Palestinian Nonviolence in the context of Trump’s Jerusalem announcement

Photo: “Jerusalem itself has seen some of the largest protests, as here in front of the Dome of the Rock Islamic shrine at the al-Aqsa mosque compound in the Old City. Hundreds of additional police were deployed to control the masses after Palestinian calls for protests after Friday prayers.” (Getty Images/AFP/A.Gharabli, via Deutsche Welle)

Published on 13/12/2017

A week ago, President Trump’s announcement of recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s official capital and moving the US Embassy there has sparked strong reactions globally and in the region, fostering ongoing tensions. BBC wrote that the “status of Jerusalem goes to the heart of Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians”, as both sides make their claims to the city. Jerusalem is home to key religious sites for Jews, Muslims and Christians, especially in the East. While Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has welcomed the US’ move and labeled it a “historic landmark” and “courageous and just”, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas blamed the decision to be unacceptable and to undermine every peace effort. Leader of the Islamist movement Hamas, Ismail Haniya, has called for a “new intifada” and sees the American move as an aggression against his people. Meanwhile, “Fatah Central Committee Member Nasser al-Qudwa called for participation in ‘non-violent’ and ‘unarmed’ protests“, reported The Jerusalem Post.

UN Secretary General António Guterres stated the issue “would jeopardise the prospect of peace for Israelis and Palestinians”, the status of Jerusalem better to be negotiated between the two parties. During a UN Security Council emergency meeting which was held on Friday, the move was also met with widespread international condemnation. US Ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, countered the criticism, calling the decision common sense due to other Israeli political institutions being in Jerusalem. She went on to say that “with its decision, the US has not taken a position on boundaries or borders; it has not advocated for any change in the administration around holy sites in Jerusalem, and it has not predetermined final status issues”, wrote Al Jazeera.

Besides the condemnation on the diplomatic level, Trump’s announcement has also caused widespread protests and sometimes violent clashes in the Palestinian territories, but also beyond the region. Not only were protests held in other countries with major Muslim populations across the Middle East, North Africa or Southeast Asia, but also in cities like London, Athens, Rome or Berlin. While some security forces, like those in Lebanon met demonstrators with means like teargas and water cannons, Israeli military has reportedly killed four in Gaza targeting “Hamas facilities” after rockets fired earlier in Israeli direction.

Where such violence by security forces should certainly be condemned, this article rather seeks to focus on acts of violence in civil society engagement. That is, because violence can be destructive for civilian-based power looking to create change. In CANVAS Guide to Effective Nonviolent Struggle, “Nonviolent Discipline” is explained as one of the three general principles for success of nonviolent campaigns and movements (pp. 88-92). In this context, nonviolent discipline is two-fold: it means “following the strategic plan for a struggle and refraining from violence” (p. 90), wherein the latter refers to members of the movement not using violence in their own actions and not participating in “threats to violence”. The importance of nonviolent discipline is due to several reasons. It makes movements more inclusive for the general population and takes away the excuse for a violent crackdown or de-legitimizes the opponent if met with violence in return. Nonviolence also creates sympathy and growing support for a cause, even with security forces who are deployed and receive orders to suppress the movement – a recent example of which has been the Honduran police defying its orders.

Furthermore, studies like the prominent example of Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan (2011) have shown that nonviolent civil resistance is more likely to be successful than its violent counterpart. And while some might have a contrary perception, articles have been highlighting a tradition of nonviolence in Palestinian resistance (see e.g. Peace Science Digest, Vol. 2 Special Issue, June 2017, pp. 10-13, Yousef Munayyer on Foreign Policy, 2011, or Mason & Falk, State Crime Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 2016, pp. 163-186). Considering this and the current international attention, Palestinian protesters could build on their nonviolent past and try to push for a next step in a peaceful, constructive and inclusive resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict.

To read more about the protests and international reactions to the announcement you can go to the following sources:

Fighting Big Corporations – Attac-Activists Occupy Apple Store Paris

Protest at the Apple store in Paris on Saturday Credits: Christophe Archambault/AFP 

Published on 05/12/2017

Over the weekend, Apple was the target of a wide-spread protest-campaign. Groups of activists all over France protested against alleged tax-evasion by the US-based multinational technology company.  The occupation of the Apple store in Paris was the event that generated most media-coverage. About a hundred activists invaded and occupied the expansive two-level store near the Paris Opera for several hours. Activists demanded that the US technology giant pays billions of euros of overdue taxes.  

The actions came after the August 2016 reporting by the European Commission, in which it estimated that the company owed $14.5 billion in taxes after it negotiated highly favourable tax arrangements with the Irish government. Last month “Paradise Papers” shed light on Apple’s tax avoidance strategy, by which the company transferred funds to the small island of Jersey, which typically does not tax corporate income and is largely exempt from European Union tax regulations.  

The French protesters were a part of Attac, an international organizational network of activist groups that seeks alternatives to unbridled globalization, particularly opposing its neo-liberal aspects. The group held about 30 demonstrations across France on Saturday. “From Rennes to Marseille, from Dijon to Saint Brieuc, Lille or Velizy”, Attac was everywhere in France over the weekend. The direct actions were mostly directed at physical Apple-stores, ranging from public display of discontent to exchanging ideas and information with Apple customers.  

But how does one fight the big corporates of this world? What is the ‘Grand Strategy’ used to curb the power-structures on which their malpractices rely? These companies represent immense economic interests and their powerful leadership seems to have no direct interest in seeing the current power-structures to be altered. Despite the fact that Apple might know it does something which is morally questionable, the company supports its actions by structurally stating that it follows the law in each country it operates in.  

The second target for action, perpetrator if you will, are the governments which allow these companies to make use of beneficial tax-constructions. Their conviction is that, eventually, the country will benefit from the presence of these big companies in the country. But what can you do, if you feel that this rationale does not represent your idea of how things should be. And more important, when you feel that your government ignores the popular opinion about the issue?  

Erica Chenoweth and Tricia Olsen address this issue from a quantitative social science perspective. Their research teaches us about the conditions in which big companies are more likely to concede to civil resistance campaigns. First of all, they find that big corporates will be more likely to give in when campaigns are more durable over time. Then, their study concludes that concessions are more likely when civil resistance campaigns target a large company or a company that is undergoing a leadership change. Finally, companies operating in highly competitive markets in contexts of weak rule of law, and firms operating in industries upon which the state is heavily dependent are less likely to concede. 

However, as our very own Srdja Popovic once said, “these conditions are very important for planning, but what really makes a difference is skills.” What are the methods being used by Attac in this particular Apple-tax protest? First of all, we can see that Attac fights Apple in a campaign, instead of single-protests. Instead of a one-off protest, real change needs to see “a direct-action campaign that harnesses a series of actions into an escalating sequence.” Attac’s representatives stated that they received a formal commitment from an Apple manager that the organization would be granted a meeting with national leadership within 15 days. “If this meeting does not take place, we will come back before Christmas,” spokeswoman Aurelie Trouve said.  

The French Attac campaign seems to have invested a lot of time in building a nation-wide network of activists. Their plan to take on Apple then seems to look beyond direct protests, trying to negotiate the company’s position with the top-management. A meeting with that same management will at least prove a small victory. Building does small victories will deliver you the goods in the end. 

Read more about the work done by Attac in France here! 

With Zimbabwe, other African states are shifting into spotlight!

Photo: People demonstrating their support for Ugandan President and the removal of the presidential age limit, in September (Associated Press, via Washington Post)

Published on 01/12/2017

As the world is watching developments in Zimbabwe, attention has also turned to other longtime rulers on the African continent. Martina Schwikowski for Deutsche Welle thought about the question which has now been raised “Will Africa’s autocrats stay in power?”, while Rodney Muhumuza’s article for the Associated Press titled “After Mugabe, Africa’s other longtime leaders feel a chill.”

The latter could have already been shown by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, who has been in power since 1986. Seemingly startled “by the sight of Zimbabwe’s military takeover that ended the rule of the 93-year-old Mugabe” (Muhumuza), he initiated promotions and a raise of salary for Uganda’s military and officials. “As in Zimbabwe, the military is seen as the most powerful institution in Uganda” wrote Muhumuza further, and quoted a Ugandan academic at the University of Toronto saying that Museveni is aware of the support of the army he needs to stay in power. The 73-year-old Ugandan President is currently hoping for the passing of a bill which lawmakers are working on to remove the age limit of 75 set by the constitution to be able to stay in power.

Other examples of African leaders who have been in power for more than three decades can be found in Cameroon with Paul Biya, Equatorial Guinea with Teodoro Obiang and in Republic of Congo with Denis Sassou Nguesso. Especially Cameroon could be “a powder keg that may very well explode” especially if more were to join the current main opposition party, although unlike Mugabe, Biya “has a firm hold on the military”, said a political scientist at the University of Yaounde, wrote Schwikowski.

Muhumuza expressed that like the large demonstrations in Zimbabwe urging for Mugabe to step down, “leaders across Africa risk being swept from power with support from a popular uprising, especially one angry over economic stagnation or decline.” Meanwhile, Schwikowski wrote in her article: “No Arab Spring for Africa”, warning not to “generaliz[e] the coup in Zimbabwe or drawing premature conclusions” after talking to Liesl Louw-Vaudran, a senior research consultant at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria.  As our in-depth analysis With Mugabe down, the real struggle for New Zimbabwe has just begun! showed, we certainly agree with the latter point of not drawing conclusions too early. And another statement by Louw-Vaudran, saying that “’nothing happened’”, after a coup in Burkina Faso in 2014, which led former President Blaise Compaore to flee after 27 years in power, also underlines an important aspect: having a change in leadership and power does not necessarily mean positive change for the people. This has certainly been a lesson in Egypt in 2011, as already mentioned in our aforementioned analysis: “Eventually, the bad guy was kicked out, only to pave the way for another strongman in the making and people started being suppressed again as soon as they left the streets.”

According to Schwikowski’s article, Louw-Vaudran also suggested not to make too many comparisons, referring to diverging underlying situations in different countries such as Equatorial Guinea or the Republic of the Congo. However, even though the analyst is right about considering each and every case individually, we think it is still valuable to learn from good and bad examples elsewhere. Talking about the countries taken as an example in both articles in more general terms, this could mean to not only think about ‘removing the bad guy’, pushing for a change in personnel, but more importantly, to think about how to trigger meaningful, positive and sustainable transitions for lasting change. Hopefully, political opposition, civil society and other actors involved will keep this in mind when thinking about their ‘Vision of Tomorrow’, strategies and tactics.

Meanwhile, Zimbabwe’s newly installed President Emmerson Mnangagwa presented his cabinet on Thursday. Where many had hoped and pushed for an inclusive transformative body of some kind towards the next general elections, the cabinent was received with disappointment, as largely the same people that caused the Zimbabwean crisis have been recycled. The announcement caused many to argue that Mnangagwa’s main concern seems to have been “rewarding those who brought him to power and Zanu-PF unity.”

Read more about other examples and the fate of longstanding rulers in African states here and here.

Thousands in the streets on Sunday – Romanian protests continued!

Photo: “People hold placards reading ‘All for justice’ during a protest in Bucharest” (Daniel Mihailescu/AFP/Getty Images, via the Guardian)

Published on 29/11/2017

Sunday night, a typical time for protests in Romania, about 30,000 protesters went out on the streets of Bucharest while up to 20,000 demonstrated elsewhere in the country, according to the Guardian. The people were protesting a government draft law which is criticized for possibly putting the judicial system under political control, reported Euronews. Earlier this year, these latest protests had been preceded by Romania’s biggest protests since the 1989 revolution. To learn more, you can consult this article about Lessons for democracy from Romania’s protest movement by Srdja Popovic and Cristian Sallai, also featured on CANVAS’ page in June.

During the protests on Sunday which included brief scuffling with police in Bucharest, wrote the Guardian, Romanians demanded “rights and prosperity”, shouted “Thieves” and “We want justice not corruption”, blowing whistles while they marched. An especially creative and humorous protest sign read “I’ve seen smarter cabinets at IKEA”, as seen on Euronews. According to the Guardian, new protests on Friday, a national public holiday in Romania, have been called for on social media.

And not only protesters are criticizing the proposed bill. Their criticism has been joined by the European Commission, foreign diplomats and thousands of magistrates, wrote Euronews. The news outlet further reported about Laura Kövesi, head of Romania’s anti-corruption directorate (DNA), saying that “’If voted through it will have a serious negative impact on the independence of justice and it will result in political control of prosecutors’ activity’”. She added that “’It will lead to the political subordination of the prosecutors and could seriously obstruct the anti-corruption fight”, stating that “’In my view the independence of justice is not a privilege for the magistrate – it is a fundamental principle in a democratic society.’” According to the Guardian, the national and international critics have claimed that the government seeks to protect senior figures from justice.

In the bill, the government seeks to reform organizations “at the forefront of Romania’s attempts to tackle corruption” which according to the government’s opponents would reduce the power of the DNA as the justice ministry would be able to name the head prosecutors, wrote the Guardian. A judicial inspection body overseeing the work of judges would also be controlled by the ministry, while a new structure staffed by prosecutors to investigate criminal acts by magistrates is being developed. Contested judicial changes also include the president’s right to veto candidates, stated Euronews. These proposed reforms have especially incited public protest as they coincide with changes to the tax system, making employees responsible for social security payments, instead of the employer, reflected the Guardian.

The news outlet meanwhile reports that some experts have said, the proposal does have some positive aspects like including greater transparency and parliamentary scrutiny of the secret services’ work. And according to Euronews, some critics of Kövesi called her anti-corruption drive ‘a politicized witch hunt’ and denounced DNA’s alleged closeness to Romania’s secret service. The Romanian government itself has said their proposal did not include anything allowing the state to take control of the justice system, and it called for a discussion about specific points to be addressed and a reflection of arguments of both sides.

The current government is a coalition between the center-left Social Democrat Party (PSD), the center-right Liberal-Democrat Alliance and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania. The PSD has been criticized for “harbouring former figures from the communist regime”, and its leader Liviu Dragnea has been and is involved and past and current accusations for fraud and corruption, banned from becoming prime minister after a conviction for vote-rigging, reported the Guardian.

Read more about Sunday’s protests in Romania and its background here and here, and learn more about the protests at the beginning of the year, here.

Lessons from radical, political art in Russia: Pussy Riot, Pyotr Pavlensky and Co.

Photo: “Petr Pavlensky sewed his mouth shut in protest of the incarceration of a Russian punk band” (Gleb Husky, via Politico)

Published on 28/11/2017

CNN just published an article by Marat Guelman, son of Russian playwriter Alexander Guelman, and art curator living in Montenegro, who recently opened an exhibition in London titled “Art Riot: Post-Soviet Actionism is dedicated to Russian protest art over the past 25 years.” In the CNN article on “Why Russia produces (and quashes) so much radical art”, Guelman addresses the above topic and states that “Artists have always held a special place in Russian society.”

He describes how developments during Glasnost in the mid-1980s and the return of writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn after exile in 1994, as well as rock music taking over the roles previously occupied by theater and literature, were signs of change, opening and a call for a new, open world. Recently, “contemporary art and provocative performances have proven the most effective medium for influencing public opinion. Artists have their fingers firmly on the pulse of the rapid changes taking place in Russian society”, according to Guelman. The probably most well-known performance has been that of Pussy Riot in Moscow’s largest cathedral in 2012, when they made a statement for Putin to leave his position or rather, to not be reelected. Pussy Riot’s trial and two members going to prison then captured global attention for Russia’s seemingly biased judiciary and Russia’s increasingly authoritarian path. Noah Sneider who published an article in the 1843 Magazine from The Economist Group last year, quoted Guelman saying that “From that moment, [the regime] began to seriously address the arts, to bring all their repressive methods to bear.”

Another prominent example in Russia, is Pyotr Pavlensky. His drastic actions, sometimes labeled as ‘crazy’ or ‘grotesque’, including among others, the sewing of his lips, a naked performance inside barbed wire or the cutting off of his own earlobe (like Van Gogh) confronting and criticizing the Russian state in various ways, have gained widespread attention. Sneider wrote that “Pavlensky practises actionism, an art form with a rich history in Russia. He calls his particular brand of actionism “political art” (not to be confused with art about politics).” Guelman further described that, while Pussy Riot was loud about their convictions, Pavlensky “demonstrated the strength of the weak. There was nothing the government could take away from him, because he didn’t have anything to lose.”

Pavlensky has had to spend time in a psychiatric ward as well as in prison, and has by now fled to France, were he received political asylum in May. What led to his decision to leave Russia with his family, were accusations of sexual harassment which he denied. Only last month, he staged another ‘performance’ in Paris, setting fire to a French Bank at the Place de la Bastille, referring symbolically to the historic role of the Bastille in the French Revolution.

Whether one agrees with Pavlensky’s views or the radical methods chosen, analyzing his actions baring in mind fundamental lessons about strategic planning of nonviolent campaigns, can certainly reveal some aspects about his performances. First, what did work well for Pavlensky was triggering reactions by the authorities which could be somehow described as ‘dilemma actions’. The latter “put an opponent in a situation where it must either a) grant a nonviolent movement’s demand, or b) act in a way that sacrifices some of its own support and damages its public image. […] Dilemma actions place an opponent in a situation where any action that it takes will result in a negative outcome for it. “ (CANVAS Core Curriculum, p. 144)

This is seemingly shown in what Sneider described: “Pavlensky specialises in creating situations that draw the authorities into his actions, turning them into the puppets in his theatre of the absurd.” Sneider went on to state that “the authorities respond in ways that highlight his message: after ‘Threat’, they covered the scorched doors with sheets of corrugated metal – a veritable iron curtain. During ‘Fixation’, the officers circling Pavlensky seemed disgusted by the sight of him and unsure what to do with the nail poking through his scrotum; eventually they draped him with a white sheet, turning him into a fleeting reflection of Gandhi.” Bennett adds the example of police officers refusing to carry out their orders to detain Pavlensky after his sewn-lips protest after the Pussy Riot arrest, instead waiting for doctors to arrive. Even his arrest and trial did Pavlensky see as an opportunity: “My task is to force the instruments of state power to create political propaganda. To suck them into my art. Criminal cases open a door for me to get inside the mechanics of the system — the investigators, the court system, psychiatrists — and allow me to work there”, wrote Marc Bennett about Pavlensky in an article on Politico.

The latter could also reflect one of the basic considerations for planning nonviolent campaigns, which is recognizing the current underlying power structures and trying to change it, mostly by winning over certain parts of society (for more explanations about the nature of power and power structures within society, see Chapter 1 of CANVAS’ Core Curriculum). But while Pavlevsky does seem somehow aware of such structures and has possibly managed to convince some ‘opponents’ to change their minds, like a former investigator in his case, the artists’ provocative and radical methods certainly repel others or make him seem ‘crazy’. And when planning a nonviolent campaign’s tactics, anticipating possible sympathizers’ reactions and the light the tactics will shed on your movement, is essential. Furthermore, even though Sneider states that Pavlenksy “sees no sense in art for art’s sake, believing instead in art as change, as progress, as awakening”, some aspects are frequently is not so clear: What are his intentions in each action, does he seek to mobilize others to help push for his vision of a free Russia and especially, which concrete steps would he want the country to take in order to do so? Despite these questions, his performances have certainly caused widespread attention, as have other actionists’ in Russia.

Learn more about Russian political art, actionism and Pavlensky here, here and here.

With Mugabe down, the real struggle for New Zimbabwe has just begun! – [In Depth Analysis]

Photo Credits: BBC

Published on 23/11/2017

Coup, resignation, celebration-good news or the bad news for Zimbabwe?

Despite the dancing people in the streets of Harare, we must be aware that the coup in Zimbabwe which led to resignation of its long sitting president Mugabe, was not committed in their best interest. Not in the first place, at least. And where most analysis of the recent military intervention focuses on the outcomes of the coup, maybe we should start by realistically looking at its roots. If the ultimate goal is to create a more free and democratic society in Zimbabwe, there is both good news and bad news for the country. Only when we understand that the military intervention is focused on the continuation of ZANU-PF rule in the first place, can we decide what the role of the political opposition, civil society and international community should now be.

Let’s start with the bad news.

 

The difference between the Party and the State

In Zimbabwe, ruling party and state have been interwoven for over 37 years. With ZANU-PF being supreme over state institutions and -structures, whatever happens in ZANU-PF directly affects the state (Msindo 2016). The lines between the ruling party and the state have become blurred, and as a result of ZANU-PF’s monopoly on power, Zimbabwe has become a de-facto one-party state.

The ruling party uses “both tangible and intangible” state-resources for its campaigns during elections, giving ZANU-PF a decisive advantage over opposition political parties.[i] Furthermore, the party’s thorough control over state institutions such as state-media, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, and Registrar General’s Department has enabled ZANU-PF to control the electoral process. Finally, the party obscures the difference between ZANU-PF and Zimbabwean nationalism, in very subtle ways. Funerals of former ZANLA-fighters are turned into state-events, and the Zimbabwean flag is appropriated as a party symbol.[ii]

As much as United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson expressed hope that a “stable and successful Zimbabwe” will emerge from the coup, there is one thing Johnson clearly does not fully understand. The military coup is not about the future of a country, but about the power-structures within the ruling party in the first place. Unfortunately enough for the cheering people in the streets of Harare on Saturday, General Constantino Chiwenga did not have the Zimbabwean citizens on his mind when he drove down Josiah Tongogara Street towards State House late on Tuesday last week.

While the military coup might seem to be focused on those who caused the socio-economic deprivation in the state, what it essentially seeks to do is control the power-structure within the ruling party. The difference between what is good for the ruling party and what benefits the state should therefore be clearly kept in mind when developing scenarios for the roadmap to a more free and democratic Zimbabwe. Despite Major General SB Moyo’s  suggestions that the military actions were motivated by “crimes that are causing social and economic suffering in the country”, it was in fact a shifting power-balance in the succession struggle within the ruling party that eventually caused the army to move.

 

Succession Struggle

This succession struggle dates back to the 2014 purge of former vice-president Joice Mujuru and eight cabinet ministers. Mujuru was said to have become a too powerful force within the party, and was then accused variously of corruption, theft and even plotting to kill President Mugabe. Mujuru and her followers had to go, a practice that is said to be characteristic of Robert Mugabe’s style of ruling ZANU-PF.

When Mujuru was replaced by Emmerson Mnangagwa, a bitter struggle between two factions within the ruling party began, which continued relatively quietly until last week. The so called ‘G-40’-faction represents the younger generation within ZANU-PF, a group of politicians [most notably, Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukuwere and Patrick Zhuwao] without war-credentials. G-40 allegedly backed Mugabe’s wife Grace for the party-leadership, despite the fact that ‘Gucci-Grace’ is not popular among most groups in Zimbabwean society.

On the other hand, is the so called ‘Team-Lacoste’-faction, which backs Mnangagwa as Mugabe’s successor for party-leadership. The former Vice-President has been with Mugabe from the start, as they worked together both during the liberation-struggle as well as during Mugabe’s ruling days. Mnangagwa has a strong following in Zimbabwe’s powerful military and amongst war veterans, and has kept a lot of connections from his days as both Minister of Defense and intelligence chief.

In December, ZANU-PF planned to host its last annual congress before the 2018 elections. As the party-assembly is seen as a decisive event for the future of the party, all contesters for party-leadership have tried to position themselves as best as possible. As several of the G40 faction members were discredited over the last months, Mnangagwa’s hand seemed to play out. However, early this month, the factional infighting took a different turn, as Mugabe openly accused Mnangagwa of “disloyalty, disrespect, deceitfulness and unreliability.”[iii] On November 7, Mugabe fired Mnangagwa. For many, his removal meant that Grace Mugabe was expected to be appointed vice-president at the party congress in December.

Mugaberests

Time for Bob to rest now

Why the bad news is so important

From that point onwards, we can clearly see that the conflict out of which the coup came forth is about the party and not about the country. On November 8, before the coup still, War-Veterans leader Chris Mutsvangwa stated that “[President Robert] Mugabe is not the owner of the party.” On that same day, Mnangagwa released a statement saying that he had fled Zimbabwe, lashing out to his President saying that “the ruling ZANU-PF party “is not personal property for you and your wife to do as you please.”

On Monday November 13, Zimbabwe’s army chief Constantino Chiwenga demanded a “stop” to the purge in the ruling party and warned that the military could intervene. Then, very late on Tuesday, soldiers sealed access to parliament, government offices and courts in Harare. Access to the president’s official residence was also blocked by troops, and Robert Mugabe is forced into negotiations about the end of his rule. After Robert Mugabe hijacked these negotiations to postpone his departure from power, an impeachment-procedure started on November 20.

In his Sunday address to the Zimbabwean nation, Robert Mugabe stated that he does “believe that these [issues raised by the military] were raised in the spirit of honesty and out of deep and patriotic concern for the stability for our nation and for the welfare of our people.” Seeing the cheerful and especially diverse and united front of people in the streets of Harare on Saturday, one would almost start to believe that the military decided on their move out of sincere concerns for all of those who came out on Saturday. The truth, however, is different.

The main concern of those who are now being hailed as the revolutionaries of Zimbabwe, not in the last place by the Zimbabweans themselves, is the power of the ruling party over the country. All these clues should clearly show us that this coup was not brought about because several million people are suffering in Zimbabwe, but because a handful of elite saw their power-position being given away by a 93 year old man.

This distinction is of a vital importance, as it emphasizes the risk that the ongoing redistribution of power will not change anything for the people of Zimbabwe. The de-facto one party state; the control of ZANU-PF over the electoral process; the suppression of contentious political claims; the subtle monopolization of Zimbabwean nationalism by ZANU-PF; none of this has changed with the military coup and the appointment of Emmerson Mnangagwa as the new party leader. As Steven Feldstein puts it, “Mnangagwa is massively invested in ensuring his continued and unfettered access to power, which has proven highly lucrative for him. The vice president is “reputed” to be one of Zimbabwe’s richest people. All of this suggests he might become yet another dictator.” Instead of cheering that Mugabe’s days seem to be over, let us focus on the opportunities the current developments offer for more democratically oriented forces to go against a continued ZANU-PF dominated Zimbabwe.

 

The Good News

As Jason Burke and Emma Graham-Harrison finally expressed in the Guardian on November 20, “the [military] purge has in effect decimated the [G-40] group and underlines the degree to which the overthrow of Mugabe’s 37-year rule has been driven more by competition for power within the ZANU-PF than popular anger at a dictatorial and corrupt regime.” However, this popular anger, or decades of build-up grievances if you will, seems to be able to more and more take over the momentum that the coup has created.

This is where the good news comes in. As we speak, the citizens of Zimbabwe could be hijacking the military coup, turning the elite’s power-quest into a bottom-up demand for a more free and fair Zimbabwe. The call for people to take their frustration over Robert Mugabe’s refusal to step down to the streets might have been insinuated by the military and ZANU-PF elite to make their purge look like the will of the people. However, as Zimbabweans continue to be on the streets of all major Zimbabwean cities, the recent developments in the country have opened up unbelievable opportunities for those forces in Zimbabwean society that can counter ZANU-PF’s continued authoritarian and corrupt rule.

The Zimbabwean military leadership is trying everything they can to make their coup look like something constitutionally legitimate. This is not without a reason. The eye of the world is on Zimbabwe. With the exception of the violence surrounding the 2008 elections, Zimbabwe has been largely ignored by the international media in the last two decades.[iv] That is different now.

partyinparliament

Zimbabwean MPs cheered and celebrated as Mugabe’s resignation was announced

Political Opposition

These newly found opportunities are especially beneficial for the Zimbabwean political opposition parties. Only a few months ago, there seemed to be not a single chance for them to play a serious role in next year’s elections. Due to big divides between political parties and coalitions, and a very ill Morgan Tsvangirai desperately holding on to the leadership of the MDC-T, ZANU-PF was looking forward to another walk-over electoral victory in 2018.

Now, the people on the streets of Zimbabwe and their call for democratic change have opened up a window of opportunity. The question is, however, can the opposition regain the trust of the people, which is currently at an all-time low. From field-research conducted earlier this year one can conclude that the hope for a better Zimbabwe that mainly the MDC brought up to 2008 was shattered in the last decade. Especially during and after the period of the Government of National Unity (GNU), that party lost a lot of public support.[v]

The party’s grassroots structures had been badly damaged by the violence preceding the 2008 elections. The actions of the MDC-T during power sharing then damaged the party’s public reputation. The side-lining of civil society from the negotiations not only put tremendous strain on the MDC-T’s relations with the civic movement that had brought it to life, but also eroded the popular support for the Global Political Agreement. Its upper leadership visibly benefiting from participation in the inclusive government[vi] fostered the perceptions that the party had “joined the gravy train”.[vii] The eventual walk-over victory of ZANU-PF in the 2013 elections sealed the fate of the political opposition. A 2017 study by Lekalake shows that trust in opposition politics collapsed, from 64% in 2008 to only 34% in 2014. Personal affiliation with opposition political parties even dropped from 74% in 2008 to 28% in 2014.

 

End of Political Apathy?

Over the last two decades, the aggressive strategies that characterized the sphere of party-politics in Zimbabwe developed into a heavily polarized society, which was not limited to the political realm. “Zimbabweans viewed political and economic developments through the heavily tinted lens of party affiliation”.[viii] Creating ‘insiders and outsiders’, these short-run strategies of polarization then brought with them intimidation, violence and subsequently fear.[ix]

The inaccessibility of the political realm, combined with the disappointment in the MDC described above, has resulted in political apathy among Zimbabwean citizens. Zimbabwean youth in particular respond to this polarized field of political violence and intimidation by withdrawing from that public political sphere and staying away from political actors and discourses.[x] Citizens would rather accept the inaccessibility of the party-political sphere than run the risk of getting caught up in the violence that it is characterized by, resulting in “the comfort of doing nothing”.[xi]

But with the recent events in Zimbabwe, the tables have turned. With the whole world watching, the party-political sphere cannot be dominated by violence and intimidation any longer. The mass-mobilization we have seen on the weekend, which continued on Monday, is the first proof of a re-engaged citizenry. This is an unprecedented window of opportunity, but it remains doubtful if the opposition parties can regain the trust lost in the last decade.

 

Chance for Social Movements to step in?

This is where Zimbabwe’s social movements step in. Where the opposition-parties should play the role of the end-vehicle to translate the mobilized momentum into political yields, a broader coalition of democratic forces in Zimbabwe should first ensure that the military coup will not end up a replacement of the one bad guy with another. In seizing the current window of opportunity, Zimbabwean social movements might play a decisive role. Where the current status of the political opposition is at an all-time low, the movements’ 2016 contentious episode is still fresh in memory.

The year 2016 proved their capability to mobilize a big part of the Zimbabwean citizenry. With #ThisFlag and #Tajamuka/Sesjikile as the main protagonists, the latest episode of social movements in Zimbabwe was able to let Zimbabwean citizens make unprecedented contentious political claims against their repressive government. Field-research carried out in Zimbabwe between March and June 2017 abstracted some of the most important factors which made this mobilization possible.

What was essential for mainly the #ThisFlag-movement in 2016 was a revaluation of active citizenship, as an alternative for participation in the party-political landscape. Values of boldness, framed as “holding the government to account without fear or favor,”[xii] and a renewed love for one’s country, opposed to selfish interests of the ruling elite, created a clear identity-divide between the movements, and those they fought against.[xiii] Today, this clear identity-divide is of essential importance to not mistake power-hungry elites for Zimbabwe’s new liberation heroes, as described in the beginning of this article.

Furthermore, part of the repressive circumstances, which made the 2016 protests such a surprising phenomenon, could be said to no longer stand in the way of mass mobilization. With the whole international community watching, ZANU-PF cannot use their repressive tactics in the way they did openly in 2008, and a little bit more hidden in 2013. Also, the low-threshold methods #ThisFlag had to offer for citizens to be able to participate in protest have now become unnecessary. If a broad spectrum of civil society actors can continue the momentum of a citizenry which seems ready to take the streets and stand for democratic changes, while the whole world is watching, that might be able to force the ruling party to allow them/the political opposition a seat at the table.[xiv]

 

Every Crisis Forms an Opportunity!

The parallels with a different revolution that happened in 2011 are crystal clear. After mass protests in the streets of Cairo, the military abused the Egyptian citizens by hijacking their revolution. While the people of Egypt thought they were changing their country, the military interference silently turned their “purpose” into one which legitimized internal power struggle within ruling elite, hiding it as a ‘people’s revolution’. Do we recognize this from somewhere? Eventually, the bad guy was kicked out, only to pave the way for another strongman in the making and people started being suppressed again as soon as they left the streets.

In the last week, the Zimbabwean citizens stood up and started to mobilize for that change. But a hijacking is dangerously close again. Mugabe’s resignation is not the people’s victory yet, because also here we could see one dictator being replaced by another. That is why now, the political opposition and social movements, supported by the world’s eye focused on Zimbabwe, should push as hard as they can to translate the current excitement into political concessions by the ruling party.

The way to do that would be by actively leading the “awakening of the people” and make sure that the most important problems of Zimbabwean society – such us democracy, human rights, political and social oppression and economic reforms – are on the top of the list during the transition process that will be taking place in next few months.

Anyone inclined to see the results of this strategy, might have to consider looking beyond the 2018-elections. Real political reform through cultural alteration in Zimbabwe will prove to be a marathon rather than a sprint. However, the current momentum provides an opportunity for short-term impact, and opposition political parties, social movements and other civil society actors should not let that opportunity get away. The Zimbabwean revolution should not be about Uncle Bob vs. The Crocodile – it should be about turning a suffering country away from the path of dictatorship and despair.

 

 

Bibliography:

Aeby, Michael (2016), “Making an impact from the margins? Civil society groups in Zimbabwe’s interim power-sharing process”, Journal of Modern African Studies, 54.4, 703728.

Chigora, Guzura and Ndimande (2015). The Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) Regime in Power in the 21st Century: A Question of Popular Support or Preserving Power by Undemocratic Means, International Journal of Politics and Good Governance Volume VI, No. 6.3 Quarter III 2015

Kagoro, Brian (2005) “The prisoners of hope: Civil Society and the opposition in Zimbabwe”, African Security Review, 14:3, 19-29.

LeBas, A. (2006), “Polarization as craft: party formation and state violence in Zimbabwe”, Comparative Politics, 419-438

LeBas, A. (2014), “The perils of power sharing”, Journal of Democracy, 25(2), 52-66.

Lekalake, R. “Popular views of the opposition in Southern Africa’s one-party dominant regimes”, AfroBarometer Policy Paper Nr. 38, February 2017, online via afrobarometer.org

Msindo, E. (2016). Factionalism and Robert Mugabe’s Leadership in Zimbabwe. Governance and the Crisis of Rule in Contemporary Africa, 147-172.

Oberdorf, J. P. R. A. (2017). Inspiring the Citizen to be Bold: Framing Theory and the Rise and Decline of the# ThisFlag-movement in Zimbabwe (Master’s thesis).

Oosterom, M. A. and Lloyd, Pswarayi, “Being a Born-free. Violence, Youth and Agency in Zimbabwe”, Institute of Development Studies Research Report 79, December 2014, online via ids.ac.uk

Raftopoulos, Brian (2013) “The 2013 Elections in Zimbabwe: The End of an Era”, Journal of Southern African Studies, 39:4, 971-988.

Raftopoulos, Brian (2014), “Zimbabwean Politics in the Post-2013 Election Period”, Africa Spectrum, 49, 2, 91-103.

Ranger, T. (2004), “Nationalist historiography, patriotic history and the history of the nation: The struggle over the past in Zimbabwe”, Journal of Southern African Studies, 30(2), 215234.

 

Notes:

[i] Chigora, Guzura and Ndimande 2015: 10

[ii] Ranger 2004, Oberdorf 2017: 39

[iii] Earlier this month, a documentary is leaked, allegedly made by Education Minister Mojo, outlining how Mnangagwa would have subverted and captured State-institutions in a power grab.

[iv] See Coltart (2008: 9) for a reflection on the reasons for this. In the instances Zimbabwe is covered by  international media, the conflict is mainly used as an arena in which the battle over meaning and definition of the crisis on a macro-level takes place, rather than  a platform to tell the story of the Zimbabwean struggle at a micro-level. See for example Williams (2005) on the British media reporting on Zimbabwe.

[v] Raftopoulos 2013: 984-985, 2014: 98

[vi] LeBas 2014: 60, 2016: 4

[vii] Aeby 2016: 719

[viii] LeBas 2006: 420

[ix] LeBas 2014: 53-54

[x] Oosterom & Pswarayi 2014: 47

[xi] Kagoro 2005: 21

[xii] Evan Mawarire, “Rehearsing the #ThisFlag six core values”, 22 of July 2016, Accessed 10 July 2017, online via instagram.com/thisflag_zw, 26th of July 2016, also see thisflag1980.com/our-values

[xiii] Oberdorf 2017: 37-38

[xiv] Besides #ThisFlag and #Tajamuka/Sesjikile, there have been other social movement making waves in Zimbabwe for the past two years. Some which have to be considered are the National Vendors Union Zimbabwe (NAVUZ), Occupy Africa Unity Square (OAUS), and #ZimbabweYadzoka (focused on the rural communities of Zimbabwe).

 

 

Throwing a Pie – More than a Simple Act of Protest

Published on 22/11/2017

The art of creative and humorous nonviolent resistance methods, laughtivism if you will, has been a popular topic for readers all around the world. Pie, and then especially the throwing of the object, could be considered a prototype political provocation, and a powerful punchline when staying on the surface of the act itself. David against Goliath, an “act of punching up”, mostly against a higher status person, showing that, with our face covered in pie, we all look alike, and nobody would dare to claim a superior position with a face full of cream.  

An unprecedented piece of journalism by Ben Paynter shows us the history of throwing pie as a form of nonviolent activism.  Although the record of political pie-throwing dates back to at least the mid-1600s, the recipe (of both the pie and the protest-method), have not changed much. Although maybe for one factor. Over time, “each hit became a surreal must-share moment for news agencies,” and pie-throwing “became an early political meme.” Communicating with their followers, but also more neutral audiences, “activists made sure to videotape or take pictures of each delivery, which with the growing reach of the internet were easily passed along to embolden others,” according to Paynter.  

But why exactly is throwing pie funny? Paynter claims that it is good to emphasize this for a bit, given the fact that some people involved in the act “felt the pie throwing was theater of such poor quality that it required a violent response.” To explain the humorous nature of pie, we can use something called the Benign Violation Theory, and was developed by Peter McGraw, marketing and psychology professor at the Humor Research Lab at the University of Colorado Boulder. According to McGraw, “for something to be funny in the eyes of the audience, the situation needs to be wrong yet okay, threatening yet safe. It needs to not make sense, yet make sense.” Most everyday experiences can be considered either good-natured (benign) or inappropriate (a violation). Only when a certain inappropriate action is made to be acceptable will it be considered funny: a benign violation! Throwing pie is inappropriate, but throwing a pie as a form of protest instead of using violence then makes it relatively acceptable.  

However, as with every method, there should come an underlying strategy. When this strategy is not in line with the act of throwing a pie, things might get ugly. And of course Paynter is right to conclude that, “from a strategic standpoint, pelting someone with a non-lethal, somewhat fluffy object makes sense: baked goods do less damage than bullets.” However, as our very own Srdja Popovic points out in the article, even pie-throwing can be a step to far sometimes. The best nonviolent acts are low risk and should not alienate any potential supporters, so they can be repeated by others to build momentum. How innocent pie throwing might sound, examples from Paynter’s article prove that the action can carry physical and legal repercussions. “[Pie throwing] can be funny, but it also can be offensive and insulting and people can take it differently,” Popovic says. 

 

Read Paynter’s full article here, and think twice before you start throwing them pies around! 

Zimbabwe’s Unity of Purpose (in Protest-Signs)

Photo: Protesters demanding President Robert Mugabe stands down march towards State House in Harare. The fact that Mugabe has to go seems to represent most Zimbabweans. But what will happen after the 93-year old is put aside? Photograph: AP (via Independent.co.uk)

Published on 20/11/2017

This weekend, Zimbabweans all over the country took to the streets. On Saturday, tens of thousands of protesters came out to demand an end to Mugabe’s rule, but seemingly also to simply celebrate that change was finally coming. And change is coming, that is for sure. An official source with direct knowledge of the ongoing negotiations told CNN that Zimbabwe’s long-time president has agreed to the terms of his resignation and a letter has been drafted. According to the source, the aim of Sunday’s televised speech, in which Mugabe amazed and infuriated the country by apparently resisting calls to step aside, was to ensure the veteran leader openly declared the military’s actions to be constitutional. Despite the disappointing speech, the end of the Mugabe era is only a matter of time.  

Saturday’s protests were described to represent an unprecedented diversity within Zimbabwean society. From war-veterans to displaced white farmers, from ZANU-PF supporters to social-movement leaders, protesters seem to agree on this one point: Mugabe has to go! However, when Mugabe goes, several different scenarios could develop. In very simple terms, the spectrum goes from continued ZANU-PF autocracy under a different leader on the one side, to a transitional coalition authority leading the country into free and fair elections on the other (most positive) side. Considering this spectrum of possibilities, it should be doubted if every Zimbabwean who found him- or herself in the streets on Saturday would still be so united as to the future of Zimbabwe.  

 

Unity of Purpose 

If we look at the role nonviolent strategy could play in the country, the success of the future struggle for a more democratic and free Zimbabwe will be strongly influenced by three general principles: Unity, Planning, and Nonviolent Discipline. Let us look at the first principle of unity, for now. Besides unity of people, and unity within the organizations which will have to oppose the authoritarian and repressive forces in Zimbabwe, there has to be unity of purpose. As page 87 of the Canvas Core Curriculum tells us, “a movement or campaign must have internal consensus about its goals, and these goals must resonate with significant parts of the larger population.” ‘Mugabe must Go’ might be the mantra which unites the purpose of the broadest base of the protesters on Saturday. However, after Mugabe goes, what must happen? Is there a unity of purpose among Zimbabwean on that part? Or is celebration enough for now? 

 

Protest-signs 

As an in-depth research on the purpose of protesters in Zimbabwe might prove hard on such a short notice, let us use a different source: protest signs. As Zimbabweans are becoming a more and more connected people, pictures and videos of Zimbo’s protesting went all over the world on the weekend. What can their protest signs tell us about the unity of purpose among Zimbabweans?  

First, we can see many signs thanking the Zimbabwean Defense Forces, for the role they played in the inevitable toppling of Robert Mugabe. Especially army General Constantino Chiwenga seems to have earned the respect of many protesters. However, would these same people vouch for a continued control of the army over Zimbabwe? Or a new intervention by the General when the developments, let’s say in three months’ time, are not to his liking? It would not be acceptable to say this opinion would resonate with significant parts of the larger population in Zimbabwe, especially not those favoring a more constitutional roadmap towards the future.  

Furthermore, Emmerson Mnangagwa was a strongly represented person in the protest signs over the weekend. The former Vice-President, who is now put forward as the next leader of ruling party ZANU-PF, could, however, not be said to represent the larger population either. As Steven Feldstein puts it, “Mnangagwa is massively invested in ensuring his continued and unfettered access to power, which has proven highly lucrative for him. The vice president is ‘reputed’ to be one of Zimbabwe’s richest people. All of this suggests he might become yet another dictator.” Although the favored option for some, it does not seem likely Mnangagwa as Zimbabwe’s next leader is in the best interest of the Zimbabwean citizen either. Many protest signs also made reference to the fact that, more than wanting Mnangagwa as their next leader, Zimbabweans would at least not accept Grace Mugabe as the next in line of the Mugabe-dynasty, adding to the division in purpose.  

What might worry some, finally, is that those signs referring to bread and butter issues, or a better life for the average Zimbabwean, are very hard to find. A democratic, constitutional process, in which Zimbabwean opposition is represented besides ruling party ZANU-PF seems like the best and most realistic option moving forward for Zimbabwe. But signs referring to the unwanted interference of the African Union or Southern African Development Community, is as far as Zimbabwean protesters get. A free Zimbabwe, for future generations is as scarcely represented. But wouldn’t that be at least part of the goals that should resonate with significant parts of the larger population?  

Luckily, protest signs will not define the future of Zimbabwe by themselves. 

 To end on a lighter note, humor is a Zimbabwean characteristic that cannot be denied. Despite a military coup, the end of a 37-year rule, and not to forget an ongoing socio-economic crisis, some protesters have other things on their mind 

Zimbabwe Coup November 2017 – Developments and Analysis

Published on 17/11/2017

Seeing the recent developments in Zimbabwe, with an alleged coup on Tuesday/Wednesday as the peak so far, we are in dire need of some background and perspective. Below you will find a small analysis on the most recent developments in the country.

Splits in the ruling party over succession

As Robert Gabriel Mugabe does not have the eternal life, the battle for his succession has started within ruling party ZANU-PF. However, the current president has set out to rule Zimbabwe unchallenged for the rest of his life. His favored technique for guaranteeing his dominance is to build up potential successors only to destroy them, when coming to close to power.

The succession struggle has not started only last week, but dates back to the 2014 purge of former vice-president Joice Mujuru and eight cabinet ministers. Mujuru was said to become a too powerful force within the party. She was then accused variously of corruption, theft and even plotting to kill Mr Mugabe, and therefore she and her followers had to go. Mujure was replaced by Emmerson Mnangagwa.

Then, a bitter struggle between two factions within the ruling party began, which continued relatively silently until last week. On the one hand, there is the so called ‘G-40’-faction. This faction is supposed to represent the younger generation within ZANU-PF, and is allegedly led by Education Minister Jonathan Moyo and Zanu-PF political commissar Saviour Kasukuwere. The faction’s main point of existence seems to be to fight against Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa succession as party leader. As an alternative, G-40 seems to support Mugabe’s wife Grace, who is more and more profiling herself as the main guard for anyone and anything who will put the position of her husband under attack. Grace (nicknamed Gucci-Grace for her exorbitant shopping sprees), is not popular among Zimbabwean citizen. Although G40 is believed to be fronting the First Lady for succession, there have been no official statements she would be running for the position when her husband dies.

On the other hand, there is the so called ‘Team-Lacoste’-faction, which backs up Mnangagwa as Mugabe’s successor for party-leadership. The former Vice-President has been with Mugabe from the start, as they worked together both during the liberation-struggle as well as during his ruling days. Mnangagwa has a strong following in Zimbabwe’s powerful military and amongst war veterans, and has kept a lot of connections from his days as both Minister of Defense and intelligence chief.

 

Latest Developments

In December, ZANU-PF will host its last annual congress before the 2018 elections. As the party congress is seen as a decisive event, all contesters for party-leadership are trying to position themselves as best as possible. As several of the G40 faction members were discredited over the last months, Mnangagwa’s hand seemed to play out. However, early this month, the factional infighting took another turn, as Mugabe openly accuses Mnangagwa of “disloyalty, disrespect, deceitfulness and unreliability.” A documentary is leaked, allegedly made by Education Minister Mojo, outlining how Mnangagwa would have subverted and captured State-institutions in a power grab. On November 7th, Mugabe fires Mnangagwa. For many, his removal meant that Grace Mugabe is expected to be appointed vice president at the party congress in December.

From that point, we could slowly see the signs of what eventually happened this week. On November 8, war veterans head Chris Mutsvangwa said that “[President Robert] Mugabe is not the owner of the party,” and called on almost every group thinkable in Zimbabwean society (churches, whites, MDC, the diaspora and South-Africa) to address the “menace that Zimbabwe now faces with Mugabe a senior old man with a mad wife.” On that same day, Mnangagwa released a statement saying that he had fled Zimbabwe, lashing out to his President saying that “the ruling ZANU-PF party “is not personal property for you and your wife to do as you please.”

 

Military coup

On Monday, Zimbabwe’s army chief Constantino Chiwenga demanded a “stop” to the purge in the ruling party and warned the military could intervene. Then, very late on Tuesday, soldiers seal access to parliament, government offices and courts in Harare. Access to the president’s official residence is also blocked by troops. The first official statement comes very early on Wednesday-morning, when the military takes over state broadcaster ZBC and military spokesman, Major General SB Moyo makes an announcement on state television. In this statement, the military explains it has temporarily taken control of the country to “target criminals” around President Robert Mugabe. They also immediately state that Mugabe and his family are “safe and sound and their security is guaranteed”. Finally, the statement also emphasizes that “this is not a military takeover of government,” but an act committed “to pacify a degenerating political, social and economic situation in our country which if not addressed may result in violent conflict.”

 

Towards the Future

After a day of house-arrest, talks between the president and senior military officers continue on Thursday, with senior church leaders and envoys sent from neighboring South Africa involved in mediation efforts. Emmerson Mnangagwa was reported to have returned to Zimbabwe on Tuesday evening from South Africa. Speculations about him replacing Robert Mugabe as the leader of Zimbabwe continued up to this moment. Mnangagwa’s particular role in the coup remains unclear. Reports that Grace Mugabe had fled to Namibia on Wednesday appeared false, with several sources saying she was detained with her husband in their residence in Harare.

According to the Guardian, several opposition officials have stated that negotiations had been ongoing for several months with “certain people within the army”, with that same army reaching out to different factions to discuss the formation of a transitional government. One opposition official said Mugabe would resign this week and be replaced by Mnangagwa, with opposition leaders taking posts as vice-president and prime minister, although there have not been any official statements as to this moment. However, Robert Mugabe seems to stubbornly hold on, demanding that he can finish his term in office.

 

Pillars of power

The early Wednesday speech by Major General SB Moyo on state television is very important to understand the movement of different power forces in Zimbabwe right now. Instead of speaking of their military takeover in bold and powerful terms, his argumentation is very inclusive, almost humble. Moyo addresses Robert Mugabe as “His Excellency, the president of the republic of Zimbabwe and commander in chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces”, as if Mugabe is still fully and solidly in power.

Moyo then continues to address all stakeholders in society (civil servants, judiciary, parliament, citizens, political parties, religious groups, the media and the war-veterans). Goal seems to be to facilitate this transition of power as calm and clean as possible. But is that an option in such a fractured and tense political arena? And wouldn’t it be naïve to see the military coup as such an altruistic deed? Let us look at some of the main players up close.

President Robert Mugabe

One has to understand that, even at this moment when President Mugabe’s role seems to have played out, it is not. Despite the fact that he has mistreated Zimbabwe for the past 30 years, his support-base is still incredibly strong. As Piers Pigou, a South Africa-based analyst for the International Crisis Group put it. “The [army] still need him to provide a veneer of legitimacy and constitutionalism. If he doesn’t want to play ball that is a bit of a problem.” It is not without a reason that the military statement on Wednesday began with saying that the President is safe and that this military takeover was not directed towards him. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the events of the last 72 hours in Zimbabwe mark the beginning of the end of Robert Mugabe’s reign.

Grace Mugabe and the G40-faction

Can the faction of young Turks within the ruling party still play a role, influencing the process towards a new power divide in Zimbabwe? This does not seem to be likely, as they are (more than President Mugabe) the target of the military take-over. According to the BBC, several ZANU-PF officials are reported to be in custody including, Mr Mugabe’s former spin doctor Jonathan Moyo and Finance Minister Ignatius Chombo. Zimbabwean newspaper NewsDay is reporting that MP and government minister Paul Chimedza has been arrested at a road block trying to flee to South Africa.

The question now is how different organizations in society who used to back G40 or Grace Mugabe will react. As an example: ZANU-PF Woman’s League used to be backing Grace very firmly. At last year’s annual ZANU-PF conference, the Women’s League had moved that President Mugabe should appoint a woman into the presidency; a trick designed to influence the reassignment or expulsion of Mnangagwa to make way for a female Vice President. No official statement has come from their side yet.

Zimbabwean Military

A force which has always been strongly in the grip of the ruling-party, now has chosen a clear side. This has only been possible because of the rifts within ZANU-PF. It has to be understood that, in the revolt against specifically Grace Mugabe, the military top in Zimbabwe would never allow somebody without liberation-war-credentials to be the leader of the country. The military has strong ties to ZANU-PF as the liberation party, not to just any person who might want to lead that party.  Mnangagwa has these credentials, and his connections stemming from former positions as Minister of Defense and the intelligence-services give him a clear head start.

ZRP

Because police officers are believed to be on President Mugabe’s side, the army moved in to take power over the police forces early on Wednesday. The Zimbabwean military is in charge of a paramilitary police support unit depot in Harare and has disarmed police officers there, an army source told Reuters. Only in August, there were clashes in central Harare between the Zimbabwe Republic Police – loyal to first lady Grace Mugabe and her allies in a Zanu-PF faction, G40 – and soldiers who are loyal to Mnangagwa. The role of the ZRP seems to be played out for now.

War Veterans

Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA)’s members have been an integral part of President Mugabe’s election campaign machinery since the emergence of the Movement for Democratic Change led by Morgan Tsvangirai. However, the War Veterans are now firmly opposing Robert Mugabe’s increasingly authoritarian rule. Already in 2016, the veterans announce a split from Mugabe, after which a personal with Mugabe develops.  Christopher Mutsvangwa, chairman of the ZNLWVA, was one of the victims of the purge of Mnangagwa’s allies from the party over allegations of indiscipline and plotting against President Mugabe. As well as for the military leadership, the war veterans find it very important for somebody with actual liberation war credentials to rule over ZANU-PF and thus over Zimbabwe. However, the stance of the war veterans is different to that of the military, in that their struggle is essentially against Robert Mugabe and his dictatorial tendencies. The military looks beyond this and tries to guide the future direction of the ruling party itself.

Political Opposition

As for the political opposition, the coup all of a sudden offers possibilities of which nobody had dared to dream a few months ago. None of the key players in the opposition have condemned the military coup so far, and some even dare to speculate on their role in the “roadmap back to legitimacy”. Truth is, however, that the political opposition seems to have had no hand whatsoever in the current developments in Zimbabwe. The opposition is fractured, but more importantly has lost its popular support over time. The hope for a better Zimbabwe that the MDC brought up to 2008 was shattered in the last decade. Especially during and after the period of the GNU, the MDC lost a lot of public support. The party’s grassroots structures had been badly damaged by the violence preceding the 2008 elections, and the actions of the MDC-T during power sharing damaged the party’s public reputation. The MDC side-lined civil society, while its upper leadership visibly benefitted from participation in the inclusive government. That fostered the perceptions that the party had “joined the gravy train.” The eventual walk-over victory of ZANU-PF in the 2013 elections sealed their fate. Now, all of a sudden, we can think of a scenario in which the opposition parties would join a transitional government. Where this might offer new opportunities to build their support towards the 2018-elections, it would be naïve to think that a new ZANU-PF leadership would allow their power to be taken away by the opposition.

South Africa – International Community

As the regional superpower, South Africa appears to be backing the takeover, as they are sending ministers to Harare to help with negotiations to form a new government and decide the terms of Mugabe’s resignation. The South-Africans, as well as the rest of the international community will mostly profit from a relatively calm take-over of power, as this will benefit the stability in the region. Despite the fact that Mnangagwa is not their dream candidate for the Zimbabwean leadership, this might be of minor importance for now. Alpha Conde said Thursday that the African Union “will never accept the military coup d’etat” in Zimbabwe. The head of the African Union stated that, despite the fact that there are internal problems, these have to be solved politically by the ZANU-PF party and not with an intervention by the army

Civil Society and Social Movements

In line with the Zimbabwean political opposition, the civil society is also fractured, seeming to play no role in this episode of hard power. This week’s events also simply shift public attention away from their efforts. Nevertheless, civil society organizations such as #ThisFlag, the Zimbabwean Heads of Christian Denominations, and others call on the people in power, especially the military, to provide them with a clear roadmap back to constitutionalism. Some of them even pledge for a solution in the form of an inclusive government or another kind of transitional authority to be put in place. The role of these groups seems to be to focus the Zimbabwean citizen’s attention on the issue of what happens after the military coup is over, and the battle for power has been settled.

 

Possible Scenario’s

It is important to emphasize that this coup is essentially and foremost a party occasion. Despite the fact that the military is of course a state-institution, the power-struggle revolves around the party in the first place. Because ZANU-PF and the Zimbabwean state are so interwoven, one tends to forget that the coup is not so much focused on taking control over the country, as well as over the direction in which the leadership of the ruling party is headed. This is essential in realistically assessing what might be the outcome of the restructuring of power in Zimbabwe. Simply said, the leadership of the ruling party is subject of negotiation, the leadership of the country by the ruling party is not.

That being said, several news sources claim that Robert Mugabe would announce his resignation somewhere on Friday, although until now this has not been confirmed. According to South Africa’s Times Live, based on a senior intelligence source, Mr Mugabe is insisting he remains Zimbabwe’s only legitimate ruler in Zimbabwe. In any case, the Zimbabwean leader is stalling the process until today

Although there is a slight chance of the President staying in power at the end of this, the days of Robert Mugabe as Zimbabwe’s leader seem to be over. The seemingly most logical development would now be for Mugabe to announce his own resignation (probably mentioning health as the official reason to safe face), and putting forward Mnangagwa as his successor. Possibly, the Mugabe-family would negotiate a free passage out of Zimbabwe, opting to go into exile. Then, the December ZANU-PF party congress will elect the former Vice-President as the new party-leader, who is running for the presidency in the 2018 elections. However, this is not the preferred option of those in the opposition, as well as many western governments, who fear Mnangagwa would be in many ways a continuation of Mugabe. As the New York Times puts it on Wednesday, it would be “naïve to believe that any leader who takes power under such conditions will strive for democratic reform.”

An alternative scenario would include opposition political parties in negotiations towards a transitional government following the military takeover. Although speculative, this would be the preferred option for Mnangagwa, with economic recovery as the first priority. Main opposition party MDC-T (in the person of Secretary-general Douglas Mwonzora) has, however, already stated that this is possible “only if certain conditions were met,” alluding to the unfortunate process during the 2009-2013 Government of National Unity.

A final scenario could be a continued control over Zimbabwe by the military. Despite their apparent humble attitude, there is no more powerful force in Zimbabwean society at the moment. When the military leaders will not see a solution with enough beneficial guarantees for their people, holding on to power a little longer is a likely possibility. With the power in the hands of the military, Zimbabweans will be left at the mercy of a very unpredictable group that has rarely worked on behalf of the people in the past.

 

Photo: In his first public appearance after the coup, Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe arrives to preside over a student graduation ceremony at Zimbabwe Open University on the outskirts of Harare Photograph: AP – via Telegraph.co.uk

Peace Science Digest focuses on Nonviolent Resistance

Published on 16/11/2017

Peace Science Digest is a project by the War Prevention Initiative and on a bi-monthly basis, covers selected research and findings in the field of Peace Science (Peace and Conflict Studies), seeking to “enhance awareness of scholarship addressing the key issues of our time by making available an organized, condensed, and comprehensible summary of this important research as a resource for the practical application of the field’s current academic knowledge.” It is Peace Science Digest’s goal to create “a mutually beneficial link between the field’s academic community and its practitioners, the media, activists, public policy-makers” and others.

The War Prevention Initiative envisions “a world beyond war by 2030 and humanity united by a global system of peace with justice”, while its mission “is to advance the Global Peace System by supporting, developing and collaborating with peacebuilding efforts in all sectors of society.”

In its June 2017 Special Issue, Peace Science Digest focused on the topic of Nonviolent Resistance, covering publications on the following five topics:

  • “Adding Humor to the Nonviolent ‘Toolbox’”
  • “Diversity, Identity, and Privilege Among Multinational Activists in Palestinian Civil Resistance”
  • “Creating a Broad-Based Movement for Black Lives”
  • “Indigenous Civil Resistance and Treaty Rights”
  • “Nonviolent Resistance and Government Repression“

In these articles, Peace Science Digest compiles and discusses the main findings of other authors’ publications, also addressing the respective topic’s contemporary relevance and practical implications. Moreover, the publication points towards further useful sources concerning the issues.

And not only the Special Issue of Peace Science Digest comprises topics relevant for nonviolent struggle. If you are interested, take a look at other articles the Peace Science Digest has published, as well, or check out other suggested resources on the War Prevention Initiative’s website. To find the Peace Science Digest’s Special Issue on Nonviolent Resistance and download it for free, follow this link.

 

Photo: Cover of Peace Science Digest, Vol. 2 Special Issue “Nonviolent Resistance”, June 2017