC-T supporters in the 2008 run-off election, and generalized deterioration of basic institutes, such as the health sector, and generalized oppression have caused many to leave their country as a last resort.

South Africa’s response was deportation, though those who are deported often return to the country only a few weeks later. Additionally, only a select few of those who apply for asylum actually gain said status. South Africa’s then-President Mbeki ignored the severity of the situation.

Zimbabwean’s fleeing their country also sought asylum in the United Kingdom, given they could afford the plane tickets, or other neighboring countries, such as Botswana, Mozambique, and Zambia.164

The health system in Zimbabwe has taken several severe hits over the last decade. During the last year of hyperinflation and the following year, a cholera outbreak sent the already diminishing state of hospitals into total disarray. While approximately 60,000 people were being treated for cholera, the vacuum of hospital staff – particularly nurses – caused a challenge to treatment. A severe shortage of both drugs and medical equipment also caused problems.\(^{165}\) Since then, improvements have been made, but the system is still struggling. The number of doctors and nurses increased dramatically, and the spread of HIV and AIDS was stabilized.\(^{166}\)

The healthcare system once again was hit, this time coinciding with the wave of protests. A strike by nurses, who were protesting not getting paid their salaries from the prior month, temporarily halted hospitals. Import bans caused depleted hospital supplies to remain in low quantity, with Citizens Health Watch reporting that 90% of healthcare facilities lack stock of essential medicines. Shortages of antiretroviral (ARV) drugs also happen sporadically, potentially causing patients to miss dosages – a potentially dangerous event. A majority of Zimbabwean hospitals are currently running at under 30% of capacity.\(^{167}\)

The lack of food in Zimbabwe has been a major problem since the land reform’s saw a decrease in staple food production. What was once a food exporter has needed to import vast quantities of food for nearly two decades now. In 2005, in order to avoid famine, Zimbabwe needed to import 1.2 million metric tons of food.\(^{168}\) The Global Hunger Index (GHI) gave Zimbabwe a score of 30.8 in 2015 (with a lower score being better), which corresponds to a "serious" threat. Approximately one out of every three citizens are undernourished. Fortunately, the score has decreased since 2005, when the score


Currently, 4.1 million Zimbabweans are food-insecure, predominately in rural areas; drought and El Niño have caused natural issues regarding food production, but the government's actions have also had a significant impact on the current food crisis.\textsuperscript{170} Due to the current drought across southern Africa, Mugabe has declared a "state of disaster" as half of Zimbabwe's rural population – nearly five million people – need or will soon need food assistance. The government has attempted to import grain from neighboring countries to help prevent a famine.\textsuperscript{171} A reported US$1.5 billion is needed by the government to fund this emergency importation, as well as to finance other relief programs.

As the grass dried up, animals died due to lack of food; approximately 16,000 cattle have perished due to the drought. Wells also dried up, causing many people, usually women, to travel long distances to retrieve water.\textsuperscript{172}


Zimbabwe’s relations with its neighbors and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as a whole are generally positive, though have faced rough patches over various crises in Zimbabwe. SADC contains fifteen member states: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Individual members mostly have favorable relations with Zimbabwe. In honor of the strong relationship between Mugabe and former President Julius Nyerere, Tanzania maintains a committed relationship to Zimbabwe and its leaders; military trainings of Tanzanian cadets in Zimbabwe has strengthened the relation between the nations. Angola and Namibia both have close military alliances with Zimbabwe, and Zimbabwe supported Mozambique’s government against militant Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). Mozambique also heavily supported Mugabe’s ZANU group during the Rhodesian Bush War. Zimbabwe also played a key role in backing Laurent Kabila’s Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) against insurgencies sponsored by Rwanda and

Uganda.\textsuperscript{174} Neighboring Zambia has seen an increase in trade between the two nations, and a general strengthening in the relation between the states.\textsuperscript{175}

Relationships with neighbors Botswana and South Africa have been more strained, particularly due to a substantial influx of refugees to both states. A fence between Botswana and Zimbabwe has caused some tensions, but Botswana maintains its stance that it is for preventing Batswana cattle from being infected with foot and mouth disease coming from across the border in Zimbabwe. Others have compared the fence to that surrounding the West Bank, and the Zimbabwean government believes the fence is to prevent illegal crossings into Botswana.\textsuperscript{176} The 500 km (311 miles) electric fence started construction in 2003 and ranged from Maitengwe (north of Francistown) to Mabata; 2,500 illegal crossings were taking place from Zimbabwe to Botswana per month at the height of hyperinflation.\textsuperscript{177}

The regional power, South Africa, has had a tense relationship with Zimbabwe. Through the majority of the economic crisis in Zimbabwe, South African President Mbeki used “quiet diplomacy” in an attempt to stabilize their neighbor. The policy has been widely criticized, particularly because it was unsuccessful in achieving any major results, save a highly flawed unity government.\textsuperscript{178}

The Zimbabwe import ban has more recently sparked disagreements between Pretoria and Harare. The South African government has expressed plans to challenge the ban, though the ban remains in effect and has the potential to expand.\textsuperscript{179}

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Mugabe’s stance towards the West is unfavorable, while he views many Western governments with suspicion. The ZANU-PF government has throughout the decades stated harsh words towards Western nations, such as accusing the United States and United Kingdom for causing drought in 2005\(^\text{165}\) to criticizing “illegal economic sanctions, subversive activities and internal interferences from hostile countries.”\(^\text{180}\) The land reforms of 2000 sparked the hostilities from Zimbabwe, especially towards the United Kingdom. Mugabe also saw MDC, formed in 1999, as Western-sponsored. Western media has had no hesitation in returning insults, comparing Mugabe to the likes of Pol Pot and Hitler.\(^\text{181}\)

With the new 2013 constitution, the European Union saw a potential for change, and dropped sanctions and offered aid money to Zimbabwe. While travel bans are still in effect for Mugabe and his top officials, as well as an arms embargo on the country, the resumption of positive interactions leads the possibility of further cooperation between the southern African nation and the trading bloc.\(^\text{182}\)

The United States has also maintained its targeted sanctions against the regime and continues to condemn the ZANU-PF-sponsored political violence. While Washington and Harare are quick to criticize each other, the United States has continued to provide aid to Zimbabwe throughout their history; an attempt to restore the economy followed dollarization and a Center for Disease Control (CDC) health assistance program also assisted Zimbabwe with combating HIV and AIDS.\(^\text{183}\)

Despite the West economically contributing to the country, the West and Zimbabwe are at odds and still have no trust in each other. Any intervention in Zimbabwe from the West is accused of being against Mugabe, and any opposition to the president is suspected of being Western-sponsored.


Relations with Russia and China date back to the Rhodesian Bush War and Zimbabwe’s fight for independence. During the war, the two factions fighting white minority rule were ZAPU, backed by the Soviet Union, and ZANU, a break-off group who was backed by China. Support from the two Eurasian countries came in the form of military support, logistics, and training. The Soviet Union and China’s backing of the two opposing guerrilla groups was itself a proxy for a growing rift between the two superpowers.

After the war ended and Mugabe won the elections, the Chinese relationship was maintained; Mugabe additionally worked towards allying himself with the Soviets, inviting them to the country’s independence celebration. This inclusion in turn caused greater support by China, in fear of losing influence in the new country. Following his inauguration, Mugabe himself visited Beijing. Throughout the remainder of the twentieth century, loans and high-level official visits strengthened the China-Zimbabwe relationship further. Following the harsh criticism of China following Tiananmen Square, Zimbabwe continued to support their Asian ally. China also defended Zimbabwe during criticisms of Mugabe and his controversial land reform program.

Until the turn of the century, economic ties between China and Zimbabwe were fairly weak; economic ties between Russia and Zimbabwe were even less eventful. With


the schism between the West and Zimbabwe following land resettlement, Russia and China had an opening to influence the country unchallenged. While Zimbabwe received sanctions from the United States and the European Union, it received a massive increase in trade from China, with trade volume with China more than doubling from 1997 to 2000.

Ties further strengthened when Zimbabwe introduced its “Look East” policy, where the government looked to increase relations with countries from the East (such as China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Russia, and Singapore) after the country had been shut off from the West. In his statement, Mugabe announced, “we have turned east, where the sun rises, and given our back to the west, where the sun sets.”

Around the same time, China was looking towards Africa with its Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC). While the West had cut off Zimbabwe from their funds due to the controversial land reform, China’s non-interference policy let the relationship continue, regardless of the actions taken by the government. Through the framework of FOCAC, the economic ties between the nations began strengthening yet again, this time through loans and investment projects.

Russian relations also grew, and so did economic ties; Russian companies invested in power, aviation, and especially mining sectors. The country became known as Zimbabwe’s “all-weather friend.”

The isolation from the West increased alliances not only economically. China and Russia together vetoed a sanction resolution in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2005, and again in 2008 for a targeted sanction resolution. While China maintained its non-interference policy, the government still supported the African Union and SADC in solving the political stalemate in 2008. China has also continued supporting Zimbabwe with arms, which led to controversy on at least one occasion. In April 2008, a Chinese shipment of weapons to the landlocked Zimbabwe landed at Durban, South Africa; the dock workers refused to unload the cargo and were backed by their powerful South African unions. Anglican archbishop Rubin Phillip of KwaZulu Natal (KZN; the province Durban is in) also appealed to the country’s High Court in an attempt to stop the transportation of the arms, believing they would be used for repression. Following a brief waiting period in South African ports, the An Yue Jiang was refused unloading of its cargo, and eventually headed to Luanda, Angola. Only cargo for Angola was unloaded in Luanda.

After China cancelled US$40 million in debt in late 2015, Zimbabwe added the yuan as legal tender, bringing the basket of foreign currencies used up to nine currencies. The following year, Zimbabwe’s economic situation continued to deteriorate and mass protests began; China was silent on the issue. The country known for its non-intervention policy stayed true to its word throughout Zimbabwe’s human rights controversies, but China continues to stay true when Mugabe needs the intervention to support himself and his ruling party. Relations between Zimbabwe and both Russia and China remain strong; the relations also play an important role in supporting Mugabe and his regime.


II. PILLARS ANALYSIS

Over the years, Mugabe has relied heavily on a wide swath of pillars in order to remain in power. Over the years, various groups have fallen in and out of ZANU-PF’s control, and the pillars supporting the regime have shifted. More recent shifts have occurred due to the current economic crisis and mass protest movements. Even with all these changes, some pillars remain heavily entrenched under Mugabe’s control.

### POLICE AND MILITARY:

Both of the main armed forces have long supported the status quo, with leaders in both the police and military firmly entrenched in the ZANU-PF system. With plenty of benefits in the current system, both groups oppose the current protests. Police have used violence to break the groups up. While the general soldiers and officers are not necessarily firm supporters of ZANU-PF, they are largely for the continuation of the system as it provides them with pay and security. Claims that the police and military could join the protest are justified though, with that event likely to occur if the workers are not paid on time; with the government’s lack of cash and failure to pay many other civil servants on time, falling behind on paying police and military members is not unlikely.

Even so, both groups are still acting on behalf of Mugabe at the moment, and that is unlikely to change soon. While the police switching sides over lack of pay is plausible, it is unlikely that the entire military would change allegiances.
The military’s ties to ZANU-PF range back to the war of independence, and strong ideological links exist. The army chief has even stated the military would only recognize a president that is a veteran from the war.\textsuperscript{191}

Under direct order from the president himself, the CIO has been used by Mugabe to stay in power, especially through orders of violence during elections. The group has performed harassment, beatings, abductions, and torture against opponents of ZANU-PF; the organization functions as a branch within ZANU-PF. Due to political benefits from the higher-ups in the CIO, the organization is unlikely to break from ZANU-PF, in particularly President Mugabe, any time soon. 

Much of the respect towards Mugabe comes from his efforts to free the country in the Rhodesian Bush War, where he served as a leader in ZANU. Additionally, many others in the ruling ZANU-PF previously fought in the independence war. Nationalism and gratitude for ZANU-PF is fueled out of the respect of the veterans of war. Even nearly four decades after the end of the conflict, the strong collective legacy of the war is present in the country. Support of opposition parties has been portrayed as betraying the country and those who fought for it. The idea of honoring the freedom fighters by supporting ZANU-PF has been further pushed by the army, combining threats of violence, intimidation, and guilt.

Traditionally, the courts have sided with Mugabe, whether it be on their own accord or through pressure from the executive branch. In the last few years, though, several levels of courts have begun making rulings that go against the ruling party, showing signs that courts might be becoming more independent. Major blows against the government’s tight media control came in October 2013 and again in June 2014. In the first case, the judge ruled in favor of the two journalists and the visual artist, ruling that sections 31 and 33 of the Criminal Law (Reform and Codification) Act to be removed; this only applied to cases which occurred before the new constitution. The second victory against media control came just under a year later, where the Constitutional Court dismissed the charges against two journalists charged with defamation, striking down section 96 of the Criminal Law (Reform and Codification) Act, which contained the criminal defamation provisions.

While those cases did go against the ruling party, the rulings were only minor setbacks for ZANU-PF. In Pastor Mawarire’s July 2016 trial, Magistrate Vakayi Chikwekwe ruled against the charges of “acting to overthrow the government;” the Magistrate claimed that Mawarire was charged with inciting public violence and disturbing the peace, but the charges were increased following the arrest, thus breaking police protocol. This ruling showed even further independence of the judiciary, as by this point Mugabe saw Mawarire and the #ThisFlag movement as a serious threat to his power.
War veterans have been one of Mugabe’s most loyal and crucial supporters throughout most of his stint as head of state. The war veterans were the lead perpetrators of land seizures during the land reform, as well as one of the groups who utilized violence during the same events. Violence during several elections also took place at the hands of this group. Long thought to be firmly on the side of Mugabe, the group has started to shift away from their long-time leader. At the end of August 2016, Victor Matemadanda, secretary-general of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veteran Association (ZNLWVA), met with Tsvangirai; Victor later stated that the war veterans wanted to work with everyone in the goal of building a new Zimbabwe. The war veterans have also met with Promise Mkwananzi, leader of Tajamuka, and plans to meet with former vice president Mujuru and Simba Makoni, leader of the quasi-political party Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn (MKD). In a new turn of events, war veterans are now able to support the political party of their choosing, as opposed to the previous, exclusive support for ZANU-PF.\textsuperscript{192}

Zimbabwe’s southern neighbor has long remained generally neutral and silent about the crises in Zimbabwe over the years, especially under previous president Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy” policy. His successor, Jacob Zuma, has continued relative neutrality towards Mugabe. Pressure from within South Africa, especially from opposition party Democratic Alliance (DA), is pressuring Zuma to break his government’s silence and take a firm stance at addressing the issues in Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{193} The import ban on many basic commodities threatens to force action by South Africa, who is Zimbabwe’s largest trade partner. The South African government has exerted pressure on Zimbabwe to remove import limitations, though response has been weak.\textsuperscript{194} While the import bans are still relatively new, there is potential that South Africa will begin speaking out against Mugabe’s regime in the very near future, starting with the trade blockade.


Zimbabwe’s independent media, as well as international media, has been highly critical of the Mugabe regime. The most accessible information though, it from government-controlled media sources. In recent years, the government media has been used as a weapon between in-fighting factions of ZANU-PF as the fight for Mugabe’s successor intensifies. The media therefore has lost the strict pro-ZANU-PF stance it once had, and instead can be occasionally seen attacking prominent members of the ruling party themselves. It is clear that independent and foreign media will support regime change, the media will be fighting on behalf of a given faction, which is not necessarily entirely against removing Mugabe, if the political toss-up can be taken advantage of in their favor.

While China has consistently been a close ally for ZANU-PF, with both countries backing each other through thick and thin. That said, China still holds dear its non-interventionist foreign policy, which has shown as China has remained quiet during the current string of protests. Continued investment and backing in the UN Security Council are likely to continue, but so is China’s support of groups looking to seek solution in Zimbabwe. The current heads of China are unlikely to differ from their long-held policy, and will therefore not intervene in any major way.

While opposition parties are split across over a dozen groups, the main objective of all the parties is still identical: taking down Mugabe. While the discussions on strategy and the post-Mugabe government have no unity, an allegiance still exists to is forming. A coalition between Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn (MKD), Renewal Democrats of Zimbabwe (RDZ), MDC-N, Zimbabweans United for Democracy (ZUNDE), and the Democratic Assembly for Restoration and Empowerment (DARE) has already formed, with DARE head Gilbert Dzikiti as chairman. MDC-T and Mujuru’s Zimbabwe People First have expressed interest in joining the coalition, though have not fully committed yet. There is also a possibility that ZAPU might join.\(^\text{196}\)

Opposition movements will also cooperate, especially the two largest groups, Tajamuka and #ThisFlag, who have already announced their intentions to coordinate. The stay-away protests were produced as a cooperation between both these protest movements and major opposition parties. The groups are likely to continue pressuring the Mugabe regime in collaborations.

The rift between Mugabe and the West seems to be too far gone to recover, with consistent human rights abuses condemned by the United States, the European Union, and others. Various sanctions from several groups also target the leaders of ZANU-PF, but are not placed on the entire country or on opposition leaders. Support for the unity government came from the West, as has support for Tsvangirai. The United States’ claim to support democracy across the globe holds true in Zimbabwe, where the hegemon has continuously supported and called for free and fair elections, as well as true democracy.

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Both teachers and recent graduates – as well as those soon to join the latter – have a vested interest in seeing ZANU-PF leave power. Teachers have been primary targets for voter oppression, with threats and various acts of violence levied against them. Generally, the teachers have been forced out of the realm of opposition politics for their own safety, but a growing change could see greater safety in voicing support for opposition parties. Graduates, with their advanced education, have faced years of no jobs and their career fields in ruin. Many have been forced to street vendors or other low-paying jobs in order to scrape by; others have sought work elsewhere, particularly in South Africa. As Mugabe has previously shown, his government is unable to handle the recovery of an economy, which is what so many graduates desperately need.

Mugabe’s handling and perpetuation of the failing Zimbabwean economy from the late 1990s through the formation of the unity government was disastrous. The ZANU-PF government continuously made poor choices, usually at the benefit of the elite and destitution of the poor. The formation of the unity government in 2009 placed MDC-T members in charge of the economy, which introduced dollarization and the stabilization of the market. After the next elections saw the victory of ZANU-PF, the economy began once more eroding. This time, political pressure and mass protests demanding economic reform are placing further pressure on the leading party to this time manage to save the economy. The legacy of Mugabe’s previous redenominations and excessive bill-printing are still fresh in the minds of many, and none are eager to return to those days.
Violence is one of any dictator’s favorite tools, and it is one that Mugabe has not hesitated to use in the past against his enemies. Elections are riddled with violence against opposition supporters, or even those just thought to be opposition. Particularly violent was the run-off election in 2008, after Mugabe lost the initial election. Clearly feeling out of other options, the mass oppression that followed caused Tsvangirai to pull out, thus securing victory for Mugabe. Elections are not the only time Mugabe has used violence to achieve his political aspirations; the 1980s saw tens of thousands of individuals in ZAPU stronghold Matabeleland killed. Mugabe was able to secure the merger of ZANU and ZAPU, thus creating his desired one-party state.

It is entirely possible that with many of his traditional allies distancing themselves from him – such as war veterans – Mugabe might feel the only remaining power at his disposal is the armed forces. Repression against both opposition parties and the protest movements could break out, especially during protest rallies where large groups gather together. While the protests are primarily demanding economic reform, the opposition parties are attempting to win at the elections, which is likely to face violence once again. In this scenario it is not so much if Mugabe will utilize violence to secure his next term as president, but when. As a man who (indirectly) gained his position through violence, Mugabe is almost assured to use it to keep his position.
As Mugabe is 92 years old and has deteriorating health, death is not far away. But with his death, it is more likely that an unchosen successor from within ZANU-PF will take control and lead the nation. Research suggests that if a dictator is to die while in power, neither democracy nor a regime change is most likely; instead a new leader rises. While Mugabe’s successor is unknown, it is likely between Grace Mugabe and Emmerson Mnangagwa. Most likely, one of those two would become the next president if Mugabe died in office, and neither are likely to introduce sweeping changes or the introduction of free democracy.

While political parties have before been close to winning against Mugabe and ZANU-PF, the protest movements have targeted ZANU-PF and pulled away his most trusted allies, such as the war veterans. With other pillars, such as the courts, moving away from fully supporting him, Mugabe continues to lose control with each passing month. Mugabe will not go down without a fight, but the goals of the protest movement, specifically a free and fair election, might come to fruition if enough pressure is placed on the despot. There is a strong chance that if these free and fair elections can actually be achieved, opposition victory is a very real possibility. That of course would also mean a united opposition, which has real chances of joining together for the 2018 elections.

The protest movements are also placing pressure on economic policies and reform. As the government is nearly out of foreign cash, some form of change is going to have to happen, whether the government willingly changes its policy or simply runs out of money to spend. Specifically, if the plans to introduce bond notes is put on permanent hold, the minimal foreign cash remaining in the country cannot remain in the possession of the government. With no money to spend, the civil servants – potentially including the police and military – will join and further grow the protests. Inaction on behalf of the government will lead to a lack of options for Mugabe, and the strength of the protest movements will determine if he stays in power or not.

Change is coming to Zimbabwe, whether Mugabe likes it or not. The Zimbabwean president is not only battling the opposition, but also his fracturing party and his deteriorating health. While the opposition remains split, mass protest movements are bringing individuals together in a way not seen before in Zimbabwe. As unity and resolute grow in those not supporting the 36-year reigning head of state, Mugabe’s own ZANU-PF party has shown infighting over who will succeed Mugabe once he passes; based on the minimal details released about Mugabe’s health, that day might be coming sooner rather than later.

The opposition movements have been able to gain widespread support, but have relied on only a handful of tactics. Protest rallies are consistently met with police violence, and have done little but gain notoriety. Several “stay-away” protests have also occurred, though only the original managed to have success. While the demands of the first stay-away were not met, the fact that the protest worked brought fear to the ruling party that the protests were not to be taken lightly. With leader of the #ThisFlag movement, Pastor Evan Mawarire, abroad, the protesters have faced doubts about their abilities to continue effectively placing pressure against the regime. Recent protests have faced a mix of successes and failures, and face the potential to see the distribution shifted to the latter if new ideas are not introduced.

As the economy of Zimbabwe once again crumbles, a nation longing for economic stability looks for hope in a fresh, fiscally responsible ruling party. The opposition might be fractured, but most citizens know that whatever forms from opposition unity and coalition is superior to the economically illiterate ZANU-PF. With a new coalition of opposition parties forming, the potential for a united opposition to Mugabe is for the first time since 2005 possible. While not all opposition parties have signed on, most notably the largest opposition party, MDC-T, signs point to a strong likelihood that other parties will join the agreement.
With no foreign currency in their possession, both the citizens and the government are going to have to either improvise or face a stunned economy. With exports continuing to outspend imports, nearly half of the money coming into the government is through remittance. As the government does not mint its own currency, and even the pseudo-currency bond notes being rejected by the population, they are soon to be forced to make changes in order to continue operating. While previously the government simply printed more money to pay for debts or salaries, that option is not available this time.

While there have been attempts to take Mugabe out of office since the mid-1980s, for the first time the possibility has actually arrived. While there are still many paths Zimbabwe can go down, a brighter future is within reach.