Category: Canvas In Worldwide Media

For more than twenty years, Venezuelan pro-democracy activists have fought against authoritarianism, united in their wish to build a free, democratic Venezuela. Once Latin America’s richest state, today’s Venezuela is synonymous with economic collapse, mass emigration, and harsh state repression, legacies of Chávez and Maduro’s authoritarian rule. Under both dictators, democratic institutions crumbled, power was concentrated in the executive and opposition voices were ruthlessly silenced. Yet, Venezuela’s powerful if overlooked opposition remains a force to be reckoned with, committed to holding the government accountable despite huge adversity. In this article, we’ll explore Venezuela’s current political landscape, focusing on state strategies to stifle dissent, and the opposition’s evolving tactics to counter democratic backsliding. Just as authoritarian regimes around the world learn from each other, Venezuela’s 2024 protests offer crucial insights for pro-democracy activists worldwide, guiding them as they craft their own strategies for change.

Context:

Government:

Venezuela’s descent from democracy into authoritarianism didn’t happen overnight; it was a calculated process, engineered by Hugo Chávez. Capitalising on widespread anti-party sentiment, Chávez came to power in the 1998 elections, promising to check elite influence on Venezuelan politics. But, once in power, he didn’t rejuvenate democracy. Instead, he dismantled it from within, bringing the judiciary, legislature, National Petroleum Company, and electoral bodies under his influence. The media wasn’t spared either—critical outlets, like RCTV, were shut down or denied broadcasting licenses after legislation penalising ‘offensive’ content was introduced. And, when civil servants like Judge María Lourdes Afiuni spoke out, they were prosecuted on the nebulous charge of ‘treason’; Afiuni spent years under house arrest.

When Maduro took the reins in 2013, he didn’t just maintain Chávez’s authoritarian framework; he intensified it, while the country suffered from hyperinflation, mass migration and humanitarian crisis. In 2016, he blocked a recall referendum on his rule. By 2017, when the opposition-led National Assembly threatened his control, he stripped it of its legislative powers, leaving him the sole authority in Venezuela’s (by now) hyper-presidential system. Under his rule, Venezuela slid further into authoritarianism; what remained of democracy was now a mere façade. Against this backdrop, opposition figures mobilised to protect their country’s future.

Opposition: 

Over time, different opposition groups came together to challenge Chávez and Maduro’s authoritarianism. Up until recently, Venezuela’s main opposition front was the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD), formed in 2008, which encompassed conservatives, social democrats and centrists. Despite internal coordination problems centred on whether to use electoral or protest approaches, figures like Capriles helped the group secure numerous regional and local election victories, outlined below in the ‘Strategies’ section.

Today, the ‘Unitary Platform’ umbrella coalition, which came from the former MUD, dominates the opposition landscape. The Unitary Platform encompasses democratic parties with nominally different agendas, including the centre-left Democratic Action, the Christian Democrat Primero Justicia (PJ) and centre-left VP, and plays a crucial function in shielding opposition groups from ‘electoral’ government crackdowns. Most recently, in March 2024, the National Electoral Council (CNE) disqualified 19 political parties without due process for failing to meet the 1% vote threshold in the municipal elections. 

The 2024 elections were a critical test for the new Unitary Platform, testing their unity. In 2023, the coalition held primaries to select its leaders, with María Corina Machado leading the pack. However, both Machado and her replacement, Corina Yoris, were subsequently barred from holding public office—a move clearly designed to disrupt the coalition’s momentum. Despite blatant state harassment, the coalition underlined its strategic flexibility, or ability to think on its feet, by successfully fielding a new candidate, Edmundo González Urrutia, in the 2024 election. González was declared the rightful winner by independent electoral monitors, hence Venezuela’s ongoing 2024 protests (for more details, see the ‘Strategies’ section below), reminding both the regime and the world that the fight for democracy in Venezuela is far from over.

Strategy pre-2024: 

Chávez: 

Despite decades of surveillance, arrests, and the erosion of democratic norms, Venezuela’s opposition remains a powerful force. What lessons did they carry into the 2024 elections, and how were these shaped by earlier battles?

Back in 2007, during Chávez’s presidency, the opposition won key electoral battles, slowing the country’s democratic backslide. Student leaders like Yon Goicoechea and Freddy Guevara cooperated with pro-democracy advocacy groups like CANVAS, organising mass protests against proposed constitutional reforms. Chávez wanted to abolish presidential term limits and grant the PSUV sweeping powers to arbitrarily detain citizens, so fighting his reforms was essential. Here, thanks to well-coordinated decentralised student-led protests, non-violent mobilisation succeeded in blocking these authoritarian measures, providing a rare check on Chávez’s power.

But not all battles ended in victory. During the 2012 presidential election, the opposition MUD coalition, led by Henrique Capriles Radonski, failed to stop Chávez from winning a fourth presidential term; Chávez won 54% of the vote, to Capriles’ 45%. The 2012 election was widely considered rigged, and certainly took place on an uneven playing field; state-controlled media regularly slandered Capriles on national television. The opposition’s momentum stalled following this setback.

Maduro:

When Maduro took power in 2013, he immediately reinforced the authoritarian structure he inherited. However, the MUD opposition, now seasoned from years of struggle, won significant victories, not least in the 2015 parliamentary elections. Taking 66% of parliamentary seats, change seemed imminent; the opposition finally had the power to check Maduro’s authoritarianism. But victory was short-lived. In 2017, Maduro launched a preemptive strike, illegally robbing the National Assembly of its legislative power.

Maduro’s brazen power grab forced the MUD to rethink its strategy. Its response? Boycotting elections. Many Venezuelans joined the MUD in protest, and voter turnout plummeted; in the 2018 presidential election, turnout fell to 46.01%, and in the 2020 parliamentary elections turnout fell to 31%. But boycotts were a double-edged sword. Though they quantifiably demonstrated popular anger with a rigged system, they had a downside: uncontested elections gave Maduro room to consolidate his grip on power. 

Run-up to 2024:

Confronted by an increasingly oppressive regime, Venezuela’s opposition knew they had to adapt. Could they find a way to challenge Maduro within a system rigged against them? In 2019, seven months into Maduro’s second term— unrecognised by the EU, US, and Lima Group—Juan Guaidó, the leader of the National Assembly, made a bold, non-electoral move: he declared himself interim president, galvanising international support in the process.

Despite international backing, however, Guaidó’s momentum waned, especially during the rigged 2021 regional elections. But it wasn’t a lack of popular support that stopped the opposition from winning seats; it was internal inter-opposition infighting. Had the two largest opposition factions cooperated, the opposition would have won 13 instead of the 4 governorships. The lesson was clear; lacking unity, bold gestures weren’t enough.

That said, in 2023, Venezuela’s opposition scored a major victory with the US-brokered Barbados agreement. Following negotiations supported by 7 other countries, they persuaded the government to hold nominally competitive elections by 2024, cracking open a critical window of opportunity. In exchange, the US agreed to lift oil sanctions for six months, boosting Venezuela’s economy. The US also promised to prepare an extended license for Chevron Oil Corp’s Venezuela operations and agreed to exchange prisoners following Qatari arbitration, but only if Maduro engaged in sustained dialogue with the opposition. 

Maduro himself had other reasons for engaging. Notably, he wanted to regain international legitimacy after the ‘stolen’ 2018 election, so he used the negotiations to rebuild his global standing. Before the negotiations, he was regularly spurned by Western leaders. After the negotiations, in 2022, he met with Macron in Egypt, and the meetings gave him more legitimacy when they were shown in Venezuelan state media.

Strategy – 2024 Elections: 

Faced with a regime determined to hold on to power by ‘hook or by crook’, the opposition had to be shrewd. Elections in Venezuela, even when manipulated, offered a rare chance to corner the government and galvanise public support. So, the ‘Unitary Platform’ decided to field a single, joint candidate. Moreover, they strengthened their legitimacy by choosing their candidate through democratic primaries organised without state support.

Soon, María Corina Machado, a charismatic political leader, led the pack, winning the Unitary Platform’s primaries. But on 30 June 2023, without explanation, the Supreme Court banned her from holding office for 15 years, a tactic later used against her handpicked successor, Corina Yoris. Despite this brazen attempt to weaken the opposition, the Unitary Platform showed its strategic flexibility by rallying behind former diplomat Edmundo González Urrutia. Although Urrutia contested the election, the government-controlled National Electoral Council (CNE) declared Maduro the winner with 51.2% of the vote. These results were clearly rigged; the results by polling station were never published, but the opposition managed to publish vote tallies showing that Edmundo González had won with 67% of the vote. You can check the results here: https://resultadosconvzla.com/

Notwithstanding these fraudulent results, the opposition successfully used the 2024 elections to their advantage. By successfully mobilising grassroots support and leveraging international attention, the opposition showed the fight wasn’t over. Maduro might remain in power, but his grip is increasingly unstable; the 2024 elections destroyed his remaining legitimacy, trapping the state in ongoing lose-lose dilemmas. The 2024 protests themselves might well achieve similar ends; should the state arrest María Corina Machado at a protest, more and more Venezuelans are likely to publicly challenge the state’s authority to lead.

What can non-violent struggle theory teach us about Venezuela?

Unity: How the Primary Unified the Opposition Around María Corina Machado

Unity is a critical factor in any successful movement, yet achieving it is often a complex and elusive goal, as activist Srdja Popovic has noted. Venezuela is no exception. The opposition parties faced significant challenges in cooperating with each other due to three main factors:

• Divergent Strategies: Opposition parties differed in their approaches to solving Venezuela’s political crisis. Some believed that participating in elections was the best path forward, while others argued that nonviolent protest was the key to restoring democracy. These strategic differences made it difficult to forge a united front.
• Mutual Distrust: Distrust permeated the opposition, both internally and externally. Internally, not all parties wielded the same influence, leading to power imbalances and tensions. Parties with more authority often imposed decisions, causing fractures within the opposition. Externally, the government systematically targeted opposition parties with unequal levels of repression. Some parties faced severe repercussions, such as imprisonment or persecution of their members, while others were allowed to participate in elections with fewer consequences. This unequal treatment exacerbated divisions and made consensus harder to achieve.
• Government Co-optation: The government also undermined the opposition by co-opting members through corruption and the promise of public office. Although the majority of opposition members remained committed to their principles, the defection of a few prominent figures deepened the mistrust among the parties.

Given these challenges, achieving unity among opposition members was no small feat. The first step toward building this unity was to identify a legitimate process that reflected the will of the people, rather than merely a negotiated compromise among party leaders. The opposition had a precedent to follow: the 2012 presidential primaries, which had yielded positive results and high voter participation. This experience suggested that holding primaries could be an effective way to unify the opposition and identify a strong leader, and in this case, that leader became María Corina Machado.

The Power of Small Wins

When discussing the success of nonviolent movements, it’s crucial to recognize the importance of small wins. These incremental victories are essential for gradually building momentum and achieving long-term goals. While small wins require meticulous planning, they can eventually escalate into something much larger and more impactful. In Venezuela’s case, something similar occurred—not in the sense of starting a movement from scratch, but in terms of building on successive small victories to create a broader movement.

Why Small Wins Matter

Small wins are vital for two main reasons: they help movements grow in numbers, and they create a perception of success. People are naturally drawn to winners or those who seem capable of achieving their objectives. However, it’s not enough to simply achieve these small wins; they must also be effectively communicated to the public. This not only reinforces the image of success but also persuades more people to support and get involved with the movement. This was one of the biggest challenges the Venezuelan opposition faced: how to persuade the public to support and actively engage with them.

The Primaries: A Small Win with Big Impact

One of the most significant challenges for the opposition was selecting a new leader who could coordinate and unify the various factions. Coordination had always been difficult due to the issues previously mentioned, but the primaries themselves became a small win that instilled hope among the citizens.

The idea of holding primaries was fraught with difficulties, particularly due to the complex logistics involved. Many political analysts and prominent commentators doubted the ability of civil society to successfully organize such an event without the involvement of the government-controlled CNE. Even members of the National Primary Commission, the body responsible for overseeing the opposition primaries, resigned from their positions, believing it was impossible to carry out the event.

The Commission faced a critical decision: either relinquish control to the CNE or proceed independently with reduced resources. Ultimately, they chose the latter. Against all odds, the opposition successfully held organized primaries on October 23, 2023, with substantial participation from civil society and a high voter turnout, especially for this type of event.

This small but significant win demonstrated to the rest of the country that: 1) the opposition had the capacity to execute a complex, nationwide event with electoral centres in every city and town. 2) The process was transparent, with results being released within 24 hours of the polls closing. 3) The active involvement of ordinary citizens underscored their commitment to a civil society-led primary. This victory reignited hope in what many had considered a lost cause and provided a foundation for the opposition to build upon in the future. For the first time in a while, citizens genuinely felt they were part of creating a change.  

How to be strategically flexible and adapt to circumstances

After María Corina Machado was elected as the leader and presidential candidate of the opposition through the primaries, it was clear that many obstacles from Maduro’s regime would arise. To advance and effectively challenge the regime in an election, strategic flexibility was crucial. It’s essential to understand the regime’s nature; as an authoritarian government, its use of power and institutions does not follow a fair game. Instead, these institutions are employed to maintain power at all costs. This includes controlling who can run for president and using state resources to create an uneven campaign. María Corina Machado and her team understood this reality and knew they needed to adapt to pose a real threat.

The first step was to prioritize strategic goals: Was it essential that María Corina Machado herself be the opposition’s candidate, or was the ultimate goal simply to win the election? This distinction was critical, as the likelihood of Machado being unjustly barred from participating was extremely high—and indeed, this is what happened. After being notified that she was administratively disqualified from participating in any election until 2039, Machado had to find a substitute. Her initial choice was Corina Yoris, an academic aligned with her cause and a member of the National Primaries Commission. Yoris was largely unknown in political circles, as she had dedicated her life to academia. However, Machado’s choice was a masterstroke: Yoris shared her first name, making it easy for people to recognize her as Machado’s substitute. Yet, in authoritarian regimes, things rarely go as planned, and the platform for registering Yoris as a presidential candidate simply refused to process her enrollment. No explanation was provided—her name just didn’t appear.

While the opposition scrambled internally to resolve the issue, they had already registered a candidate to secure their place on the ballot—Edmundo González Urrutia, a former diplomat and a relatively unknown figure who had long been connected to the opposition. In an unexpected turn of events, after continuous negotiations with the rest of the opposition leadership, Machado agreed to support González Urrutia as her replacement. Her strategic flexibility ensured that the opposition remained unified and with a chance in the election. From that moment, Machado and González Urrutia acted as a combined force. She shifted her focus from being the candidate to leveraging her influence and knowledge to introduce González Urrutia to the public.

Fighting authoritarian regimes requires the ability to act with the circumstances you’re dealt, even if they go against your plans, and still adapt to achieve victory. It’s not about what you want to happen, but how you respond to what actually unfolds. In this case, Edmundo González Urrutia was already in a position to participate, and ultimately, what mattered was winning the election, not who won it.

Dilemma Actions: How to Put Your Enemy into a Lose-Lose Situation

One of the core principles of nonviolent resistance is the ability to place your adversary in a decision dilemma—where no matter what choice they make, they face a lose-lose situation. Effective leaders excel at creating these scenarios; one of the most iconic examples is Gandhi’s Salt March in 1930.

María Corina Machado and the opposition successfully put Maduro’s regime in such a dilemma with the presidential election. For this to happen, two key steps were necessary: first, to genuinely win the election, and second, to convincingly demonstrate that victory. This is where the challenge lay. From a technical standpoint, proving the win required a highly organized civil society capable of collecting most of the voting tallies for public verification. The opposition mobilized a vast network of volunteers who worked tirelessly on election day to gather tallies from nearly all voting centers. As a result, they managed to publish 83.5% of the tallies online.

The next step was to make these results accessible to the public. This involved scanning and digitizing all the tallies, creating a secure online platform to store the data, and developing a user-friendly website where anyone could verify the tally from their voting center. This transparency was crucial because it meant that any winner declared by the CNE would have to be credible.

By both winning the vote and demonstrating that victory, Maduro’s regime was forced into a lose-lose decision: 1) acknowledge their defeat and declare Edmundo González Urrutia the winner, or 2) commit electoral fraud, which would come with significant internal and external repercussions. The regime chose the latter, and we are now facing the consequences of that choice.

Committing fraud has led to a severe crackdown on dissent, with the regime aggressively repressing, jailing, persecuting, and harassing dissidents in ways never seen before in the country. In the two weeks following the election, over 1,000 dissidents were arrested—tripling the number of political prisoners in that short time span. However, the opposition’s strategy lies in sticking to the publication of voting tallies, in accordance to the Venezuelan law, and with big support from the international community.  

Conclusion

Venezuela’s ongoing struggle against authoritarianism serves as a powerful case study for pro-democracy movements worldwide. The opposition’s commitment to unity, strategic flexibility, and non-violent resistance, despite the immense challenges posed by Maduro’s regime, offers valuable lessons for those facing similar battles. The 2024 elections and the subsequent protests highlight not only the opposition’s resilience but also the potential of well-coordinated civil society actions to challenge entrenched autocratic power.

What we are witnessing in Venezuela is more than just a political conflict; it is a testament to the evolution of non-violent resistance in the modern era. As authoritarian regimes adapt and evolve, so too must the strategies employed to oppose them. Venezuela’s experience underscores the importance of innovation in resistance strategies, showing how even in the most repressive environments, there is room for impactful action.

While the ultimate outcome remains uncertain, one thing is clear: Venezuela’s pro-democracy movement has fundamentally altered the political landscape, setting a precedent that could inspire and guide other movements worldwide. Will Maduro ultimately leave the presidency? It’s still early to tell, but the situation has dramatically shifted in the opposition’s favor.

Authors: CANVAS & Rodrigo Gil

Article Source: Journal of Democracy 

By Srdja Popovic and Steve Parks

For the most ardent defenders of global democracy, recent days seems a disappointment: In Turkey’s elections on May 14—despite optimistic polling and the opposition’s solid, united campaign—the ruling party kept its parliamentary majority, and the increasingly autocratic president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, beat the opposition candidate by five percentage points. He is likely to prevail in the May 28 runoff.

But the overwhelming media focus on Turkey obscured a big win for democracy on the other side of the world. On the same day Turks went to the polls, Thailand’s opposition scored a thunderous success in that country’s election. The Thai opposition exceeded the most optimistic predictions, with the progressive Move Forward party winning an estimated 151 of the 500 seats in parliament, and another opposition party, Peu Thai, capturing 141 seats. The conservative ruling incumbent, United Thai Nation Party, meanwhile, won only 36 seats. For Thailand’s military junta, it was a colossal and unexpected loss.

So, as we read dozens of articles about what went wrong in Turkey, it is worth asking: How did the Thai opposition prevail on an equally tilted electoral field? What tactics did they deploy, and what lessons might they teach those resisting autocracy around the world?

Strategies of Resistance

Soon after seizing power in a 2014 coup, Thailand’s military junta solidified its rule by rewriting the constitution. The regime hollowed out democracy enough to preserve the thinnest veneer of electoral legitimacy while ensuring it had the tools to make sure it keeps power. The junta’s “creative” solution was to add a senate, whose 250 seats are appointed by the military, to sit alongside the democratically elected 500-seat parliament. Since the prime minister needs a majority in both houses, the constitution effectively gives the military a 250-vote advantage.

In another move straight from the authoritarian playbook, the Thai government has heavily abused the legal system to target its critics. In late 2019, the regime trumped up charges to disband the second-largest opposition party, Future Forward, and to jail most of its leadership—spurring months of student protests. With that perceived threat neutralized, the Thai government, much like Russia’s and Turkey’s, passed a series of laws in 2021 to contain civil society—a typical antidemocratic move.

Thailand’s leadership also went to great lengths to tame and control social media in 2019 and 2020, introducing a set of sweeping online regulations under which any criticism can be labeled as “attacking the monarchy” or violating other poorly defined provisions. These regulations led to the prosecution of more than 250 young activists and opposition figures.

Despite these heavy blows, Thailand’s prodemocratic forces adapted and innovated to survive. As fast as dictators are learning from each other, their opponents are adapting to and outsmarting their attacks. Faced with the creeping authoritarianism of former Serbian president Slobodan Milošević in the leadup to the 2000 election, my (Srdja Popovic’s) movement, Otpor! (Resistance!), crafted a four-part response: 1) uniting the opposition, 2) mobilizing young voters, 3) training thirty-thousand election monitors to document and prevent electoral fraud, and 4) combining mass protests with a general strike to force Milošević to concede once he had lost. The Thai opposition not only employed all of these tactics, but they developed several of their own:

Recovering and regrouping. In the face of crackdowns, opposition parties came back stronger. The 2019 banning of the Future Forward party and jailing of its leadership led its MPs to form the Move Forward party under the leadership of the young and charismatic Pita Limjaroenrat. The other main opposition party, Pheu Thai, had seen two of its leaders—former prime ministers Thaksin Shinawatra and his sister Yingluck—ousted from power, prosecuted, and exiled. After regrouping, the party benefited from the leadership of Thaksin’s daughter, Paetongtarn Shinawatra. In both cases, government crackdowns backfired, sparking well-organized nationwide protests that shredded the regime’s popularity and inspired young Thais to enter politics.

Unifying. As the election date was set, opposition parties turned their attention to the question of unity, which is one of the primary elements of successful nonviolent movements. To broaden its appeal, the Thai opposition decided to run on two different tickets—as they correctly calculated that each party would appeal to very different parts of the electorate—but did so with the clear intention to form a united coalition after the elections. It worked out well, as the Move Forward party captured youth voters and large urban centers, while the more traditional Pheu Thai dominated rural and working-class areas in the country’s northeast. Only days after election, the two parties formed a governing coalition.

Bypassing censorship. Faced with a censored internet and the threat of prosecution for online criticism, the opposition behaved “like water” to find its way to millions. To stay at the top of news feeds while avoiding censorship, opposition figures disguised their online posts as nonpolitical. The most-watched video on Move Forward’s official TikTok account (with more than thirteen-million views), for instance, shows Pita demonstrating different uses of a traditional Thai loincloth. Move Forward also created a TikTok filter of him waving, which party backers can overlay onto their own videos to discreetly show their support. The party’s efforts worked miracles: Pita’s youthful image was ubiquitous on social media, and the government was unable to censor it.

Offline, the opposition adopted a guerilla-grassroots campaigning strategy, organizing thousands of small, low-risk events at local fairs and markets across the country. Its supporters also made creative use of the “Hunger Games” three-finger salute to identify and show solidarity with one another.

Joining forces with civil society and mobilizing youth. The 2020 protests in Thailand, sparked by the prohibition of the Future Forward Party, gave birth to a vivid and active youth NGO scene. For example, the Thai Youth Anti-Corruption Network mobilized students from more than ninety universities to use social-media platforms for sharing ideas, photos, and information about anticorruption campaigns. Their efforts were funded by on-campus coffee shops run by students. The opposition closely cooperated with Thailand’s NGOs to mobilize support beyond political parties, educate voters, and recruit and train thousands of election monitors, who were often accompanied by trained NGO activists while in the field. These efforts proved effective in not only preventing potential fraud, but also in mobilizing opposition-leaning but otherwise nonpartisan young people, who voted in historically unprecedented numbers.

These tactics played a critical role in helping the Thai opposition to prevail despite the government’s best efforts, and they may help other prodemocratic movements to challenge the world’s ever-growing band of autocrats. But we should never forget that strongmen in Turkey, Thailand, and beyond have repeatedly shown us that they don’t know how to accept defeat. Whether by manipulating election results, weaponizing courts against the opposition, or resorting to more extreme measures such as coups d’état (which have frequently occurred in Thailand), autocrats will do everything they can to hold on to power. Although the opposition has prevailed in Thailand, it remains to be seen if the political elite will allow them to govern. But one thing is clear above all: However hard the bad guys may try to crush democracy, they will never succeed as long as the opposition stays smart, creative, and one step ahead. 

The article was published in The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Summer 2022 edition:

 

Abstract

 

This essay addresses some of the challenges that nonviolent activist movements encounter when navigating non-state stakeholders, including violent groups and transnational corporations. It argues that as the more successful strategy to wage conflict, contemporary nonviolent movements track non-state stakeholders’ fluctuating loyalties and leverage methods of protest, boycott, civil disobedience, and noncooperation in order to secure small wins. The essay provides insight into two movements in Iraq and Myanmar and breaks down how each group engaged non-state stakeholders and used nonviolent tactics to garner support and enact meaningful democratic change.

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, power continues to be devolved from the state and into the hands of non-state stakeholders including militias, extremist groups, and international corporations. Some of the particularly violent stakeholders, such as those in Iraq, developed into extended and highly unaccountable arms of a military. In other scenarios, wealthy individuals and global corporations have scaled to compete with the state in monetary terms by leveraging their investments to influence geopolitics in their favor. Nonviolent activists know better than most that this dispersion of power has greatly altered the political landscape, and that non-state stakeholders must be skillfully navigated to guarantee victory.

This essay examines how nonviolent movements pivot their strategies to achieve democratic change and considers the rise of non-state stakeholders to positions of power. While subscribing to the core methods of strategic nonviolent struggle, the essay compares how movements in Iraq and Myanmar are utilizing non-state stakeholders’ newfound power to achieve positive change.

Part One provides context on the method of strategic nonviolent struggle and why, even in the face of violent repression, it is more likely to result in sustainable change compared to a violent strategy. Part Two discusses the challenge that movements face in navigating non-state stakeholders due to the nature of these actors’ loyalties. This section also compares how activists in Iraq and Myanmar tracked non-state stakeholder’s loyalties over time to identify ripe moments to secure wins for the cause. Despite a difference in context, this essay concludes that the scenarios in Iraq and Myanmar illustrate how a nonviolent approach that carefully navigates non-state stakeholders is the key to achieving democratic change—even in the face of unimaginable violence.

WHY NONVIOLENCE WORKS

The success of nonviolent resistance challenges conventional thinking, which assumes that political violence is the most effective way for a resistance campaign to challenge an adversary and achieve its goals. As a civilian-based method, strategic non-violence leverages social, psychological, economic, and political means to challenge an adversary without the threat or use of violence.[1] Hundreds of methods of nonviolent resistance—including economic boycotts, labor strikes, public protests, non-cooperation, and nonviolent intervention—have been recorded by scholars and are employed regularly to mass mobilize populaces as means to assert political pressure and delegitimize adversaries.[2]

History even favors nonviolence as the choice method of resistance over that of a violent strategy. According to The Nonviolent and Violent Conflicts Outcome (NAVCO) 1.3 Data Set (an initiative including comparative data on 622 global resistance campaigns between 1900 and 2019) movements that adopt a nonviolent strategy are successful 52 percent of the time.[3] The achievements of nonviolent movements starkly differ to violent resistance campaigns, which have so far only been successful 39 percent of the time.[4]

Still, some contemporary scholars and activists have argued that political violence is a legitimate tool that activists should employ, particularly in the face of repression.[5] Nevertheless, the strategic logic behind nonviolent resistance reaffirms the method’s superiority. Many who argue in favor of violent tactics have claimed that nonviolence is a “Western” technique and that those who advocate for its application fail to consider risks involved with the strategy.[6] Some also argue that using methods of unarmed violence, like launching Molotov cocktails or throwing rocks, is effective for achieving short-term change due to a lack of other mechanisms at a groups’ disposal, such as elections.[7] Other activists claim that they’ve found a balance in establishing fringe groups in their movement who successfully employ unarmed violence in tandem with nonviolent actions.[8]

While it may be possible that the adoption of unarmed violent tactics resulted in short-term change for some movements, there is little evidence to suggest that the use of these tactics is effective for enacting long-term democratization. This is because when a resistance movement adopts a violent strategy, they are challenging their adversary in an area where their adversary maintains the upper hand.[9]

Adversaries (whether they are a corporation, military, or extremist group) have wielded violence to uphold what Johan Galtung, a Norwegian sociologist, refers to as structural violence.[10] Unlike direct violence, which Galtung defines as the “physical harming [of] other humans with intention,” structural violence is the driving force behind social systems which prevent part of the population from meeting their basic needs, causing premature death as a result of exclusion, neglect, and poverty.[11] In modern societies, structural violence tends to manifest as institutionalized colonialism, racism, sexism, ethnocentrism, elitism, and nationalism. Galtung argues further that those stakeholders who benefit from structural violence rely on widespread direct violence, such as police violence or disinformation, to maintain their position of power.[12]

The theory of structural violence highlights a key reason for why adopting violence is unwise: a movement’s adversary has had many years of experience in using violence as a tool to stay in power. This means that in most scenarios, a movement’s adversaries will have an absolute advantage in a violent strategy from both a material and structural perspective.

WHAT ARE NON-STATE STAKEHOLDERS AND HOW DO WE CONCEPTUALIZE THEIR LOYALTIES?

Non-state stakeholders are entities that are not directly funded by the sitting government of the state from which they operate. In real terms, high net-wealth individuals, multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, militias, and nonviolent movements are among some of the entities that fall under the category of “non-state stakeholders.” Some of the more powerful non-state stakeholders tend to operate with a large degree of impunity as they have superseded the authority of a sitting government.[13] While countries have combined their resources to develop a global system of justice through the establishment of entities like the United Nations or international courts, powerful non-state actors persistently subvert accountability for international crimes.[14] Groups operating with impunity can be highly problematic for nonviolent movements as they can lead to unchecked repression targeting activists or result in a non-state stakeholder becoming the lifeline of the movement’s adversary.[15]

In order to overcome the conundrum of non-state stakeholders, successful activists have broken down non-state stakeholders according to their loyalties and created campaigns that aim to shift some of those loyalties to the movement’s cause. Loyalty in this scenario may be thought of as both an emotion and a set of behaviors.[16] Similar to emotions like love or sorrow, individuals can be loyal to multiple things at once and their expression of loyalty manifests in myriad forms. An individual’s loyalty to something or someone may also shift radically if a superior alternative comes along.[17]

This approach for conceptualizing loyalty alignments is congruent with the logic of strategic nonviolent struggle. This approach humanizes the individuals within a non-state stakeholder by asking: “what are those individual people loyal to as it relates to being part of that non-state stakeholder and why?” Therefore, instead of approaching a non-state stakeholder as an institution, activists view them as a large group of individuals. Each of those individuals, a human, is loyal to a variety of things, such as their families, their religion and their job.[18] The goal for activists is to acknowledge these loyalties and present individuals that constitute the stakeholder with a beneficial alternative, such as gaining freedom of expression or earning more money.[19]

 

Navigating Non-state Stakeholders to Achieve Victory

To complement the theory, we will now examine two examples of nonviolent movements that successfully navigate non-state stakeholders. The first example in Iraq conveys the importance for movements to act on individual’s loyalties when the prospect of winning the support of an entire non-state stakeholder group is not possible. The latter example in Myanmar examines how a boycott and divestment campaign tracked several non-state stakeholders’ fluctuating loyalties to apply sustained pressure and eventually, win over their support. In both cases, activists were faced with a choice between adopting a nonviolent or violent strategy to achieve their goals; activists in both cases chose nonviolence in the face of violent adversaries and yielded victories for their causes.

Iraq:

Popular discontent over poor living standards, unemployment and insecurity had been simmering in Iraq’s Shia Muslim majority areas during summer 2019, including the capital city Baghdad and across the oil-rich southern governorates. It had been one of Iraq’s hottest summers and despite generous oil revenues, most low to middle income Iraqis lacked clean running water and a sustained source of electricity. The situation boiled over in September 2019 when security forces violently dispersed a peaceful student sit-in outside the Prime Minister’s office in Baghdad using a water cannon.[20] Coordinated demonstrations surged across the capital and in the south; protesters were met regularly with live ammunition by the country’s Hashd al-Shaabi formations, an umbrella of militias that were originally mobilized to combat ISIS.[21] Several of the Hashd’s more powerful militias are loyal to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Force, both ideologically and monetarily, and have affiliations with Iraqi political parties.[22]

The coordination among activists grew more sophisticated as more took to the streets, particularly following the former Prime Minister Adel Abdil Mahdi’s decision to transfer a commander Abdel-Wahad al-Saadi from the elite Iraqi Counter Terror Service to the Defense Ministry.[23] Seen as one of Iraq’s core war heroes in the fight against ISIS, al-Saadi was celebrated, particularly among Shia young men. While his promotion was executed by Prime Minister Madhi, al-Saadi’s followers perceived his demotion as an act of political coercion stemming from the Hashd’s powerful pro-Iran militias, and thereby an act of foreign influence from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.[24]

Protest participation surged once more, as activists began occupying public squares in Baghdad and the southern governorate capitals. In Baghdad’s Tahrir Square, protesters developed methods to communicate their demands, including a newspaper publication known as “Tuk-tuk,” named in honor of the local motorized taxi drivers known for bravely transporting wounded demonstrators to hospitals.[25] The movement also broadened its membership, inviting Iraqi women to join its leadership ranks. Participation surged once more with numbers reaching up to 100,000 in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square as hundreds of women took to the streets.[26]

To challenge the Iranian-aligned militias’ loyalties and persuade them to join the cause, protesters focused on a commonality among the support base’s loyalties: national pride. The demands, though arguably vague, included a stop to all foreign intervention in Iraq, whether it be Iranian or Western, fresh elections and an end to the country’s “status quo” of corruption, high unemployment, sectarianism, and violence.[27]

Fringe groups using unarmed violent tactics popped up, particularly in the South. They burned down the Iranian consulate general in Najaf as crowds chanted “death to Khamenei,” the Iranian Grand Ayatollah.[28] Iranian-aligned militias reacted aggressively, employing indiscriminate live ammunition, and launched Iranian-supplied military-grade tear gas, killing over 500 protesters.[29] Between December 2019 and August 2020 the militias proactively kidnapped and assassinated activists, namely female activists, to condemn their participation.

As a reaction to the militias becoming more entrenched in their loyalties, Iraqi protesters began to focus on chipping away at the militia’s source of manpower by persuading young disenfranchised, unemployed men to join the cause instead of the militias’ ranks.[30] When threatened by powerful clerics over gender integration in the streets, protesters held hands in the square and covered public spaces with drawings of martyrs and Iraqi women resisting.[31] This strategy enabled activists to forgo focusing on pulling the militias to their side altogether and instead appealed to the loyalties of individual fighters or prospect fighters.

As the protests raged, the Iraqi parliament pushed through electoral reform legislation in late 2019, changing the system from a proportional system to a single non-transferrable system.[32] Though imperfect, the change allowed for voters to select individual candidates over party lists. The legislation also reserved a quarter of the total 251 seats for women.[33]Still, the protests pressed on, with corruption and foreign influence remaining. On February 11, 2021, activists demonstrated the true influence of their actions after the powerful Iraqi Shia Cleric Muqtada al-Sadr dissolved his “Blue Caps” militia. This was in response to protester demands over viral videos displaying the militia members killing dozens of protesters in Najaf to reopen roads.[34] The appetite to appease the movement reflected the protesters’ adjustment to appeal to Iraqi-aligned militia members’ loyalties to their country. In May 2021, the protesters’ campaigns over the Iranian militia’s kidnapping and assassination intimidation campaign also yielded a small win after the head of the Iranian aligned al-Anbar militia Qasim Muslin was arrested for playing a role in the death of two kidnapped activists.[35]

The movement’s true success shone through the parliamentary elections in fall 2021. The Iran-aligned militias’ Fatah Alliance lost ground in Parliament, relinquishing 31 seats. Meanwhile, Iraqi women- including two women representing the ethno-national minorities in Iraq, surpassed the established quota and won 97 seats.[36] Iran-aligned militias deemed the results as illegitimate and threatened to escalate their violence. Instead, the Iraqi Supreme Court ratified election results in December 2021.[37]

While the results may appear to be small victories, these extraordinary developments represent a

demotion in the militias’ power, a condemnation of their use of violence and an endorsement for the Iraqi state’s inclusion of women and minority groups. This progress was achieved as a result of the activist movement acknowledging that the Iranian militias’ loyalties were unlikely to shift in their favor. Instead, they made a conscious decision to appeal to the loyalties of young Iraqis and persuade them to join the nonviolent cause over the militias.

Myanmar:

 

On November 8, 2020, Myanmar’s National League for Democracy won a landslide victory in the national elections. The elections were a major step forward on the path to democratization.[38] Nevertheless, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) declared the results as illegitimate on February 1, 2021, and launched a coup d’état against the elected government. Established activist groups, professional unions and civil servants quickly mobilized to form the “Civil Disobedience Movement” that aimed to garner broad support from across the country.[39] The goal was straightforward: to execute a national labor strike and bring the economy, and the Tatmadaw’s sources of financing, to a full stop.[40]

While the United States and its European counterparts began imposing economic sanctions on the Tatmadaw’s revenue streams, Myanmar’s liquified natural gas (LNG) industry remained untouched. Lobbying by companies with direct investments in the country, including the French oil and gas venture TotalEnergies (Total) and the US-owned Chevron Corporation (Chevron ensured smooth operations in the LNG sector).[41] The Civil Disobedience Movement recognized that by not sanctioning the LNG activities, the Tatmadaw would still maintain a strong source of revenue.[42]

The movement set about winning over non-state stakeholders’ support, convincing them to divest from the Myanmar LNG pipeline connecting the offshore Yadana Gas field to Thailand.[43] Activists mapped out Total and Chevron’s loyalties and deduced that profit and brand reputation were the critical assets that both companies were most loyal to. The Civil Disobedience Movement then worked with supporters abroad to develop the “Stop Buying Juna Business” boycott and divestment campaign, while also pulling both companies’ workers at the Yadana gas field into the nationwide labor strike on February 11, 2021.[44] LGN workers posted pictures from the offshore platforms calling on both companies to condemn Tatmadaw’s growing list of human rights violations against nonviolent protesters.[45] TotalEnergies promptly responded to the strike and calls to divest claiming that they would not stop producing gas on the Yadana Fields “in part to protect employees from those who might otherwise risk repercussions from the military junta.”[46]

Over the next 30 days, international pressure mounted as global news agencies, such as Reuters, published lists of foreign companies with direct ties to the Tatmadaw and acts of protest and civil disobedience which directly targeted these companies’ offices began to pop up.[47] In Washington D.C., American activists staged a demonstration outside of Chevron’s local office and took turns whacking a pinata adorned with a picture of the company’s primary lobbyist responsible for aggressively working to keep the US from sanctioning Myanmar’s energy industry.[48] This dilemma action targeted Chevron’s loyalty to its profit and identified the absurdity of its actions to protect that profit while directly funding the violent military junta. In May, an activist covered the façade of the national Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise’s headquarters with red paint, brandishing slogans demanding that Chevron and Total withdraw from the country, otherwise risking more Burmese blood being spilled.[49]

By the end of May 2021, sustained, albeit small scale protests, had popped up at numerous Chevron refineries in the US and at Total offices in Europe.[50] The campaign managed to impose enough upward political pressure on Chevron and Total that on May 27, 2021, the energy giants jointly suspended cash distributions derived from the Yadana gas venture to the Tatmadaw junta. The decision followed a joint vote by both companies’ shareholders.[51] The suspension marked an important step in the shift of the energy companies’ loyalties, as it signaled that they were unwilling to risk their reputation and potentially, their profit, if the boycott and divestment campaign grew stronger. With a combined 59.24 percent share in the offshore project, the act partially fulfilled The Civil Disobedience Movement’s goal to cut off financial support to the Tatmadaw.[52]

Amidst sustained nonviolent campaigns, including continued direct action targeting both companies, the energy giants halted all operations and withdrew from the Yadana gas venture on January 21, 2022, citing human rights abuses and a deteriorating rule of law as a direct result of Tatmadaw’s coup d’état.[53]

CONCLUSION

Non-state stakeholders, ranging from high net wealth individuals to violent extremist groups, will continue to emerge onto the political scene and challenge traditional sources of political power like standing governments, militaries, and international courts. The cases in Iraq and Myanmar demonstrate how those non-state stakeholders which manage to supersede a domestic government may act with high levels of impunity in using violence against civilians, or in maintaining business ventures that directly fund entities accused of committing war crimes. This shift in the political landscape presents a particularly complex challenge for nonviolent movements that aim to pull as many individuals as possible to their side because powerful non-state stakeholders exist outside of the system already attempting to democratize. For several movements, such as those in Iraq and Myanmar, tracking and appealing to individuals’ loyalties who collectively make up a non-state stakeholder has proven fruitful in realizing their goals.

Successfully tracking loyalties as a means to navigate the rise in non-state stakeholders will be critical for those movements seeking to enact meaningful change in constituencies especially where extremist groups have established viable alternatives to government systems. Despite their extremist ideologies, groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia or the Islamic State-Khorasan in Afghanistan, are able to govern territories because they provide core services in the absence of the central government, such as security and clean water delivery. The populations they govern therefore, have accepted their ruling in order to survive. In other scenarios, such as Russia’s invasion in Ukraine, large-scale corporations’ boycott and divestment from those abusing human rights may prove to be a powerful tipping point in a movement’s ability to apply political pressure on its adversary. Activists’ ability to influence large-scale divestments may be achieved by appealing to the loyalties of the core decision makers within these corporate non-state stakeholders.

To work in parallel with activists’ strategy in appealing to loyalties, policy makers must meaningfully engage and endorse nonviolent movements as the legitimate voice of the people. Further, by applying economic sanctions on individuals within militias, extremist groups, or corporations who either monetarily support or directly repress nonviolent activism, the international community will aid in democratically diffusing power to the people.

[1] Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2014), 18.

[2] Gene Sharp, 198 Methods of Nonviolent Action, Albert Einstein Institution, 1973.

[3] Erica Chenoweth and Christopher Wiley Shay, List of Campaigns in NAVCO 1.3 – NAVCO Data Project, V1 (2020), distributed by Harvard Dataverse, https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ON9XND.

[4] Ibid.

[5] See: Brent Simpson, Robb Willer, and Matthew Feinberg, “Does Violent Protest Backfire? Testing a Theory of Public Reactions to Activist Violence,” Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World 4 (January): 1-14.; Daniel Q Gillion, The Loud Minority : Why Protests Matter in American Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020).; Isaac Chotiner, “How Violent Protests Change Politics,” The New Yorker, May 29, 2020, https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/how-violent-protests-change-politics.; Tonya Mosley and Allison Hagan, “Violence As A Form Of Protest | Here & Now,” Wbur, June 11, 2020, https://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2020/06/11/voilence-protests-racial-justice.; John Morreall, “The Justifiability of Violent Civil Disobedience,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1) (March 1976): 35-47.

[6] Mosley and Hagan, “Violence As A Form Of Protest.””

[7] Interview with Hong Kongese activists, July 9, 2021.

[8] Austin Ramzy, “In Hong Kong, Unity Between Peaceful and Radical Protesters. For Now,” The New York Times, September 27, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/27/world/asia/hong-kong-protests-violence.html.

[9] Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 22–24.

[10] Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research 6 (3) (1969): 175-179.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” 183.

[13] Sabine C. Carey, Michael P. Colaresi, and Neil J. Mitchell, “Governments, Informal Links to Militias, and Accountability,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 59 (5) (2015): 850-876; Stéfanie Khoury, “Corporate (Non-)Accountability and Human Rights,” Asian Journal of Social Science46 (4/5) (2018): 503-523.

[14] Ore Koren, “Means to an End: Pro-Government Militias as a Predictive Indicator of Strategic Mass Killing,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 34 (5) (2017): 461–84.; Khoury, “Corporate (Non-)Accountability,” 2018).

[15] For detailed examples in Iraq and Myanmar, see Marija Ristic, Ivan Angelovski, and Maja Zivanovic, “‘Epic’ Serbian Arms Deal Led to Pierced Skulls in Baghdad | Balkan Insight,” Balkan Insight, December 13, 2019, https://balkaninsight.com/2019/12/13/epic-serbian-arms-deal-led-to-pierced-skulls-in-baghdad/.; Manny Maung, “Myanmar Atrocities Show Need for International Action,” Human Rights Watch,  December 15, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/12/15/myanmar-atrocities-show-need-international-action.

[16] For theories on how loyalty is considered an emotion versus a behavior, see: James Connor, The Sociology of Loyalty, 9–34. (New York: Springer, 2007); Robert C. Solomon and Lori D Stone, “‘On “Positive” and “Negative” Emotions,’” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 32 (4) (2002): 417–35; Jack Katz, How Emotions Work (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999).; Morton Grodzins, The Loyal and the Disloyal: Social Boundaries of Patriotism and Treason (Cleveland: Morton Books, 1956).

[17] Katz, How Emotions Work.; Connor, The Sociology of Loyalty.

[18] Connor, The Sociology of Loyalty, 222–24; Grodzins, The Loyal and the Disloyal, 82–86.

[19] Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works.

[20] “In Baghdad, All Bridges Lead to Revolution,” Al-Wasat, November 7, 2019, http://alwasat.ly/news/arabic/263236.

[21] “The Popular Mobilization Forces Admit to Shooting Protesters on the Night of the ‘al-Khilani Massacre,’” Al-Quds, December 9, 2019, t.ly/q5BR.; “Protests Erupt in Iraq against the American Targeting of the ‘Hashd,’ Abdul-Mahdi Threatens to Review the Relationship with the International Coalition,” Al Jazeera, December 31, 2019, t.ly/IcF4.

[22] For an excellent overview of the Hashd al-Shaabi’s structure and operating model, see: The Hashd and Politics from Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, International Crisis Group, July 30, 2018.

[23] Mustafa Saadoun, “Iran’s Influence Seen in Transfer of Iraqi War Hero,” Al-Monitor, October 4, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2019/10/iraq-protests-abdul-wahab-al-saadi.html.

[24] Ibid.; Mizar Kamal, “A Women’s Revolution in the Iraqi Streets: We Will Win!” Daraj, October 30, 2019, https://daraj.com/23324/.

[25] “Iraqi Protesters’ Newspaper Aspires to Be a Means of Change,” Reuters, November 20, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/idARAL8N2802YD.

[26] Mass Al-Qaisi, “Women Become the Icon of Iraqi Protests,” Al-Ithtijaj, March 8, 2020, https://alihtijaj.com/view.php?cat=1140.; Kamal, “A Women’s Revolution”; Dr. Ilham Makki, “The October Demonstrations Are a Turning Point in the Iraqi Feminist Movement,” Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 2020, t.ly/hfus.

[27] Ibid.

[28] “The Protest Scene after Protesters Burn down the Iranian Consulate General in Najaf,” Enab Baladi, November 28, 2019, https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/345572.

[29] Saadoun, “Iran’s Influence Seen.”

[30] Makki, “The October Demonstrations.”; Saadoun, “Iran’s Influence Seen.”

[31] Ibid.

[32] Iraqi Council of Representatives, Iraqi Parliament Elections Law (No. 9 of 2020), 2020, https://moj.gov.iq/upload/pdf/4603.pdf.

[33] Iraq’s Electoral Preparations and Processes- Report No.4, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, December 10, 2020; “In a Remarkable Precedent, Women Make a Surprise Win in the Iraqi Elections,” Al-Jazeera, October 20, 2021, t.ly/2DeE.

[34] Muqtada Al-Sadr, Twitter post, February 11, 2020, https://twitter.com/Mu_AlSadr/status/1227247455818915840.

[35] “Iraq Arrests Commander in Iran-Backed PMU over Activist’s Murder,” Al-Arabiya, May 26, 2021, https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2021/05/26/Iraq-arrests-chief-of-Iran-backed-PMU-over-attacks-on-base-hosting-US-force-Sources.

[36] “The Iraqi Federal Court’s Approval of the Election Results Removes Opacity in Iraqi Politics,” Iraqi News Agency, December 27, 2021, https://www.ina.iq/144833–.html.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Maung, “Myanmar Atrocities.”

[39] Victoria Milko, “How Are the Myanmar Protests Being Organized?” AP News, February 9, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/technology-aung-san-suu-kyi-myanmar-yangon-asia-pacific-026ad5eb9ad6920f0d0d5446e17e27c2.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Kenneth P. Vogel and Lara Jakes, “Chevron Lobbies to Head Off New Sanctions on Myanmar,” The New York Times, September 16, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/22/us/politics/chevron-myanmar-sanctions.html.; “403 Myanmar Civil Society Organizations to Patrick Pouyanne and Michael Wirth,” Progressive Voice Myanmar, April 20, 2021, https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2021/04/20/open-letter-to-total-and-chevron/.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Amanda Battersby, “Oil Workers in Solidarity against Myanmar Coup | Upstream Online,” Upstream, March 11, 2021, https://www.upstreamonline.com/politics/oil-workers-in-solidarity-against-myanmar-coup/2-1-960420.

[45] Battersby, “Oil Workers in Solidarity.”; Reuters Staff, “Total Says Abandoning Myanmar Gas Field Would Hurt Workers, Cities,” Reuters, April 3, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics-total-idUSKBN2BQ0OX.

[46] Reuters Staff, “Total Says Abandoning Myanmar Gas Field Would Hurt Workers, Cities,” Reuters, April 3, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics-total-idUSKBN2BQ0OX.

[47] “Rights Groups Call on Total to Suspend Payments in Myanmar Operations,” Reuters, March 16, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/rights-groups-call-total-suspend-payments-myanmar-operations-2021-03-16/; Thomas Conway to Michael K. Wirth, March 21, 2021, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1gJxc8edR_FidQaH1TJxIx6eMB1qvaMYLC9kKcVyEuxQ/edit.

[48] SomOfUs, IMG_7380, photograph, Flickr, April 16, 2021, https://www.flickr.com/photos/sumofus/albums/72157718943019609.

[49] “Rights Groups Call.”

[50] “Protesters Demand Chevron Suspend Payments to Myanmar Junta Ahead of Shareholder Meeting,” MyanmarNow, May 25, 2021, https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/protesters-demand-chevron-suspend-payments-to-myanmar-junta-ahead-of-shareholder-meeting.

[51] Agence France-Presse, “French Energy Company Suspends Payments to Myanmar Army,” Voice of America News, May 26, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_french-energy-company-suspends-payments-myanmar-army/6206257.html.

[52] “Chevron, Total Energies Stopping Operations in Myanmar over Human Rights Abuses,” NPR, January 21, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/01/21/1074792462/chevron-total-myanmar-human-rights.

[53] Ibid.

 

 

Article Source: Journal of Democracy

By Sophia McClennen, Srdja Popovic, and Joseph Wright

In 1982, during the Polish Solidarity movement, the people of Świdnik, a small town in eastern Poland, decided to protest government-media propaganda by taking their television sets for a walk. Activists had wanted to register their discontent at the communist state’s control of all news media, but decided that encouraging individuals to attempt a private boycott would be pointless: After all, who would know if you were sitting at home in your living room not watching the news? But what if a way could be found to make such a boycott publicly visible? What if dissatisfaction with government propaganda and the state’s stranglehold on information could be put on unmistakable display for everyone to see?

Eventually, the activists decided to take their television sets onto the street at the time of the main evening newscast, “walking” them in wheelbarrows as though they were babies in carriages. Before long, anyone walking the streets of the town at this hour could see friends and neighbors ambling and laughing, pushing their TVs, using the thirty minutes previously spent listening to the official newscast to greet one another, gossip, and share in the thrill of standing up to the regime together.

The practice of “walking” TV sets was not only creative but contagious. It was a great gag, and the practice soon spread to other Polish towns. Flabbergasted, the communist government weighed its options. It could not arrest anyone; there was no law forbidding Polish citizens from pushing television sets down streets. All the regime could do was move the 10 p.m. curfew up to 7 p.m., thereby forcing everyone indoors [End Page 110] and signaling its powerlessness to contain criticism with a move that outraged the Polish public even more.

The wheelbarrow protests put the government in a tough spot: Ignoring the protesters would simply embolden them, reveal the government’s weakness, and increase resistance. Repressing protesters for doing something as innocuous as pushing TVs in wheelbarrows would make officials look heavy-handed and overly repressive. The clumsy effort to tamp down the protests by decreeing an earlier start to the curfew cost the regime credibility, expanded the base of Polish citizens critical of the government, and made the authorities look absurd. They could no longer claim that they were acting in the best interest of the people. Once that narrative had been disrupted, their grip on power became tenuous and eventually the regime fell. This specific type of nonviolent tactic is called a dilemma action. It is designed to create a dilemma for the target and force opponents into a “lose-lose” situation: Whatever the opponents do, they will suffer reputational harm and end up looking bad. A well-chosen dilemma action taps into widely held beliefs and uses unpredictability and humor to destabilize the official narrative and attract widespread public support.

But, beyond making for a good story, is this tactic effective? Does it have outcomes that we can measure? Our research suggests that dilemma actions can make a nonviolent campaign 11 to 14 percent more likely to succeed. Nonviolent campaigns are already nearly twice as likely to succeed as violent campaigns (working half the time versus only 29 percent of the time), and our findings suggest that dilemma actions can give nonviolent campaigns a further edge, helping them to succeed almost two-thirds of the time (64 percent).

Over the past three decades, research has shown that nonviolent social protest has been the most reliable path to democracy.1 Recent democratic backsliding notwithstanding, sustained nonviolent mobilization remains a proven path to democratic survival, especially among new democracies.2

Nonviolent mobilization campaigns can and do fail, of course. Since 1905, their rate of full success has been 47 percent (150 of 320 cases). In a more recent subset of all cases since 1974—namely, all the cases that have occurred since the “third wave” of democratization began with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal—the rate of failure (defined as anything less than full success) has been 53 percent (137 out of 258 cases). Civil resistance reached a “new level of popularity” after 2010, but its effectiveness began to decline.3

We know that nonviolent mass movements are significantly more effective than violent ones, but why do nonviolent movements sometimes fail? Could their tactics play a role? Nonviolence itself is a broad tactic, but simply saying that a movement is nonviolent says little about how it actually pursues its goals (other than by abjuring violence, of course). [End Page 111] There is a vast difference, for example, between nonviolent movements that emphasize protests and ones that incorporate more disruptive direct actions such as strikes.

Research on the efficacy of specific nonviolent tactics is scant. Most of it focuses on comparing a few cases to one another, or studies tactical changes within a movement. Apart from suggestions that campaigns will be more effective if they use a “variety” of methods, there has been little noted regarding specific types of tactics and their role in campaign success.

This said, there has been growing interest in assessing the effects of creative tactics. Building on anecdotal accounts such as Steve Crawshaw’s Street Spirit: The Power of Protests and Mischief, or activist training guides such Andrew Boyd and Dave Oswald Mitchell’s Beautiful Trouble: A Toolkit for Revolution, or the Guide to Effective Nonviolent Struggle published by the Center for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS), Steven Duncombe and Silas Harrebye offer data on the relative effectiveness of creative versus conventional forms of activism.4 They find that across nearly every quantitative measure—observations of interest, numbers of petition signatures gathered, speed and scale of flyer distribution, reactions to the activists—the creative approach beat the conventional one when it came to reaching desired objectives.

Our study is meant to add to these contributions. It introduces, conceptualizes, and measures the efficacy of dilemma actions. We then use global data on dilemma actions during nonviolent campaigns to assess how this tactic influences campaign success. Our findings suggest that dilemma actions reliably boost campaign success. What makes this tactic so effective?

Dilemma Power
During their colonial occupation of India, British authorities held monopoly control over the vital everyday staple of salt, taxing it and controlling its production and distribution with an eye toward its value as an export. The independence movement could have angrily protested this state of affairs, but instead chose to do something far more creative. Led by Mohandas K. Gandhi, independence activists marched to the coast and began evaporating seawater to make their own salt. Tax protests and noncompliance soon spread across India and affected many things besides salt.

The British authorities found themselves in a bind: They could watch their control over salt (and more) go away, or they could launch a crackdown. They chose the latter, arresting thousands and along the way harming the colonial regime’s legitimacy, sparking an international outcry, and giving the independence movement additional momentum. [End Page 112] Gandhi’s unique ideas regarding civil disobedience became famous, but he was also a master at devising creative dilemmas that would confound his opponents and help his cause.

We have documented cases of dilemma actions across history and on every continent, but systematic study of them is a recent endeavor. The first activist to write about the success of dilemma actions was George Lakey, who in 1987 described what he called “dilemma demonstrations.” Canadian activist Philippe Duhamel read Lakey and devised a “dilemma demonstration” in 2001 designed to protest the Canadian government’s participation in the Free Trade Association of the Americas. Armed with a “giant key,” protesters embarked on a “search-and-seizure operation” at the Department of International Trade and Foreign Affairs in Ottawa, where they demanded that they be given access to the draft trade treaty. Protesters were arrested, which then drew public scrutiny. Why was the Canadian government refusing to release a draft? Why the secrecy? A week later, the protesters had achieved their goals and the drafts were made public. Duhamel later published a detailed account of the tactic.5

For Lakey and Duhamel, at the tactic’s core is the dilemma, which is created by a direct action tactic that forces the opponent into a lose-lose choice. Like all direct actions, dilemma actions work outside of conventional advocacy. They are designed to make the target respond. The typical choice is between efforts to repress the activists, which look heavy-handed, or inaction, which looks weak. In both scenarios, the target loses public credibility and the campaign builds momentum.

In one classic example, the Serbian movement Otpor! (Resistance!) plastered an oil barrel with President Slobodan Milošević’s picture, then placed the barrel in a busy shopping area. Passersby could drop a coin into the barrel and hit the image of Milošević in the face with a baseball bat. Calling the action “dime for change,” the activists encouraged their audience to recognize that they lived under a regime where the government cared more about shielding the autocrat’s image than about letting people peacefully express themselves. Police arrived and had to decide what, if anything, to do. They chose to “arrest” the barrel, which provided excellent photo opportunities and left the police, and by association Milošević, looking absurd. Otpor! could have gone the route of traditional protest, but a fun, provocative dilemma action drew far greater attention to the regime’s repression and built support for the nonviolent movement against it.

Even more important, our definition of dilemma actions, which builds on the CANVAS training experience, requires that activists tap into a widely held belief. Thus, for example, the “dime for change” dilemma action foregrounded the belief that people should be able to peacefully express frustration with their government. When the police shut things down, the repressive response made Otpor! more legitimate and the Milošević regime less so. By combining a peaceful action with [End Page 113] one that taps into a widely held belief, activists have a better chance of building broad public sympathy for their goals and incorporating the type of “large and diverse participation” that Erica Chenoweth has noted as critical for campaign success.6

The third element of a good dilemma action is playful irony. Humor is a powerful tool for activists targeting authoritarian regimes. Laughtivism has been defined as the “strategic use of humor and mocking by social nonviolent movements in order to undermine the authority of an opponent, build credibility, break fear and apathy and reach target audiences.”7 Showing that humor in political activism goes beyond just “letting off steam,” Majken Jul Sørensen explains how funny political stunts can disrupt repressive regimes’ discourse and reframe the narrative.8 Her research shows that using humor also helps activists themselves, who report feeling less fear when engaging in acts that have a humorous element.

Not all humorous stunts are ironic, of course. Activists dressing up in funny costumes may be fun but is not necessarily ironic. Dilemma actions, by contrast, need irony. They hinge above all on exposing the situational irony of opponents’ claims to be acting in the public’s best interest when in fact they are not doing so. As Bill Moyer writes, power-holders devise myths to justify their self-serving policies and programs.9 Oppressive governments do not need citizens to actually believe these myths, but they do need citizens to act publicly “as if” they believe them.10 The inherent irony is that the powerholders’ public narrative hides the truth of their actual practices.

The activists’ goals, then, are to use creative tactics to reveal the truth behind the myths that have been presented to the public as true, and—just as important—to expose citizens to public acts that subvert those myths. If, for example, a regime will not allow the people to publicly express themselves in protest, then a dilemma action will ironically call attention to that by displaying blank signs, staging silent protests, or having toys instead of people do the protesting. Dilemma actions are therefore a form of public disobedience that undermines regime narratives, but in a manner that honors a widely held social norm. The upshot is a public demonstration of how the regime’s narrative defies social norms.

A government may say that it has started a war to keep its citizens safe, while in fact the war puts the citizens at far greater risk. Protesters could respond by hitting the streets in a traditional protest, or they could try creatively ironic dilemma actions: writing antiwar messages on currency, [End Page 114] dressing in skeleton costumes to protest in cemeteries, or holding up blank pieces of paper in silent complaint.11 Arresting a bunch of creative activists for peaceful actions will hurt the regime’s reputation. This outcome is of great interest since a major factor shaping campaign success or failure is how the public perceives activists. When they are seen as disruptive or annoying or extremist, they tend to fail to attract new members.12 By contrast, research shows that if the public feels moral outrage at how the state treats activists, public support for the movement will likely rise.13 Actions that have an element of ironic play can be very effective at portraying activists sympathetically and their targets as hostile.

While the dilemma actions in our study vary in terms of how playful or funny their actions may be, they all share an effort to use creative irony to expose the intrinsic ironies of autocratic power.

The Dilemma-Action Study
This project began with the goal of pairing decades of activist experience with academic research. One member of our research team, Srdja Popovic, knew that dilemma actions could make a difference. He learned this firsthand as a leader of Otpor! helping to bring down the Milošević regime, and later from decades of CANVAS work training other activists across the globe. In order to put experience to a test, we conducted a holistic case study of 44 dilemma actions, coding nine different success metrics. This formed the basis of our 2020 book Pranksters vs. Autocrats.14 The results were encouraging, and led to this study, which documents the extent to which nonviolent campaigns use dilemma actions and tests whether they affect success rates.

To test the efficacy of dilemma actions as part of a nonviolent campaign, we examined dilemma-action tactics that took place during the 320 nonviolent campaigns occurring between 1905 and 2019, and which are included in the larger Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) 1.3 dataset covering the period from 1905 through 2019.15 The nonviolent campaigns in NAVCO 1.3 provide a sample that we can code for the presence of dilemma actions, allowing us to compare success rates of campaigns with and without dilemma actions.

The first step in coding was to learn the range of tactics used by each campaign and to search for markers of dilemma actions. Examples of these markers include boycotts, hunger strikes, media art, labor strikes, sit-ins, and symbols. If we found a dilemma action, we then coded its descriptive and evaluative features. If our team found a single example of dilemma-action tactics being used within a campaign, the search of the campaign stopped at that point—there was no need to find all dilemma actions since one was enough for comparative purposes. If no evidence of dilemma actions surfaced at first look, the team revisited primary and secondary sources twice more to confirm the absence. [End Page 115]

To give an example of how the coding went: In January 2009, during Iceland’s so-called Cutlery Revolution, nearly two-thousand people gathered outside the Althing (parliament) building to bang pans, pots, and other kitchenware. This use of everyday kitchen items was a helpful and ironic way to highlight the effect that the government’s handling of a massive banking collapse and financial crisis was having on ordinary citizens’ ability to feed their families. Banging pots and pans also made a lot of noise and drew media attention.

The demonstrators called on Prime Minister Geir Haarde and his cabinet to resign, and demanded reforms to make government more transparent. This disruptive action forced the government to either treat the protesters like criminals—and likely face charges of having overreacted—or let the noisy demonstrations continue. The demonstrators achieved their short-term goals: Haarde, the head of the central bank, and the country’s top financial-oversight officer all stepped down. Early elections were held that April. In order to code this case, two members of the research team independently consulted five distinct secondary sources, including newspaper articles, an encyclopedia entry, a peer-reviewed journal article, and an extant database of nonviolent mobilization.

Iceland’s Cutlery Revolution is just one example. Overall, our data indicate that dilemma actions occurred in only about a third of nonviolent campaigns, but at a fairly constant rate over time, suggesting that the presence of dilemma actions is not new. Dilemma actions also occur outside nonviolent campaigns, in part because many attempts at mass mobilization—both with and without dilemma actions—never attract the thousand or more participants that are needed to make it into the NAVCO dataset. In order to get around this limitation in the data, we have assembled our own database of more than four-hundred dilemma actions that includes instances where such actions were one-off events untied to any larger movement, let alone one with a thousand members. We have included, for example, the May 2013 “Kisses in the Subway” protest that happened after public-transit officials in Ankara, Turkey, looked at a station’s security-camera feed and noticed a couple kissing. Defying official admonitions to cease displaying affection on public transport, more than a hundred people flooded a station and spent several minutes kissing. Some held signs reading “free kisses.” Officials then had to decide whether to criminalize kissing or let these protesters undermine their authority. The dataset of dilemma actions found in the NAVCO data comprises about a quarter of the cases that we have studied thus far.

The Evidence
The success rate across all nonviolent campaigns in the NAVCO 1.3 dataset is roughly 54 percent. The left plot in Figure 1 shows that this average varies considerably by whether a campaign uses a dilemma action. [End Page 116] Nonviolent campaigns lacking a dilemma action have an overall success rate of just under 50 percent, while those with dilemma actions succeed on average 64 percent of the time.

 

Figure 1.

Dilemma Actions and Nonviolent-Campaign Success

Note: Partial success is treated as 50 percent, failure as 0, and full success as 100 percent.

Next, we tested the efficacy of dilemma actions.16 Our estimate suggests that dilemma actions are associated with an increase of ten percentage points in the probability of campaign success. This is lower than the prior fourteen-point estimate (64 versus 50 percent success rate), but our estimate comes from an approach that is often less sensitive to outlier observations. Both approaches suggest that, on average, dilemma actions make nonviolent campaigns significantly more likely to succeed.

The difference in success rates has narrowed over the last three decades, however, just as the overall success rate for nonviolent campaigns has dropped. Both these trends—the smaller difference made by dilemma actions, and nonviolent campaigns succeeding more rarely overall—seem to have started as the Cold War was ending. For much of the twentieth century, including the years from 1920 to 1950, we see a success rate for dilemma-action–inclusive campaigns that substantially outstrips the success rate of campaigns lacking a dilemma action. In the three decades or so since the Cold War ended, however, the difference shrinks. Specifically, it goes from 25 points between 1905 and 1988 to 9 points since that latter year: From 1989 through 2019, nonviolent campaigns with at least one dilemma action succeeded in 61 percent of cases, while campaigns without succeeded 52 percent of the time.

What can explain the shrinking success gap? Could it be that dilemma [End Page 117] actions have a bigger impact when used against full-fledged autocracies of the sort that were more common before the Cold War’s end? Such regimes are by definition farthest from rule by consent of the governed, and as such start out with wider legitimacy gaps for dilemma actions to exploit. To examine this possibility, in Figure 2 we plot the estimated marginal effect of dilemma actions by the level of democracy of the targeted government.

Figure 2. Dilemma Actions Boost Nonviolent-Campaign Success in Autocracies

Source: Democracy data (x-axis) from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project.

The plotted line indicates that the marginal effect of dilemma actions is highest in more autocratic countries. When campaigns target the most autocratic governments (those with democracy scores between zero and 0.2), the dilemma-action effect is well above average. In the most democratic governments in the set (those with democracy scores above 0.6), by contrast, the dilemma-action effect is about half what it is in autocracies. In short, when nonviolent campaigns target more-autocratic governments, dilemma actions are nearly twice as likely to boost campaign success compared to the situation where dilemma actions are used in more-democratic settings.

How Dilemma Actions Help Nonviolent Campaigns
Our team gathered a range of descriptive data on each dilemma action case to code fifteen distinct metrics, some of which were descriptive and some evaluative. Our evaluative findings indicate four specific elements of dilemma actions that shape nonviolent-campaign success: facilitating [End Page 118] group formation, delegitimizing opponents, reducing fear, and generating sympathetic media coverage.

Group formation
Popovic has argued that a successful movement will tap into what he calls the “cool factor.” His experience is borne out by research regarding what dilemma actions can do to shape public perceptions of the movement as well as the morale of those directly involved. Such actions, for example, present activists as nonthreatening.17 Research on humor and activism further suggests that the use of humor lowers the resistance of the audience to the activist’s message and can induce audience members to think about an issue that they might have been avoiding.18 Even more important, the use of play in activism can help to break down social barriers, creating new alliances among disparate members of society.19

Dilemma actions not only affect public perceptions but the activists themselves. Dilemma actions done with humor and irony give participants as a group positive feelings. To a greater degree than other nonviolent strategies, dilemma actions can help groups to form and stay active. The short-term adverse reactions that dilemma actions tend to rouse from opponents are easily interpreted as tactical successes, which can make activists feel empowered.

Almost all the time (that is, in 92 percent of cases) dilemma actions during nonviolent campaigns are followed by increases in the numbers of campaign participants. Movement mobilization continues after the dilemma action 82 percent of the time, and in 93 percent of cases the event boosts public sympathy for the nonviolent campaign.

Legitimacy
Dilemma actions must not only pose a true dilemma (failed attempts are often traceable to a lapse on this score), but must also touch the chord of a widely held belief. Getting the opponent to respond to the dilemma action in a norm-transgressing way is key. The response is “lose-lose” because the dilemma action dictates that the only alternative to violating a widely shared norm is nonaction, which is a loss because it looks weak.

The dilemma then creates a situation whereby the target is likely to lose legitimacy in the eyes of the public. How onlookers assess the probable value of activism against the target may change as well.20 For example, if the opponent’s first choice is to avoid responding publicly to a dilemma, citizens may sense weakness and resistance grows as a result. If the number of people involved in the dilemma action swells, activists’ legitimacy will rise while their target’s falls. In practice, this means that one of the best ways to mount a dilemma action is to aim at an opponent’s absurd, excessive, irrational, or repressive rules. If protesting is outlawed, then activists can hold up blank signs. Arresting people with blank signs will cost the opponent legitimacy as the public loses respect [End Page 119] for the opponent’s rules. A well-executed dilemma action can reframe the narrative of the regime from legitimate to illegitimate, from just to unjust, from representative to autocratic, and so on.

Regime nonresponse is rare. We find that 90 percent of the time, a dilemma action meets with an aggressive or violent response, or at least one that arguably looks like an overreaction. In July 2011, for example, people marched en masse in Malawi to protest their government. They flew the country’s original postindependence flag—the government had recently changed the design and banned display of the old one. They wore red clothing and called themselves the “Red Army for Democracy and Peace.” Riot police launched violent crackdowns in several cities, but this did not quell the protests, which went on for several more days and sparked again in August and September. The authorities’ harsh reaction, just as in our earlier example of the Polish government’s overreaction to walking TVs in wheelbarrows, aided the activists and undercut the legitimacy of the regime.

Fear
A third causal mechanism linking dilemma actions to campaign success involves the psychology of fear. Egyptian satirist Bassem Youssef writes that fear has always been the “best weapon” of repressive regimes, but “when you laugh, you aren’t afraid anymore.”21 He is the Cairo heart surgeon who became famous for his satire in early 2011, not long after the Arab Spring had toppled the Hosni Mubarak dictatorship, through videos shot in his laundry room and posted to YouTube. Youssef accumulated millions of views on the internet and then made waves with a television show styled similarly to Jon Stewart’s Daily Show. Youssef’s program, Al Bernameg, eventually reached thirty-million Egyptians (almost a third of the populace) and offered groundbreaking comedy featuring unprecedented open mockery of the Egyptian government. Authoritarian regimes use fear to discourage expression, stifle resistance, and foster social division. Fear may create feelings of isolation and apathy by inducing pessimistic perceptions of risks and by boosting risk aversion—two mechanisms that reduce participation in protest.22 Yet as Youssef learned firsthand, laughter can work against fear. When the government of President Mohamed Morsi arrested him in March 2013 for allegedly insulting Islam and the Egyptian state, for example, Youssef showed up at his hearing in a massively oversized version of the hat that Morsi had worn earlier that month while receiving an honorary degree in Pakistan. Rather than let himself be intimidated by the arrest, Youssef used the opportunity to laugh at Morsi’s inability to handle criticism.

Youssef left Egypt in 2014 after further repression from the military regime that had ousted Morsi in a July 2013 coup, but the effects of Al Bernameg continued as other comics such as Shady Abu Zeid launched their own political-satire shows. Zeid also took his satire to the streets [End Page 120] with a dilemma action in 2016, offering inflated condoms as balloons to police in Cairo on the fifth anniversary of Mubarak’s fall. Videos of the protest show the activists and members of the public laughing in the face of police authorities.23 Since laughter is a positive emotion that enhances group formation and collective action, it can be a powerful activist tool.

Dilemma actions may reduce the fear of both activists and their observers. The use of laughter to counter fear may well attract more members to the movement and ease the problem of activist burnout. Perhaps even more importantly, dilemma actions that induce the opponent to react absurdly or illogically may reduce fear among nonparticipants such that they may be likelier to join future protests against the opponent or to replicate the dilemma actions in a different time or place with a different audience.

Autocrats, as Popovic and Youssef underline, do not like jokes. Dictators tend to have thin skins, and to overreact if ridiculed. Their overblown reactions to humor lay bare their outsized egos and fragile identities. In Belarus in 2011, activists were able to agitate the regime of President Alyaksandr Lukashenka by simply clapping in public. When his police arrested some of them, the public saw a heavily armed authoritarian government with every means of coercion at its disposal revealing its fear of peaceful protest.24 We find qualitative evidence suggesting that most dilemma actions (87 percent) help to reduce fear or apathy among campaign participants. By reducing fear and boosting public sympathy, dilemma actions nearly always (88 percent of cases) help to reframe the opponent as less scary or more repressive.

Media
Finally, a well-designed dilemma action will receive media coverage. The key question is whether it is favorable. Research has shown that, in general, protests get bad press and protesters are painted as deviants.25 Coverage will vary based on the outlets doing the reporting and the level of press freedom in the country. Regarding actions in highly repressive countries, international and domestic coverage will predictably diverge.

In the ideal case, media coverage of the dilemma action will introduce the group doing it (assuming it is new or otherwise unfamiliar to the public) and document the norm-violating behavior of the opponent.26 A media report might convey summary information about the group such as its size, composition, and ties to allied or sympathetic groups. Widening public awareness may in turn lead more citizens to change how they assess the legitimacy of the group and its goals.

Media coverage is key to agenda setting, framing, and priming.27 Agenda setting has to do with issue saliency (whether or not the public is thinking about an issue), framing has to do with how the public thinks about an issue, and priming has to do with what leaps first to mind when the topic is raised. For a dilemma action, media coverage is crucial: [End Page 121] Without sufficient coverage of the right sort, there will be no reframing the narrative or priming the public mind to influence what people think of the activism and the reasons behind it. The playful nature of dilemma actions, their use of irony, and their appeal to widely held beliefs are meant to attract sympathetic coverage that can reshape how the public sees the opponent. Our finding in this regard is encouraging: The goals of dilemma actions drew favorable coverage 84 percent of the time.

What Does Success Look Like?
Chenoweth has noted that even when campaigns of nonviolent civil resistance fail, they still lead to long-term reforms more often than violent campaigns do. In fact, nonviolent campaigns were about ten times more likely to precede a democratic transition by five years or less than were violent campaigns.28 Our research suggests that nonviolent campaigns deploying dilemma actions may be even more effective at these long-term outcomes.

In 2012, protesters in Sudan organized “elbow-licking Friday” in an ironic reference to then-president Omar al-Bashir’s habit of calling those who wanted him to leave office “elbow-lickers”—people with a foolish appetite for attempting the impossible. As masses of “elbow-licking” protesters hit the streets, they were met with rubber bullets, tear gas, beatings, and arrests. This aggressive repression went hand-in-hand with internet and media clampdowns plus the president’s bizarre efforts to claim that there had never been any real revolt in the first place. His government’s legitimacy drained away. He hung onto power, but it seems fair to say that the “elbow-lickers” contributed to the growth of a prodemocracy movement in Sudan. Bashir was finally toppled by a 2019 military coup, and despite another putsch in 2021 there are plans to hold elections and write a new constitution in 2023. There were no immediate concessions in this case, but again it seems fair to say that the cause of better and freer government did gain ground in the public mind, and that exposing a repressive president’s absurd ego aided the cause.

Thus, even within the set of campaigns that the NAVCO set designates as failures, those that used dilemma actions still had high success across critical metrics such as reframing the narrative, increasing activists’ appeal, and reducing fear among activists themselves. Each of these positive outcomes has the potential to help unravel repressive power in the future. Once an autocrat’s image has been tarnished by an effective dilemma, it can be hard to recover.

These effects can be seen in various instances that we have tracked of dilemma actions targeting Vladimir Putin’s regime in Russia, revealing the potential positive effects of dilemma actions even if they have not so far led to regime change. Over the last decade, a range of Russian [End Page 122] activists have deployed dilemma actions to challenge the legitimacy of Russian autocracy. In one hilarious 2012 example, activists in Barnaul, Russia, bypassed a ban on public dissent by setting up a display of toys holding tiny protest signs. Seeming to take inspiration from the arrest of the Milošević barrel in Serbia, the authorities ruled the toy array an “unsanctioned event,” then denied an application for a new display by declaring that toys could not be citizens of Russia.29 The situation drew international media coverage and made the Kremlin look ridiculous. In 2021, the police made an arrest in a snowman protest.30

Since the invasion of Ukraine, creative activists in Russia have used dilemma actions to protest the brutal crackdown on any mention of “war.” They have staged silent actions with copies of Leo Tolstoy’s War and Peace, and have drawn up self-censored posters that bear asterisks where the phrase “no to war” should appear. They have even added antiwar signs to merchandise price tags.31

In late 2022, similarly, protesters in the People’s Republic of China held up blank signs and violated bans on public gatherings in response to the government’s repressive “zero-covid” laws, efforts that led to modest concessions as the government decided to loosen restrictions. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, protesters have also used dilemma actions in antigovernment protests. Women have danced, removed their head coverings, and cut their hair publicly in efforts to mock the authority of the morality police. Their actions have received widespread public support. Each of these acts allows protesters to playfully expose the ironies of repressive power and to reframe aggressive policies as exercises in absurdity.

Will these creative tactics force the regimes in Russia, China, and Iran to end their aggressive policies? Probably not. But can such approaches harm these regimes’ authority and popularity?32 Our research shows that there is a decent chance for both to suffer damage. [End Page 123]